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This report examines how migration, combined with sound labour 
markets, can better support development prospects. It is based 
on the specific cases of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal 
and Tunisia and addresses the following issues:
? To what extent has the global crisis which started in 2008 
affected migrant workers and their families? 
? How to make migrants' remittances and return migration better 
factors for development? 
? What can be done to reduce the risk of “brain drain” arising from 
emigration of skilled migrants with little benefits for developing 
countries?  
? By putting decent work at the core of the development aid 
agenda, can better synergies between migration, employment 
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Foreword
The global financial and economic crisis which started in 2008 has brought
with it significant employment and social challenges. In the case of devel-
oping countries, the crisis has severely affected the extent to which migra-
tion can support development goals. Indeed, migrant workers tend to be
disproportionately affected by job losses in destination countries and the
flow of remittances has suffered a major cut.
In many ways these developments have highlighted the need to better un-
derstand how migration, combined with sound labour markets, can better
support development prospects. With that in mind, the central aim of this
report is to examine the links between labour markets and migration, and
the implications for development in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal
and Tunisia, including lessons learned and examples from other countries
and regions.
The issues of migration, labour markets and development are intercon-
nected and complex, entailing both complementarities and trade-offs. The
countries examined in this study highlight this complexity, being simulta-
neously countries of origin, destination and transit for migrant workers and
their families. However, the priorities and challenges of each of the five
countries vary considerably and are a function of each country's unique
circumstances.
The synthesis report presented here is just one element of a broader re-
search project coordinated by the International Institute for Labour Studies
(IILS) that was supported by the Regular Budget Supplementary Allocation
contribution from the Government of Spain for the 2008-09 Biennium.
Complementary activities undertaken by the IILS to support the synthesis
report include:
(i) the establishment of a Francophone research network to develop
country-specific background papers and organize seminars in each country
to discuss the findings;
(ii) enabling the existing African Anglophone research network (includ-
ing researchers from Institute for Development Studies, University of Nai-
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robi, University of Ghana and University of Dar es Salaam) to undertake
research projects in a number of thematic areas, including the impact of the
global economic and financial crisis, as well as issues of inward, outward
and intra-regional migration; and
(iii) building partnerships and engaging with the broader academic
community to conduct a comprehensive review of international experi-
ences and practices (Programme for the Study of Global Migration, Gradu-
ate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva).
The activities of the IILS are part of a broader programme financed by the
Government of Spain on “Improving institutional capacity to govern labour
migration in North and West Africa” implemented by the ILO Regional Of-
fice for Africa and undertaken in collaboration with the ILO International
Migration Programme.
The IILS component of the project was conceived and developed by Ray-
mond Torres, Director of the IILS. The project was co-ordinated and man-
aged by Steven Tobin, under the supervision of the Director of the Institute.
The synthesis report has been prepared by Steven Tobin and Emily McGirr
of the Institute, and Alfonso Alba-Ramirez of the Universidad Carlos III of
Madrid.
The authors would like to thank Kristina Francillon, Byung-jin Ha, Eliza-
beth Manapsal, Caroline McInerney and Elva Mourelo-Lopez for their ex-
cellent research assistance. In addition, the project benefited enormously
from the support and assistance of Sophie Lievre, Judy Rafferty, Vanna
Rougier and Françoise Weeks of the Institute. The synthesis report was
greatly enhanced by feedback received from the ILO International
Migration Programme.
Special thanks are due to the ILO Regional Office in Africa, whose staff has
been extremely supportive of the project since the outset. The Institute
would also like to thank PROGRAM and PARDEV for their continuous sup-
port throughout this process. The cooperation received from the various
tripartite organizations, academic communities and NGOs in each country
who shared their insights, perspectives and concerns during country-level
workshops has been invaluable.
Geneva, April 2010
Charles Dan
Regional Director for Africa
ILO
Raymond Torres
Director
International Institute for Labour Studies
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Executive summary
The employment situation in North and West Africa was difficult before the
global crisis and has aggravated since then...
In the five countries under review (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco,
Senegal and Tunisia), economic growth over the decade leading up to the
global crisis that started in 2008 averaged more than 3.5 per cent per an-
num. This had not, however, translated into significant improvements in la-
bour market performance.
The modest improvement in the employment situation reflects, in
part, the low employment intensity of commodity production - the main
driver of growth in many of these countries. For example, the oil sector rep-
resents over one-third of GDP in Algeria and as much as three-quarters of
GDP in Mauritania. But, in both cases, the sector directly employs less than
5 per cent of the workforce. Moreover, the labour markets of the five coun-
tries are principally characterized by informal jobs, agricultural employ-
ment and limited social protection.
The global crisis has intensified these labour market challenges.
Growth slowed significantly in 2008 and 2009, thereby adversely affecting
labour demand and the creation of good jobs. Today, less than half of the
people of working age have a job and, in the case of working-age women,
less than one-quarter are employed.
...thereby adding pressure to emigrate in search of better jobs.
Taken together, the five countries under review had over 2.7 million
emigrants residing in developed countries in 2007 - an increase of nearly 1
million since 1998. Despite strong population growth in these countries,
the total number of emigrants as a share of domestic population for Mauri-
tania, Morocco and Senegal increased by over 1 percentage point during
this period. Only in the cases of Algeria and Tunisia did this share decline
marginally.
And, while migrant workers were disproportionately affected by the
global crisis, limited evidence to date suggests that there has not been a sig-
nificant reversal of migration trends.
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Although there are multiple “push” and “pull” motivations to migrate
(e.g. cultural, family reunification, social conflict, etc.), economic reasons,
notably the search for better jobs and decent incomes, remain central to the
decision. This report presents novel evidence in this respect, namely:
 more than two-thirds of the male migrants from Algeria, Morocco and
the rest of Africa chose to migrate to Spain to either look for a job or
improve their existing working conditions;
 female migrant workers from Morocco residing in France earn 16 times
more than the average earnings of women in Morocco (for men, the
figure is close to 6 times);
 Algerian and Tunisian migrant workers earn between 3.4 and 8 times the
average earnings in their country of origin; and,
 in Spain, migrant workers from Morocco earn between 4.5 and 10.5
times the average earnings of men and women, respectively, in
Morocco.
Labour migration can support development...
Migration can be a positive factor in the development of countries of
origin, notably through two main channels: remittances and return migration.
Remittances are an important source of financial flows to the region,
having tripled since 1990 to reach over US$12 billion in 2008. For Morocco and
Senegal, this amounts to 8 per cent or more of GDP. These financial flows can
assist development directly by sustaining incomes in the countries of origin,
and indirectly to the extent that remittances help to support education, infra-
structure and investment in the private sector.
As a result of the global crisis, remittances to the region only grew by
just over 4 per cent in 2008, compared to over 23 per cent in 2007, and they fell
by an estimated 10 per cent in 2009. This decline is more pronounced than in
other developing regions, where the estimated decline in remittances is
around 6 per cent.
Similarly, the return of migrants can contribute to development through
the promotion, mobilization and utilization of productive resources. Many re-
turn having gained valuable experience and knowledge through the migration
process. Some returnees invest savings accumulated abroad and engage in en-
trepreneurial activities, with significant multiplier effects.
...but the contribution of labour migration is hindered by a number of
factors.
In practice, however, evidence with respect to the link between re-
mittances and return migration on the one hand and development on the
other is weak.
The report finds that between two-thirds and three-quarters of re-
mittances to North and West Africa are destined for either the spouse/part-
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ner or parent, with the bulk of remittances used to support household
subsistence. This financial inflow directly supports the living standards of
migrants' families and their communities. But the broader multiplier effects
on employment and the economy are limited in the countries under re-
view.
In addition, the cost of sending remittances is overly high. In West
Africa, it is estimated that over two-thirds of formal remittance transfers are
handled by one source, thus keeping transfer fees relatively high. For ex-
ample, the fees associated with sending remittances from France to either
Algeria or Morocco represent more than 16 per cent of the transfer amount.
And this does not take into account any costs incurred by the recipient in
the country of origin.
In addition, for North and West Africa, the emigration of skilled mi-
grants comes at a great cost to the development of the region. First, the exo-
dus of skilled migrants who are unable to find decent work in their
countries of origin, while a rational individual choice, deprives the region
of a precious human resource with acute secondary effects, notably
forgone tax revenues and reductions in innovation and potential growth.
Second, the promise of higher remittances from greater emigration of
high-skilled personnel is often exaggerated. This report finds that, other
things being equal, educated migrants are less likely to remit than their
low-skilled counterparts. So the loss of growth potential that occurs when
educated migrants leave the region is not offset by higher remittances.
The desire of migrant workers to return to North and West Africa is
also relatively low, even in the face of deteriorating conditions in the coun-
tries of destination. For instance, surveys indicate that 81 per cent of mi-
grants from the five countries under review who work in crisis-hit Spain
have no intention of returning.
While higher education is linked to the desire to return, one of the
primary reasons for returning to North and West Africa is to retire rather
than to work or invest. Much like remittances, the likelihood of returning
seems to decline the longer the migrant stays in the country of destination
and once family members are reunited.
A new strategy is required, encompassing a better leverage of remittances
for development...
In short, the potential for migration to contribute to development in
the five countries under review can be further enhanced. First, there are a
number of ways to reduce transfer costs and improve the use of formal
channels for remittances by fostering greater competition and through the
promotion of more efficient technology and partnerships. One of the most
prominent examples of the use of technology is that of the Philippines,
where two telecom companies, Smart Communications and Globe
Telecom, provide remittance transactions by mobile phone. Apart from
ease of use, the fee per transaction is approximately 1 per cent of the trans-
fer amount.
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Second, permanent residency status in the destination country (and
in some cases temporary residency) is associated with a higher probability
of remitting and, this being the case, consideration should be given to how
a more orderly or regulated migration process could benefit countries of
both origin and destination.
Third, the use of “matching funds” schemes is one way to better pool
resources for infrastructure-related investment activities, such as the con-
struction of schools. The Mexican Iniciativa Ciudadana 3x1 is one such
example, under which every dollar remitted by Mexican Hometown Asso-
ciations is matched with three dollars, one each from the federal, state and
municipal governments. The premise is that migrant remittances are
matched with government funding (including development assistance)
from countries of destination and origin to undertake such activities.
The emphasis on infrastructure projects appeals to migrant workers
because such projects are tangible and are directly linked to the community
of origin. They are also relatively employment intensive. Engagement of
migrant worker networks has also proven successful in this respect.
There are similar examples in Africa, but the emphasis on support-
ing the creation, development and sustainability of migrant network associ-
ations needs to be further strengthened. Moreover, engaging and
encouraging the cooperation of all parties (migrants, communities, govern-
ments in countries of both origin and destination) will improve the rele-
vance and development impact of the project undertaken. Partnerships of
this nature are also important in enhancing the accountability of all parties
engaged, instilling confidence in the formal remittance channel and, in
turn, leveraging the overall multiplier effects by strengthening the linkages
between remittance-sending households, receiving households, communi-
ties and national authorities in countries of origin.
…measures to facilitate return migration while serving employment goals...
Return migrants also demonstrate a high propensity for entrepre-
neurship, at close to one-fifth. The likelihood of being self-employed sig-
nificantly improves if, before returning, the return migrant held tertiary
education and was self-employed in the country of destination. Similarly,
the empirical findings reveal that having acquired educational qualifica-
tions in the country of destination and having them recognized upon return
are key factors underpinning the degree to which return migrants become
entrepreneurs. Among returnees, those who had set up a business were
more likely to have remitted money in the past. This calls for promoting cir-
cular migration.
Therefore, this report lends support, first, to policies and
programmes that provide support throughout the migration “cycle” – for ex-
ample by promoting and supporting entrepreneurship of migrant workers
(e.g. through remittance matching, business coaching, etc.) and facilitating
re-entry (e.g. through qualification recognition) – and, by so doing, har-
nessing the beneficial impact of return migration on development.
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Along these lines, in 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank
launched the Voluntary Return Migration Model Based on Entrepreneur-
ship Development to encourage migrants in Spain to start businesses in
their home countries. Support is provided from the initial design phase
through to start-up and business coaching following the launch. Similarly,
in the Philippines, the Unlad Kabayan Migrant Service Foundation links
community development with migration and entrepreneurship. One key
component of the programme is the "Migrant Savings for Alternative Invest-
ment", which was created to channel migrant savings into microfinance in-
stitutions, enabling both returnees and local entrepreneurs to tap into these
resources.
Second, a structured programme of circular migration could help
maximize spill-overs. This requires closer links between education institu-
tions and business communities, both in the countries of origin and abroad.
For example, the Malaria Research and Training Centre established a
scheme to attract African scientists working on malaria research. Part of the
programme sends promising young graduates in Mali to leading foreign
universities that cooperate with the centre. Students return to Mali during
their studies to undertake research, with the aim of integrating these stu-
dents with international and local academics, and to provide a stimulating
environment to facilitate retention. In China, policies were introduced in
2002 granting preferential treatment to returning students with regard to
housing and work permits. Job centres and associations were also created
to reintegrate returnees.
...improved functioning of domestic labour markets...
Remittances and return migration must complement – not substitute
– a longer term development strategy. Sustainable development can be
grounded in efforts to improve social conditions, including the promotion
of employment and decent work. Such efforts can be mutually reinforcing
and help to create an environment that promotes return migration and in-
vestment in North and West Africa.
One necessary component of improving domestic labour markets is
strengthening institutions responsible for training and employment ser-
vices. Initially, however, formal employment needs to be encouraged and
social protection schemes brought up to a well-functioning level – includ-
ing through the use of conditional cash benefits. The latter can be achieved
against the backdrop of limited fiscal space. This can help to give momen-
tum to the improvements in social and development indicators which have
already occurred in the region, such as increased life expectancy (a gain of
3 or more years over the past decade in all countries), a reduction in the un-
der-5 mortality rate and an improvement in the literacy rate by 3 to 5 per-
centage points in all countries. Finally, solid infrastructure investment,
combined with adequate and non-distorting taxation, could also support
the synergies between migration, the labour market and development.
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Other efforts can focus on retaining workers who are already en-
gaged in productive employment, i.e. encouraging "would-be migrants" to
stay, or at least extend the time they remain, in the countries of origin. Les-
sons from similar practices in Africa have shown that non-financial incen-
tives (e.g. career development) are an important consideration when fiscal
budgets are limited. Also, there may be scope for countries of origin to co-
ordinate efforts with destination countries to promote temporary stay and
return programmes for workers of all skill categories, not just low-skilled
workers in demand, which has proven to be of limited success. If a longer
term approach is taken, such circular migration could serve the needs of
both sets of countries.
…and recognizing that the challenge is particularly urgent given the
growing cohort of youth in North and West Africa and the need for rural
development.
The populations of North and West Africa are comparatively young,
with one-quarter or more of the population under the age of 15. Although
this share is expected to stabilize in the coming years, the past strong popu-
lation increase means that substantial growth in the prime working-age
population lies ahead for all five countries under review.
Developing employment opportunities that reward human capital
investments, particularly for youth, continues to be a critical issue. The
large youth cohort in North and West Africa has experienced an increase in
education levels, while employment opportunities remain scarce. Over the
past decade, evidence suggests a growth in tertiary education enrolment in
the order of 10 and 14 percentage points for Algeria and Tunisia, respec-
tively. But meanwhile, in most of the five countries, the youth unemploy-
ment rate is close to 30 per cent, rising to more than half in Mauritania (50.8
per cent and 69 per cent for young men and young women, respectively).
Opportunities to retain would-be emigrants must, in part, focus on
employment-intensive investments in agriculture and other rural non-farm
activities, but also on promoting education and decent work for youth.
Since many young people in African countries are already working in small
family businesses or are self-employed in the agriculture sector – and evi-
dence suggests that a significant proportion of young people in West Africa
would actually prefer to be self-employed rather than salaried – developing
this entrepreneurial potential is an important opportunity for growth. While
the problem of unemployment in the region is largely one of lack of de-
mand, youth could still benefit from labour market guidance that informs
young jobseekers of their opportunities.
In terms of improving educational outcomes, flexible schooling
measures can help to reduce drop-out rates and increase opportunities for
youth to upgrade skills. This approach has been shown to be particularly
useful in rural areas, where students may work at home part-time and
therefore require a modified school schedule.
x
Better targeted development aid can provide greater support for the
strategy...
Development aid could support these aims. In addition to helping
reinforce domestic labour markets, targeted development aid can support
efforts to leverage remittances, for example through developing partner-
ships via "matching funds", as discussed above, or by encouraging migrants
to invest in countries of origin via entrepreneurial activities. Recognizing
the centrality of decent work and the role of labour markets in the concep-
tualization of these projects will be one of the keys to sustaining success.
... consistent with the ILO's Decent Work Country Programmes and Global
Jobs Pact.
The ILO's Global Jobs Pact – adopted by the 98th Session of the In-
ternational Labour Conference on 19 June 2009 as a response to the eco-
nomic and financial crisis – is particularly salient for moving in the right
direction in the near term. The Global Jobs Pact is a wide-ranging crisis re-
sponse framework guided by the Decent Work Agenda. It is designed for
national and international policies aiming at economic recovery, job cre-
ation and social protection measures for workers and their families. The
framework ensures linkages between social progress and economic devel-
opment and calls for priority to be given to protecting and growing em-
ployment through sustainable enterprises, providing quality public services
and building adequate social protection for all as part of ongoing interna-
tional and national action to aid recovery and development.
As countries grapple with the various impacts of the financial and
economic crisis, international organizations must continue to advance the
migration and development agenda, working collaboratively at the global
level to better integrate employment-related aspects. In this regard, the ILO
has a prominent role to play, given the importance of achieving decent
work and making it an effective component of national development strate-
gies. The Decent Work Country Programmes are unique opportunities to
integrate migration-development-employment, in practical terms, into the
Decent Work Agenda, where it could be a key strategic component for hu-
man and economic development.
xi
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Introduction
Many individuals migrate in the hope of attaining better living and working
conditions for themselves and their families – a fact which highlights the
important role of the labour market for the individual in the migration ex-
perience. But the labour market also plays an important role in the manner
in which migrant workers contribute to economic development in the
country of destination and how migration influences development in the
country of origin.
Countries of destination stand to benefit from migration because an inflow
of workers can help address skill shortages and a declining labour supply;
contribute to a potential resurgence of many traditional sectors, such as the
agricultural and service sectors; and an influx of workers can help finance
pension schemes and other social security measures. At the same time,
these benefits must be weighed against any perceived impacts or conse-
quences that migrant workers have on the labour market of destination
countries.
Countries of origin can also benefit through remittance flows and the trans-
fer of investments, technology and skills (the latter through permanent or
temporary return migration). These factors are said to enhance develop-
ment outcomes (improved growth, reduced poverty, etc.) of countries
characterized by outward migration. In addition, outward migration is said
to reduce competition and labour supply pressures in countries of origin,
improving the relative position of workers in these countries. However,
outward migration or emigration of labour (skilled or otherwise) could also
represent a loss of human capital for countries of origin, hampering the
development process over the medium to long term.
A key challenge with respect to migration is the extent to which the coun-
tries of study share the conditions of being simultaneously countries of ori-
gin, transit and destination. While each type of approach to the migration
process has important implications and interactions with respect to the la-
bour market and development in the region, the focus of this report will be
on emigration. In particular, the aim will be to explore the channels in
which out migration can influence development in the countries of origin
in terms of: (i) impact on local labour market and development; (ii) capital
1
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returns via remittances (financial resources); and, (iii) return migration
(human capital: temporary, circular or permanent).
The report examines these issues in North and West Africa (focusing on Al-
geria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia).1 While the five countries
of study incorporate migration issues within their development strategies to
varying degrees, there is still a need for better understanding and more em-
phasis on the role of employment and labour markets.2 In the ILO’s view,
the world of work is of central importance for the migration–development
nexus. In 2005, the ILO’s Governing Body adopted the Multilateral Frame-
work on Labour Migration, in which Guideline 15.1 advocates “integrating
and mainstreaming labour migration in national employment, labour
market and development policy.”
Chapter 1 establishes the context for economic, social and labour market
indicators in the countries of origin, including the importance of migration
and reasons for migrating. Chapter 2 examines key emigration trends and
analyses the labour market performance of migrant workers from North
and West Africa and related human capital and development issues in these
countries of origin.
Chapter 3 examines the subject of remittances transferred to the five coun-
tries of study, including the labour market (and other) factors that deter-
mine the probability to remit and issues regarding the impact of such
remittances on development. Chapter 4 considers the subject of return mi-
gration, i.e. migrant workers who return to their country of origin after
spending time living and working elsewhere (either temporarily or perma-
nently). It examines reasons behind the decision to return and the factors
that determine their labour market success upon return. Chapter 5 con-
cludes with some of the main lessons and policy implications of the re-
search and discusses possible areas for future work in the field of labour
markets, migration and development. This final chapter also draws on ex-
periences from other regions and countries to illustrate the types of
practices, programmes and policies that have been implemented
elsewhere.
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Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
1 In the context of this report, North and West Africa will refer to the countries of Algeria,
Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. Similarly, unless stated otherwise, North Africa will
refer to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and West Africa to Mauritania and Senegal.
2 See country background papers prepared as part of this study: http://www.ilo.org/
inst-migration
Chapter 1:
Economic, social and labour market
performance in countries of origin
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the context for the report’s dis-
cussion of migration, development and the role of labour markets. The first
section briefly examines the current context for migration, especially with
regard to the region of North and West Africa.1 Section B gives an overview
of key social and economic indicators and, where possible, discusses the
impacts of the global financial and economic crisis which started in 2008.
Section C analyses the current labour market conditions in the five countries.
A. Current context for migration
The links between migration and development have been recognized at
the international level for some time now, with a number of initiatives gain-
ing momentum over the past decade (Box 1.1).
Migration occurs at different scales and varies considerably in type and in-
tensity across countries. There are rural-to-urban (and vice versa) flows of
people within countries, movements between cities, regional shifts and in-
ternational migration. Most countries in the world are, simultaneously, a
place of origin and of destination, albeit to varying degrees. Others play a
significant role as temporary stopover points for individuals and their fami-
lies who are in transit to other destinations.
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1 In the context of this report, North and West Africa will refer to the countries of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco,
Senegal and Tunisia. Similarly, unless stated otherwise, North Africa will refer to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia
and West Africa to Mauritania and Senegal.
Box 1.1 Migration-development nexus on the global agenda
 2003: Global Commission on International Migration was established by the UN Secretary-
General, with a mandate to provide a framework for the formulation of a coherent,
comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration.
 2004: ILO Resolution concerning a fair deal for migrant workers in a global economy
states “promotion of policies that maximize the contribution of migration to development
is another essential component of a comprehensive policy to address the global context
of migration”. 2
 2005: Global Commission issued its final report, recognizing the role that migrants play
in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin.
 2006: An International Symposium on International Migration and Development was
held in Turin in June, bringing together civil society, government representatives and
other experts to debate policy questions about how to enhance the contribution of
international migration to development. This debate was continued at the UN High Level
Dialogue on Migration and Development, held in New York in September, highlighting
the issue at the global level.
 2006: Ministerial Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development was held in
Rabat in November and in Tripoli in June, with the aim of bringing concrete, sustainable
and pertinent solutions to the challenge posed by migratory flow management.
 2006: The Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the African Union was held in Banjul in June, discussing Regional
Integration and Rationalization of Regional Economic Communities.
 2007: Emerging from the High Level Dialogue, the first Global Forum on Migration and
Development was held in Brussels, marking the start of a new global process designed
to enhance the positive impact of migration on development (and vice versa). Topics of
discussion included leveraging remittances, fostering co-development, promoting the
entrepreneurial spirit of migrants and helping countries of origin to tap the skills of their
migrants abroad.
 2008: Second Global Forum held in Manila.
 2009: Third Global Forum held in Greece. Roundtable discussions held on the issues of:
(i) utilizing the nexus of migration–development in order to accomplish the Millennium
Development Goals; (ii) integration, reintegration and mobility of migrants for the benefit
of development; and (iii) political and institutional cohesion and partnerships.
 2009: The Human Development Report 2009 was dedicated to human mobility and
development. The report investigates, among other things, migration in the context of
demographic changes and trends in both growth and inequality.
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2 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/ilcmig_res-eng.pdf.
The movement of people into, out of and through a particular country or
region also takes place according to different time scales: there are, for ex-
ample, short-term, longer term and permanent migrations. Moreover, the
motivation to migrate or stay outside the country of origin can change over
time. For example, an individual intending to stay only a few years in an-
other country may end up settling permanently, and vice versa. In light of
these considerations, the migratory configurations of most regions are un-
derstandably complex and dynamic – North and West Africa being no ex-
ception. Immigration, emigration and transit migration all take place
concurrently and they all have impacts on labour markets and develop-
ment, with resultant interrelations, complementarities and trade-offs. As a
result, the five countries in this study defy a neat classification as strictly
countries of origin, countries of transit or countries of destination.3
In recent decades, however, the North and West African region has been
viewed as a region of origin for migration to Europe and, in particular, to
France, Italy and Spain. For example, the Algeria–France migration corridor
has been active for decades, and is among the largest in the world by vol-
ume.4 Moreover, migration from North and West Africa to Europe has in-
creased in recent years partly due to rapid changes in technology and
communication. Other factors that have contributed to this increased vol-
ume of migration include temporary migration, family reunification and the
growing perception of employment opportunities available in European
countries.
Increased migration from North and West Africa to Europe is also reflected
in higher volumes of remittances received in recent years. In the past de-
cade, remittances to the five countries of study have approximately tripled
in US$ terms and doubled as a share of GDP. Encouraging those migrants
who have left to return is increasingly on the agenda of policy-makers as a
means to harness development in countries of origin. At the same time,
however, the region has increasingly become a transit zone for migrants
from e.g. sub-Saharan Africa seeking access to employment in Europe.5
The issues of emigration, remittances and return migration – their role in
development and role of labour markets – are discussed in more detail in
the chapters that follow. Throughout this report, the term “migrant” refers
to an individual who migrates or who has migrated from one country to an-
other while “migrant worker” refers to “a person who migrates or who has
migrated from one country to another with a view to being employed other
than on his own account and includes any person regularly admitted as a
migrant worker”.6 A number of other migration terms that will be used in
the report are defined in Box 1.2.
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3 A. Adepoju: Perspectives on international migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa, paper
presented at the experts’ meeting International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy
Initiatives in the Countries of Origin, Radboud University, Nijmegen, 23-24 Aug. 2006.
4 World Bank: Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008, Washington DC, 2008.
5 Adepoju (2006) op. cit.
6 ILO: Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975, C143, Article 11-1.
Box 1.2 Select migration terms
 Country of origin: country in which the migrant normally maintains residency.
 Country of destination: final country (other than the one in which residency is normally
maintained) to which the migrant intends to settle (temporarily or permanently).
 Internal migration: movement of people within a country, e.g. from urban to rural area
or vice-versa.
 Irregular migration: movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the
sending, transit and receiving countries.
 Migrant: a person that moves from one country to another (and unless otherwise stated
also includes migrant workers).
 Migrant worker: a person who migrates or who has migrated from one country to
another with a view to being employed other than on his own account and includes any
person regularly admitted as a migrant worker.
 Emigration or outward migration: the act of departing or exiting from one country
(country of origin) with the intention of settling in another (country of destination).
 Transit migration: the process of migrating to one country with the purpose of
migrating then to the country of destination.
 Return migration: process in which migrants move back to their country of origin
(voluntarily or involuntarily).
1. Employment as a principal reason for migrating
Countries of destination often classify migrants on the basis of their reasons
for migrating (i.e. family reunification, refugees and asylum seekers and
economic migrants) but these categories can become blurred. It is impor-
tant to recognize that many of those who initially emigrate for other reasons
may eventually end up seeking employment in their destination countries.
There are multiple motivations, and often mixed reasons for individuals’
decisions to migrate (Box 1.3). Conflict is sometimes cited as a strong moti-
vating factor to migrate, particularly in Africa. However, it is estimated that
conflict is associated with only about 13 per cent of international move-
ment on the African continent.7 Economic reasons, such as searching for
employment or better working conditions, play a significant role in the de-
cision to migrate, especially among men from North and West Africa (Fig-
ure 1.1). Among male migrants in Spain, more than two-thirds from Algeria,
Morocco and rest of Africa indicate employment as the reason for migrat-
ing. While family reasons predominate among female migrants, still over
one-quarter and one-third of female migrants from Morocco and the rest of
Africa, respectively, migrate to either find employment or improve one’s
employment situation.
6
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7 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, New York, 2009.
Box 1.3 Determinants of migration: Push and pull factors
Push factors
There are a number of factors that “push” migrants to leave their countries of origin,
including ethnic and social conflict, unstable political conditions and environmental
degradation. Environmental factors include drought and desertification, which could lead
to famine or may make some lands uninhabitable. Social/political reasons include human
rights abuses, conflict and political instability. Economic circumstances including a lack of
viable work opportunities, high levels of unemployment, inadequate social protection and
poverty are also major push factors.
Pull factors
Pull factors include family reunification, a desire for higher living standards and the pursuit
of better employment opportunities and working conditions. Potential migrants may feel
the “pull” to move after hearing reports from families and friends about the employment
opportunities, wages and living conditions abroad.
This is not to say that all emigration from North and West Africa can be explained by
economic and labour market factors – indeed, migration flows out of Africa do not follow
one simple pattern but are rather diverse.8 For example, in the case of Algeria,
longstanding colonial ties since the 1960s have played a significant role in emigration to
France. Additionally, during the 1990s, irregular migration out of Algeria was, to a large
extent, provoked by intense political conflicts. In Mauritania, a range of economic, social,
political and security factors underlie the trend of emigration. In Morocco and Tunisia,
family reunification has been a key determinant of emigration following male-dominated
migration to France during the 1960s. In Senegal, the contraction of formal and informal
employment opportunities over the past decade has been a contributing factor.9
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Figure 1.1 Share of individuals migrating to Spain for employment reasons,
by gender, 2007 (percentages)
Note: Employment reasons refer to either finding employment or improving one’s employment situation.
Source: IILS estimates based upon Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI), 2007.
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8 T. Zuberi and A. Sibanda: “How Do Migrants Fare in a Post-Apartheid South African Labor Market?”, in
International Migration Review, Vol. 38, Issue 4, 2004, pp. 1462-1491.
9 Background papers containing additional information on the migration process for each country under review
is available at http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
2. ILO: A rights-based approach
The ILO has defined a general framework on labour migration using a
rights-based approach. All workers, including migrant workers, have hu-
man and labour rights, as defined in international Conventions adopted by
the tripartite members of the ILO. They are entitled to these rights as work-
ers.10 Labour migration is a cross-cutting issue, with all major sectors of the
ILO – standards, employment, social protection and social dialogue – en-
gaged in work on labour migration within the overarching framework of
Decent Work.
There are three international Conventions addressing specifically the rights
of migrant workers. Two are ILO Conventions: the Migration for Employ-
ment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)11 and the Migrant Workers (Sup-
plementary Provisions) Convention (No. 143)12, each of which have
accompanying Recommendations:13
 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97). This
convention applies to migrant workers in regular status covering issues
on their departure, journey, reception, medical services, transfer of
earnings and savings. The Convention requires ratifying States to, among
other things, establish and maintain a free assistance and information
service for migrant workers. States have an obligation to apply treatment
no less favourable than that which applies to their own nationals in
respect of a number of matters, including conditions of employment,
freedom of association and social security.
 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975
(No. 143). This Convention focuses on migrant workers under abusive
conditions. It provides measures to combat clandestine migration and
the migration of workers in irregular status by taking action against their
organizers and employers, while at the same time, setting forth the
general obligation to respect the basic human rights of all migrant
workers. It also extends the scope of equality between legally resident
migrant workers and national workers beyond the provisions of the
1949 Convention. It ensures equality of opportunity and treatment in
respect to employment and occupation, social security, trade union and
cultural rights, and individual and collective freedoms for individuals
who, as migrant workers or as members of their families, are lawfully
within a ratifying State’s territory. The Convention calls upon ratifying
States to facilitate the reunification of families of migrant workers legally
residing within their territory.
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10 ILO et al.: Rights, Labour Migration and Development: The ILO Approach, Geneva, 2007.
11 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C097.
12 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C143.
13 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R086 and
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R151.
The third international Convention specifically pertaining to migrant work-
ers is the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (UN Migrant Workers
Convention or ICRMW).14 Among the five countries, only Algeria has rati-
fied Convention No. 97, but all countries with the exception of Tunisia have
ratified the UN Convention (Table 1.1).15
These Conventions and their accompanying Recommendations provide a
framework for the basic components of a comprehensive labour migration
policy, the protection of migrant workers, the development of their poten-
tial, and measures to facilitate as well as to regulate migration movements.16
In addition to these Conventions, all ILO labour standards generally apply
to migrant workers unless otherwise stated.17 ILO standards on migration
provide tools for both origin and destination countries to manage migration
flows and to ensure adequate protection for this vulnerable category of
workers.
Table 1.1 Migration-specific Conventions ratified by the selected countries
C97
Migration for
Employment
Convention
(Revised)
1949
C143
Migrant Workers
(Supplementary
Provisions)
Convention 1975
UN Convention on
the Protection of
the Rights of All
Migrant Workers
and Members of
Their Families
1990
Algeria  (19 October 1962)   (21 April 2005)
Mauritania    (22 January 2007)
Morocco    (21 June 1993)
Senegal    (9 June 1999)
Tunisia   
Note:  = ratification or accession;  = not a party to the agreement.
Source: ILO, Database of International Labour Standards and UN, treaty collection
(http://treaties.un.org).
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14 Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm.
15 ILO: Rules of the Game, A Brief Introduction to International Labour Standards, Geneva, 2009a.
16 ILO (2007) op. cit.
17 ILO: Protecting the Rights of Migrant Workers: A Shared Responsibility, International Migration Programme,
2009b.
In addition, the 2006 ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration pro-
vides rights-based practical guidance to governments and to employers’
and workers’ organizations with regard to developing, strengthening and
implementing national and international labour migration policies with a
view to maximizing the benefits of labour migration for both origin and
destination countries and for migrant workers themselves.18 It provides
guidance in the prevention of and protection against abusive migration
practices. It additionally addresses the important themes of decent work,
means for international cooperation on labour migration, the migration
process, social integration and inclusion, and migration and development.
B. Economic and development indicators
1. Overview of demographic situation
The countries of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia to-
gether had a collective population of 93 million in 2009, ranging from over
30 million in both Algeria and Morocco to 3.2 million in Mauritania (Table
1.2). The countries of North and West Africa also have relatively fast-grow-
ing populations. During the 1960s and 1970s, the pace of population
growth was relatively robust across the region. The fertility rate in Morocco
during this period was above 6 per cent, and the population of Algeria
more than tripled since 1962, with fertility rates above 7 per cent. Since the
1980s, population growth has slowed but it remains comparably high: all
countries have population growth rates above 1 per cent, in some cases 2
per cent, compared to 0.3 per cent in European countries (EU-15).
At the same time, the population density in North and West Africa is quite
low, especially in Algeria and Mauritania, where much of the land is desert.
The percentage of the population that is urban is also comparatively low:
this is especially the case in West Africa, where approximately 60 per cent
of the population live in rural areas (compared to 35 per cent in North Afri-
can countries and roughly 23 per cent in EU-15 countries).
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18 ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based
approach to labour migration, ILO, 2006, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/
multilat_fwk_en.pdf (accessed 12 February 2010).
Table 1.2 Population indicators for selected countries, 2009
Population
(000s of
inhabitants)
Population
growth rate
(2008-2009)
Population
density
(inhabitants
per sq km)
% urban
(urban
population
as % of
total
population)
2007
Age structure Age
dependency
(%
population
under 15
and over 60
years)
0-14 15-59 60+
Algeria 34 895.5 1.5 14.7 64.6 27.3 68.1 4.6 31.9
Mauritania 3 290.6 2.7 3.2 40.8 39.5 57.9 2.7 42.1
Morocco 31 992.6 1.2 71.6 55.7 28.4 66.3 5.4 33.7
Senegal 12 534.2 2.6 63.7 42.0 43.6 54.0 2.4 46.0
Tunisia 10 271.5 1.0 62.8 66.1 23.2 70.0 6.7 30.0
EU-15 390 949.9 0.6 117.9 76.4 15.8 66.2 18.0 33.8
France 62 342.7 0.6 96.9 77.1 18.4 64.9 16.7 35.1
Italy 59 870.1 1.6 198.7 67.9 14.2 65.6 20.2 34.4
Spain 44 903.7 0.7 88.9 77.0 14.8 68.1 17.0 31.9
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Demographic and Social Statistics and country
background papers produced for the purpose of this study.
The populations of North and West Africa are thus comparatively young. As
Table 1.2 illustrates, 25 per cent or more of the population are under the
age of 15 – in many cases, this is more than double the share currently pres-
ent in France, Italy or Spain. Although this share is expected to stabilize in
the coming years, the strong population growth of the past few decades
means that there will be substantial growth in the prime working-age popu-
lation (25–64) within a relatively short time in all five countries (Figure 1.2).
For example, in North Africa, by 2015 more than half of the population will
be of prime working age. Similarly, in West Africa, the share of the prime
working-age population is expected to rise to 40 per cent in Mauritania and
36 per cent in Senegal.
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Figure 1.2 Population aged 25–64 as a per cent of total population in selected
countries, 2005 and 2015 (percentages)
Source: ILO, Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections (EAPEP), fifth edition.
2. Economic performance and implications of the financial crisis19,20
In terms of the composition of economic activity in the region, more than
40 per cent of GDP in Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia is derived from ex-
ports – having risen significantly since 2000 (Figure 1.3, panel A). The per-
centage of GDP represented by exports is significantly higher than in
European countries, where exports as a percentage of GDP are around 20
per cent. In Senegal and Morocco, however, one-fifth or less of GDP comes
from exports. The bulk of exports from the region are destined for EU
countries (Figure 1.3, panel B). This is especially the case with respect to
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. North Africa, in particular, has developed
extensive trade relations with the EU, through the European–Mediterra-
nean Partnership initiated in 1995 as part of the Barcelona Process.21
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19 The following sub-section is based principally on R. Atieno and M.V. Mitullah (2009) prepared in conjunction
with this report. For more information see http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
20 See also I. Awad: The global economic crisis and migrant workers: Impact and response, ILO, Geneva, 2009.
21 R. Miller and A. Mishrif: “The Barcelona Process and Euro-Arab Economic Relations: 1995-2005”, in Middle East
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005.
Figure 1.3 Exports as a share of GDP according to destination and source country,
2000 and 2008 (percentages)
Source: World Trade Organization Statistics and World Bank Key Development Data and Statistics.
With respect to economic performance, in the period before the global cri-
sis which started in 2008, economic growth was relatively robust across the
region, averaging nearly 4 per cent per annum or more since 1997, sup-
ported in most cases by rising oil and commodity prices (Table 1.3). Ini-
tially, at least in 2008, growth in developing economies, in particular Africa,
had been fairly resilient due to the comparatively low level of financial inte-
gration.22 Over the course of 2008 and 2009, however, the impact of the cri-
sis which originated in the developed world spread to developing countries
in terms capital reversals, rising borrowing costs and collapsing world trade
and commodity prices. In fact, average annual real GDP growth in all five
countries slowed considerably in 2008 and 2009 with falling commodity
prices and declining exports the main transmission mechanisms:
 Algeria: in the short run, some of the initial external shock was
absorbed by reserves and budget surpluses accumulated during periods
of oil price increases. Nevertheless, exports – primarily hydrocarbon
products which account for almost half of GDP – have been negatively
impacted. With commodity prices rebounding, economic growth is
expected to stabilize in 2010;
 Mauritania: the economic outlook appears to be intrinsically linked to
the volatility of trade growth. For example, in 2006, exports grew over
115 per cent, which led to GDP growth of over 10 per cent. With the
13
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22 L. Kasekende et al.: Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on Africa, African Development Bank
Group Working Paper No. 96, 2009.
onset of the crisis, falling commodity prices and declining exports have
accompanied declining growth prospects;23
 Morocco: growth has been characterized by a period of instability, with
growth strongly linked to the volatile performance of the agricultural
industry, which represents over 12 per cent of GDP and some 40 per
cent of regular employment. Nonetheless, growth has averaged close to
4 per cent over the decade 1997-2007. Growth slowed in 2008 and 2009
due to a decline in exports, which accounted for nearly one-fifth of GDP
in 2008. As European consumers restrict discretionary spending, the
tourism industry in Morocco is also likely to be negatively affected;
 Senegal: the global economic crisis began to affect the Senegalese
economy in late 2008/early 2009, following the oil and food price shock
in 2008, with remittances, export prices and Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) appearing to be the main transmission channels.24 For example,
the external current account deficit amounted to 12.3 per cent of GDP,
representing a deterioration of 0.5 per cent of GDP relative to 2007,
primarily as a result of the increase in oil and food prices for the year as a
whole. Following this, macroeconomic performance continued to
decline over 2008 and 2009, reflecting the unfavourable international
environment as well as a number of domestic factors;25
 Tunisia: experienced the highest average growth rate over the period
between 1997 and 2007 at an average of 5 per cent per annum. And
despite having a relatively diverse economy, Tunisia has experienced a
sharp contraction in industrial production and exports, as well as
declines in government revenues and foreign reserves. Many sectors of
the economy have been affected, from manufacturing to tourism –
growth projections for 2009 were revised downwards by 1.5 per cent
between November 2008 and February 2009. In addition, the textiles,
auto parts and tourism sectors are experiencing a pronounced slump in
growth.26
For the region as a whole, over the course of 2010, while in most cases
growth rates are likely to remain lower compared to the past decade, im-
provements over 2009 are expected and are forecast to remain higher than
in the EU.
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23 See also O.B. Fah: Mauritanie: Migration, marché du travail et développement, background paper undertaken
for the purposes of this study. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
24 IMF: Senegal: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum
of Understanding, 2009.
25 ibid.
26 Tunisia: Europe's northern most African neighbour riding out the financial crisis, Deutsche Bank Research,
2009, http://www.dbresearch.com (accessed 5 February 2010).
Table 1.3 Average annual real GDP growth, 1997–2010 (percentages)
1997-2007 2008 2009 2010
Algeria 3.7 3.0 2.1 3.7
Mauritania 3.6 2.2 2.3 4.7
Morocco 3.9 5.4 4.4 3.2
Senegal 4.5 2.5 3.1 3.4
Tunisia 5.0 4.5 3.3 4.0
EU-15 2.6 0.3 -4.2 0.5
France 2.4 0.7 -3.0 0.9
Italy 1.5 -1.0 -4.4 0.2
Spain 3.8 1.2 -3.0 -0.7
Note: 2010 figures are forecast estimates.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database.
Despite the robust performance, levels of North and West African GDP per
capita remain substantially lower than in the EU, with considerable varia-
tion between countries. First, as Figure 1.4 illustrates, Algeria, Tunisia and
Morocco have relatively high levels (between approximately 2,700 and
5,000 US$ per capita) of GDP per capita compared to Mauritania and Sene-
gal (approximately 1,000 US$). Second, across the region, GDP in North
and West Africa remains a small fraction – nearly one-tenth or less – of the
GDP per capita in major countries within the EU.
Figure 1.4 GDP per capita, 2008 (US$)
Source: National sources based on country background papers and United Nations Statistics
Division.
15
Chapter 1: Economic, social and labour market performance in countries of origin
Ch
ap
te
r1
50 065
44 675
38 640
36 061
4 959 3 876 2 740 1 088 1 017
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
50 000
60 000
EU-15 France Italy Spain Algeria Tunisia Morocco Senegal Mauritania
3. Progress in social indicators
Generally, the relatively good economic performance of the past decade
has been accompanied by improvements in a number of social indicators
(Table 1.4):
 life expectancy at birth has risen by three or more years in all countries;
 the under-5 mortality rate has dropped in all countries – especially in
Morocco, where it has been reduced by half;
 the literacy rate has risen in all countries by 3 to 5 percentage points;
 poverty reductions are present in all countries;
 the prevalence of under-nourishment has remained relatively low, with
the exception of Senegal, where it remains high, despite some
improvements in recent years.
Table 1.4 Social indicators for selected countries
Life
expectancy
at birth
(years)
Under-5
mortality rate
(per 1,000)
Prevalence
of under-
nourishment
(%
population)
Human
poverty index
Literacy rate
(% of people
ages 15 and
above)
Human
Development
Index rank
(among 182
countries)
1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 1998 2009 2000 2007 2009
Algeria 69 72 53 37 5 5 24.8 17.5 70 75 104
Mauritania 60 64 126 119 8 8 49.7 36.2 51 56 154
Morocco 67 71 69 34 5 5 38.4 31.1 42 56 130
Senegal 59 63 148 114 32 26 47.9 41.6 39 42 166
Tunisia 71 74 40 21 5 5 21.9 15.6 – 78 98
Euro-area 77 80 7 4 5 5 – – – – –
France 78 81 6 4 5 5 11.1 11.0 – – 8
Italy 78 81 7 4 5 5 11.9 29.8 98 99 18
Spain 78 81 7 4 5 5 11.6 12.4 – 98 15
Note: Data for Morocco on literacy refer to 1995 instead of 2000. Human poverty index for selected
high-income countries, including France, Italy and Spain, is calculated differently and therefore
direct cross-country comparisons should be avoided.
Source: World Bank Statistics, Millennium Development Goals and United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2009.
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Although some social conditions have improved over time, important chal-
lenges remain. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), while
all the countries’ index scores have increased over the years, some more
quickly than others, the study countries continue to have relatively low po-
sitions in terms of their HDI rank.27 For example, Tunisia, Algeria and Mo-
rocco are ranked 98th, 104th and 130th respectively, while Mauritania and
Senegal are situated in the bottom sixth of 182 countries worldwide, at 154th
and 166th respectively. And, in terms of educational indicators, only Algeria
and Tunisia have literacy rates over 60 per cent.
There are also important within-region disparities. The gap between the
three North African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and the two
West African countries (Mauritania and Senegal) is particularly evident in
terms of the under-5 mortality rate, which is three to four times higher in
Mauritania and Senegal. Compared to Europe, the gap in social indicators is
even wider: the difference in life expectancy is as much as 19 years be-
tween Spain and Senegal, and the infant mortality rate in North and West
Africa is over 10 times the rate in the Euro-area. The prevalence of under-
nourishment in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is the same as in Europe, at 5
per cent; in Senegal, however, 26 per cent of the population are affected.
Improvements in primary school enrolment in recent years have meant
that the differences between North Africa and Europe are no longer
substantial: in Europe, primary school enrolment is close to 100 per
cent, compared to 97 per cent in Algeria and Tunisia and 88 per cent in
Morocco (Table 1.5). Rates in Mauritania and Senegal are 77 per cent
and 70 per cent respectively.
However, the gap between North and West Africa and Europe grows mark-
edly with higher levels of education. In Europe, more than 90 per cent of
the population in the secondary-age group are enrolled, but the percentage
drops to around 65 per cent in Algeria and Tunisia, 35 per cent in Morocco
and less than 20 per cent in the West African countries. The share enrolled
in tertiary education in North Africa is also relatively low – despite consider-
able increases in recent years. For Senegal and Mauritania, the problem is
especially acute with regard to university enrolment, with only 7 per cent
and 4 per cent, respectively, undertaking tertiary level studies.
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27 The HDI is a summary composite index that measures a country’s average achievements in three basic areas of
human development: health, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Health is measured by life
expectancy at birth, knowledge is measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined
primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$).
Table 1.5 Net enrolment ratio, 2003–2007 (percentage of population)
Primary school Secondary school Tertiary school
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Algeria 96.6 97.7 95.4 66.3 64.6 68.2 24.0 20.0 28.0
Mauritania 76.7 74.7 78.8 15.6 16.4 14.6 4.0 5.0 2.0
Morocco 87.5 90.1 84.7 34.5 37.4 31.6 11.0 12.0 11.0
Senegal 69.6 71.0 68.3 17.5 19.9 15.0 7.0 9.0 5.0
Tunisia 97.0 96.6 97.5 64.5 61.4 67.6 31.0 25.0 37.0
France 98.6 98.3 98.8 99.0 98.0 100.0 56.0 49.0 62.0
Italy 98.6 99.0 98.2 92.5 91.8 93.2 68.0 57.0 80.0
Spain 99.6 99.8 99.4 93.9 92.3 95.4 69.0 62.0 76.0
Note: Data refer to the most recent year available during the period 2003–2007. Net enrolment ratio is
the number of pupils in the theoretical age group for a given level of education enrolled in that
level, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group.
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre.
C. Labour market conditions and social protection
The role of the labour market in the context of migration is critically impor-
tant, not least because – as illustrated above – employment opportunities
and the labour market conditions of both source and destination countries
can act as critical motivators in the migration decision. The purpose of this
section is to develop an understanding of the labour market situation in
North and West Africa. However, a number of relevant data limitations with
respect to labour market information in the region must be borne in mind.
In particular, labour market data in Mauritania and Senegal date back only
to 2006, in some cases 2004 and 2005. Neither of these two countries con-
duct labour force or household surveys on a regular basis. Surveys in Alge-
ria, Morocco and Tunisia are more regular and more recent information is
available in a number of key areas.
It is equally important to note that information on migrant workers within
the surveys of the five countries is either not available or, as is more often
the case, not collected. More comprehensive information on the labour
market conditions in each country can be obtained from the background
papers prepared in the course of this project.28
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28 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
1. Labour force participation rates
Participation rates range widely, both among and within countries (Figure
1.5). With the exception of Tunisia, male employment rates in the region
(80 per cent or more) are generally higher in comparison to EU-15. On the
other hand, female participation rates are comparably low, with approxi-
mately two-thirds or more of women in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco not
participating in the labour market (compared to approximately half in the
EU-15). As a result, the gender gap in participation is particularly high, even
in Mauritania and Senegal where the female participation rates are above
50 per cent. In fact, in all five countries, female participation rates are at
least 20 per cent lower than rates for males, in some cases more (Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia).
Figure 1.5 Labour force participation rates, for persons aged 15 and over, by
gender, 2008 (percentages)
Source: ILO, Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections (EAPEP), fifth edition.
2. Employment considerations
While participation rate estimates are relatively high compared to Europe,
at least among men, employment in Africa, including North and West Af-
rica, is predominantly informal in nature. But by its very definition, data on
informal employment are scarce and difficult to compare between countries
– a problem exacerbated by the fact that different approaches to measuring
informality are adopted.29 In North Africa, OECD estimates of the share of
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29 Data on informal employment in African countries are quite scarce and household labour force surveys are
carried out at irregular intervals (M. Bacchetta et al.: Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries, a
joint study of the International Institute for Labour Studies of the International Labour Office and the Secretariat
of the World Trade Organization, Geneva, 2009).
informal employment (in total non-agricultural employment) indicate that
one-third or more of the workforce is engaged in informal work (Table
1.6).30 The situation is particularly acute in Morocco, where the share of in-
formal employment, at two-thirds, has risen over 20 percentage points in
the past decade.
In Mauritania and Senegal, the availability of data on informal employment
is particularly limited (although a special survey on informal employment
in Mauritania is planned for 2010). Data from the 1990s indicate that over 80
per cent of job creation in Mauritania was informal in nature.31 In Senegal,
only 10 per cent of the active population is comprised of salaried workers,
with the rest being either informal or agricultural workers.32
Table 1.6 Share of informal employment in total non-agricultural employment
by gender and share of self-employed and paid employees in total informal
employment (percentages)
1990s 2000s
Total Women Men % self-
employed
% paid
employees
Total
Algeria 42.7 40.6 43.1 66.6 33.4 41.3
Mauritania 80.0 – – 72.8 27.2 –
Morocco 44.8 46.8 44.0 81.3 18.7 67.1
Senegal – – – – – –
Tunisia 47.1 39.2 53.2 51.6 48.4 35.0
Note: Definition employed by OECD is different from that traditionally used in the context of ILO. For
more information on informality in the ILO and issues related to trade see Bacchetta et al.
(2009) Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries.
Source: OECD (2009) Is informal normal? Towards more and better jobs in developing countries.
The increasing trend in informal employment has several attendant chal-
lenges. First, informal workers earn, on average, less than regular workers
and working conditions are often unregulated. Second, informal workers
have limited access to social security benefits – a concern not limited to in-
formal workers in North and West Africa (see below). In the context of mi-
gration-related issues, it is likely that a considerable share of informal
employees are migrant workers, either from other countries or simply rural
workers who have moved to urban areas in search of employment.
20
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
30 Definition of informal employment adopted by OECD is different to that traditionally used in the context of
ILO. For more information on informality in the ILO and issues related to trade see Bacchetta et al. (2009)
Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries.
31 Fah (2009) op. cit.
32 P. D. Fall: Sénégal: Migration, marché du travail et développement, 2009, background paper undertaken for
the purposes of this study. Available at http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
Given the level of informal employment, an examination of employment
rates (i.e. employment to population ratios) gives a different perspective of
the labour market situation in North and West Africa (Table 1.7). In most
cases, the overall employment rate is less than 50 per cent, with female em-
ployment rates lower than 25 per cent and in some cases as low as 13.6 per
cent (Algeria).33
Table 1.7 Employment rates for persons aged 15 and over, by gender, most
recent year available (percentages)
Year Total Men Women
Algeria 2007 40.9 67.8 13.6
Mauritania 2004 40.0 61.6 20.7
Morocco 2008 51.0 76.1 27.1
Senegal 2006 38.7 – –
Tunisia 2008 39.7 58.7 20.7
EU-15 2008 68.5 75.9 61.1
Note: Data for Mauritania refers to the age group 15-64.
Source: IILS estimates based on national statistics from country background papers
(http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration).
In terms of employment structure, the primary sector remains an important
element in North and West Africa, especially in Senegal, Morocco and Mau-
ritania (Figure 1.6). Indeed, while much of the GDP growth in these econo-
mies comes from energy resources, it has not translated into comparable
employment opportunities. For example, in Algeria the oil sector made up
36.5 per cent of GDP in 2004, but it only employed 3 per cent of the
workforce.34 In Mauritania, less than 5 per cent of employment is related to
the petroleum industry, which generates nearly 73 per cent of GDP. Con-
versely, in Morocco, while the agricultural sector accounts for approxi-
mately 12 per cent of GDP, it represents more than 40 per cent of
employment.
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33 North Africa, together with the Middle East, has the lowest employment to population ratio among all regions
(World Bank: Shaping the Future: A Long-Term Perspective of People and Job Mobility for the Middle East and
North Africa, Washington, 2009).
34 G. Genchev: Immigration to the European Union Challenges and opportunities for a Europe of 25+, dissertation
submitted to the Department of International Relations, university of Malta, 2005.
Figure 1.6 Employment in the primary sector, most recent year available
(percentage of total employment)
Note: Data for Algeria refer to 2007, for Mauritania 2004 and for Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia
2008.
Source: IILS estimates based on national statistics from country background papers
(http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration).
3. Unemployment rates
Unemployment rates have declined considerably in recent years, especially
in North Africa. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, the unemployment rate
has fallen by nearly 10 percentage points in the past decade. In Morocco,
the unemployment rate has fallen from 19 per cent in 1998 to under 10 per
cent in 2007 (Table 1.8).35 Similarly, in Algeria, unemployment fell from
over 26 per cent in 1997 to just below 14 per cent in 2007.36 Tunisia’s unem-
ployment rate, at 14.1 per cent in 2007, has remained more or less un-
changed in the past couple of years. Formal labour force surveys are
undertaken less frequently in Mauritania and Senegal. However, the most
recent estimates indicate the unemployment rate is 10 per cent in Senegal
(2006) and 32.5 per cent in Mauritania (2004).
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35 Even in the light of the current economic crisis, the unemployment rate is not expected to rise much beyond 11
per cent (M. Khachani: Maroc: Migration, marché du travail et développement 2009, background paper
undertaken for the purposes of this study. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
36 3 million jobs were created between 1997 and 2007 with growth accelerating in recent years: 2 million since
2003 alone (M.S. Musette: Algérie: Migration, marché du travail et développement, 2009, background paper
undertaken for the purposes of this study. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration).
Table 1.8 Unemployment rates in selected countries, most recent year
available (percentages)
Year Total Urban Rural Youth
unemployment rate
Algeria 2007 13.8 14.2 13.1 27.4
Mauritania 2004 32.5 35.4 30.2 50.8 (Men)
69.0 (Women)
Morocco 2007 9.6 15.4 3.7 31.5
Senegal 2004 10.0 15.9 (Dakar)
11.1 (other cities)
6.3 –
Tunisia 2007 14.1 – – 34.1 (15-19 years)
30.2 (20-24 years)
Source: IILS estimates based on national statistics and country background papers
(http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration).
Two areas of particular concern are urban and youth unemployment. Ur-
ban unemployment continues to be a challenge as workers migrate from
rural areas to cities in search of employment. In all countries, the urban un-
employment rate exceeds the rural unemployment rate, with the problem
being particularly acute in Morocco, where the urban unemployment rate is
11.7 percentage points higher than that in rural areas. In addition, a grow-
ing number of youth are looking – albeit unsuccessfully – for work. In most
countries, the youth unemployment rate is close to 30 per cent, rising to
more than half in Mauritania (50.8 per cent and 69.0 per cent for young
men and young women, respectively). In Morocco, 80 per cent of urban
unemployment is concentrated in the 15-35-year age range.
Lack of decent work opportunities at an early age may permanently com-
promise the future employment prospects of youth, hamper development
and have important implications for the motivation to migrate. Additionally,
against the backdrop of a growing working-age population, there are fears
that the absence of employment opportunities for new labour market en-
trants could dampen the desire to undertake educational activities, creating
a vicious circle.37
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37 For example, in Morocco it is estimated that 300,000 new persons each year will be looking for work.
However, the economy generated, on average, only 217,000 jobs over the period 1995–2003. It is estimated
that, over the next few years, an average annual GDP growth rate of over 5 per cent would be necessary to
absorb the new jobseekers and keep the unemployment rate at its current level (Khachani (2009) op. cit.).
4. Social protection
Social security provides individuals and households with access to health
care and income security, particularly in cases of old age, unemployment,
sickness, invalidity, work injury, maternity or loss of a breadwinner. How-
ever, access to social security is often limited in developing countries, in-
cluding those in North and West Africa.38 For example, while social security
expenditures in Europe represent approximately 25 per cent of GDP, in Af-
rica they are around 4.3 per cent.39
Nevertheless, most of the North and West African countries in question
have provisions for many of these benefit systems, except for unemploy-
ment benefits (only present in Algeria and Tunisia for salaried workers). In-
deed, a growing number of these governments have included social
security protection in their national strategies for growth, poverty reduction
and sustainable development.40 However, there is an important distinction
to be made between provision and coverage. Even where provisions exist
(including for unemployment benefits), actual receipt of benefits is often
limited – for example, only 4 per cent of unemployed workers in Algeria
were receiving unemployment benefits in 2007 (Table 1.9).41 The low level
of coverage is due in part to the rules governing these programmes but is
also influenced by the relative size of the informal sector (see Table 1.6).
Table 1.9 Percentage of persons covered by social security in North and West
Africa, 2007
Old age pensions Formal social
health coverage
Unemployment
benefits
Algeria 40.0 – 4.0
Mauritania 7.5 0.3 –
Morocco 11.2 – –
Senegal 11.2 – –
Tunisia 57.3 – –
Source: ILO (2009c) for pensions and health coverage data and ILO (2009d) for unemployment
benefit coverage and refers to unemployed receiving unemployment benefits as a
percentage of total unemployment.
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38 ILO: World of Work Report 2009: The Global Jobs Crisis and Beyond, Geneva, IILS, 2009e.
39 ILO: The Financial and Economic Crisis: A Decent Work Response, Geneva, 2009f.
40 ISSA: Dynamic Social Security for Africa: An Agenda for Development, Geneva, 2008.
41 ILO (2009e) op. cit.
D. Concluding considerations
This chapter illustrates that the past decade in North and West Africa has
been characterized by relatively robust economic performance, with mod-
erate growth expected for 2010. There has also been considerable progress
in a number of social indicators. However, the employment situation in the
region remains rather precarious, many social challenges remain and the
gap between North and West Africa and Europe in terms of economic, so-
cial and labour market conditions has not changed substantially.
For many countries in North and West Africa, much of the economic
growth has occurred in sectors where the intensity of employment is seem-
ingly low. In most cases the employment rate of persons aged 15 and over
is less than 50 per cent, with female employment rates as low as 13 per cent
in some cases. And youth of working age – who represent a significant
share of the population in the region – are confronted with rather bleak
employment prospects, with approximately one-third searching and
unable to find work.
While a diverse set of reasons may lie behind an individual’s motivation to
migrate, the search for employment and the prospect of improving one’s
employment situation is an important factor. Over two-thirds of individuals
who migrate to Spain from Morocco and Algeria do so for these reasons.
With this in mind, Chapter 2 examines the characteristics of emigrants and
reviews key migration trends, including an analysis of the labour market
performance of migrant workers in countries of destination and related
human capital issues.
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Chapter 2:
Emigration, human capital and
labour markets
Introduction
As the 2009 Human Development Report notes, the impact of migration on
development depends critically “on who moves, how they fare abroad and
whether they stay connected to their roots through flows of money, knowl-
edge and ideas”.1 The purpose of this chapter is to present key trends in
terms of emigration, human capital, and the linkages to labour market per-
formance in countries of destination, with a view to examining implications
for development in the countries of study.2
Emigration brings forth a number of challenges and opportunities in coun-
tries of origin.3 Some authors have argued that emigration, especially of
low-skilled individuals, can have benefits for those who remain behind, no-
tably in terms of lower unemployment and higher wages.4 Labour shortages
(and ensuing wage improvements) of this nature are most likely to occur in
specific sectors or local areas. Generally, however, the classic argument is
that when skilled individuals migrate, they deprive their country of a pre-
cious resource – the so called “brain drain”. In addition to skills loss, if their
education was financed with public funds, the countries of origin are effec-
tively providing subsidies to the receiving countries, in addition to the fore-
gone tax revenues and other secondary effects such as potential reductions
in future innovation.5 On the other hand, Mountford (1997) argues that the
possibility of migration provides an incentive to individuals to educate
themselves and promotes investment in human capital in the country of or-
29
1 UNDP: Human Development Report, New York, 2009.
2 Information on migration to and within the region, as well some trends on transit migration is contained within
the country background papers, available at http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration.
3 As has been mentioned earlier, for the person migrating, welfare can be greatly enhanced if, e.g., they are able
to improve their relative employment status or earnings.
4 D. Lucas: “International Migration and the Rainbow Nation”, in Population, Space and Place, Vol. 12, No. 1,
2005, pp. 45-63.
5 J. Bhagwati and J.D. Wilson: Income Taxation and International Mobility (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989).
igin.6 Therefore, a “moderate” level of brain drain could be beneficial since
there is a “growth externality” due to an increase in educated workers in the
economy.7
Section A presents emigration trends thematically in order to shed light on
the composition of emigrant stocks and flows, including a discussion of
how patterns have evolved over time. Section B then assesses the labour
market performance of migrant workers in countries of destination; this in-
cludes aspects of employment and earnings, which are crucial for under-
standing the extent to which remittances and skills might flow back and, in
turn, contribute to development in countries of origin (the focus of
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively).
A. Emigration: levels and trends
As Chapter 1 highlighted, data on migration and labour markets are often
disparate. There are inevitably discrepancies, in some cases significant,
among the various sources due to different methodologies, definitions and
units of analysis. This is often the case even between different national
sources (e.g. large differences often exist between data on emigrants com-
piled by foreign affairs offices and border control agencies), and different
pictures can emerge depending on whether the definition of country of ori-
gin is based on country of birth or on nationality. Measurement issues are
complicated by the fact that migrant workers in irregular situations tend not
to be well represented in most formal surveys.8 Cross-country
comparability, therefore, should be undertaken with caution.
In light of these constraints, the data and information on migration com-
piled for the purposes of this chapter comes from several different sources,
including national statistics from both countries of origin and countries of
destination (using country of birth and nationality depending upon avail-
ability), along with data collected by international organizations. Each data
source has different strengths and limitations. While efforts have been
made to use the most recent data available, in some cases older sources
have been consulted to provide a more detailed breakdown of characteris-
tics (e.g. by age, gender or education). Alone, no single source gives a com-
plete picture of the migration situation but, when cross-referenced and
compared, they can present a more comprehensive outlook
With this in mind, the following section presents some key trends regarding
the volume and composition of emigration stocks and flows from the five
North and West African countries.9
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6 A. Mountford: “Can a brain drain be good for growth in the source economy?”, in Journal of Development
Economics, 53, 1997, pp. 287–303.
7 This premise, however, relies on one important assumption: namely, that a proportion of the newly qualified
workers will stay in their country of origin and find productive employment.
8 Some migrant workers may enter a destination country with regular status but, subsequently overstay their
visas, at which point they are considered to be in irregular situations. Conversely, some migrant workers who
enter destination countries in irregular situations may eventually gain regular status.
9 “Stock” refers to the total number of migrants in a country of destination that have accumulated over time,
whereas “flow” refers to the number of persons who migrate in any given period (e.g. over the course of a
year).
1. Top destinations and emigration levels
Emigration from the countries of North and West Africa flows to a number
of destination regions, including other parts of Africa, Europe and North
America. For the countries under review, however, Europe is a common
destination – in particular, the countries of France, Italy and Spain (Table
2.1). For example, Algeria-France is a migration corridor which has been
active for decades, and it is among the top migration corridors in the
world.10 In recent years, Spain has become an increasingly popular country
of destination for migrant workers, including those from North and West
Africa.11 For Senegal and Mauritania, migration between the two countries
is common and other African destinations also figure prominently.12 Table
2.1 indicates the top five destination countries for emigrants from each of
the North and West African countries of origin.
Table 2.1 Top five destination countries for emigrants from North and West
Africa
Algeria Mauritania Morocco Senegal Tunisia
1. France
2. Spain
3. Israel
4. Italy
5. Germany
1. Senegal
2. Nigeria
3. France
4. Spain
5. Gambia
1. France
2. Spain
3. Italy
4. Israel
5. Netherlands
1. Gambia
2. France
3. Italy
4. Mauritania
5. Spain
1. France
2. Libya
3. Germany
4. Israel
5. Saudi Arabia
Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008.
The stock of emigrants from the five countries residing in OECD countries
was estimated to be over 2.7 million in 2007 (Figure 2.1). For all North and
West African countries under review, the number of migrants in OECD
countries has increased over the past decade (i.e. between 1998 and 2007).
In Morocco, for example, the stock of emigrants increased by over 500
thousand from just over 1 million in 1998; in Senegal the increase was 85
thousand; in each of Algeria and Tunisia the increase was just over 50 thou-
sand; and in Mauritania the number of emigrants rose by nearly 20 thou-
sand. As a share of the domestic population, the stock of emigrants from
Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal increased by over one percentage point
during the same time period, but for Algeria and Tunisia, it declined mar-
ginally (by -0.7 and -0.1 percentage points respectively).
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10 UNDP (2009) op. cit.
11 For example, in 2006, Eurostat estimated that the increase in migrants to the EU was over 1.4 million, of which
over 44 per cent were migrants to Spain.
12 In recent years, emigrants from Senegal have markedly diversified their destination points, moving not just to
France, but also to Italy and Spain (H. de Haas, The myth of invasion: Irregular migration from West Africa to
the Maghreb and the European Union, IMI Research Report, International Migration Institute (Oxford,
University of Oxford, 2007a)).
Figure 2.1 Stock of emigrants in OECD countries in thousands and as
percentage of population, 1998 and 2007
Notes: Figures for France refer to the year 2005. For emigrants, country of origin is defined by country
of birth and where absent, nationality. Population figures used to calculate shares for countries
of origin refer to persons aged 15-59.
Source: OECD International Migration Data, 2009.
Nearly all North and West African emigrants residing in OECD countries are
in France, Italy or Spain (Figure 2.2). Given the availability of information
and the importance of these countries as a destination for the region, the
purpose of this section is to provide insights into the composition of mi-
grants from North and West Africa, especially with regard to the most com-
mon countries of destination, i.e. France, Italy and Spain (Figure 2.2):
 The vast majority of Algerian migrants (83 per cent) were in France,
with 9 per cent in Spain and 4 per cent in Italy;
 Most Mauritanian migrants were residing in France (51 per cent) and
Spain (46 per cent);
 Moroccan migrants are relatively evenly distributed across destination
countries, with 26 per cent in France, 37 per cent in Spain, 21 per cent in
Italy;
 Migrants from Senegal are also fairly evenly distributed between France,
Italy and Spain, with figures of 30 per cent, 39 per cent and 29 per cent
respectively; and,
 The majority of Tunisian migrants are in France (53 per cent), with
another 34 per cent in Italy.
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Figure 2.2 Migrants to OECD countries by country of origin, 2007 (levels in
thousands and as percentage distribution)
Notes: Figures for France refer to the year 2005. Percentage figures may not sum to 100 per cent due
to rounding. Country of origin is defined by country of birth and where absent, nationality.
Source: OECD International Migration Data, 2009.
2. Gender
Generally, the stock of migrants from the five countries of study is predomi-
nately male, with the contrast sharpest in the case of Senegalese and Mauri-
tanian migrants in Spain, where over 80 per cent are men (Figure 2.3, panel
A). However, in the more established migration corridors, the differences
between genders are less pronounced. For example, in France, women
represent nearly 45 per cent of the stock of Algerian emigrants, but in Italy
and Spain – countries which are relatively recent destinations – women
comprise only around 30 per cent of the total (Figure 2.3, panel B). This is
probably due to the fact that, while earlier flows were predominantly men,
family reunification has taken place during the intervening years.
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Figure 2.3 Number of migrants in thousands and percentage distribution by
gender and country of origin in France, Italy and Spain, 2007
Notes: Figures for France refer to 2005. Tunisia, Senegal and Mauritania presented on panel A and
Algeria and Morocco presented on panel B due to similarity of scales. Country of origin is
defined by nationality.
Source: OECD statistics, stock of foreign population by nationality.
Recent flows by gender: case of France and Spain
An examination of flows from the five countries to France over the past de-
cade shows that they are more gender balanced than the overall migration
levels although, for the most part, men continue to comprise a larger share
of new migrants from the five study countries. There has been relatively
more gender balance among migrants from Algeria, Morocco and Senegal,
with the percentage of women generally between 40 and 50 per cent. For
Tunisian migrants, this has ranged generally between 30 and 40 per cent
over the past decade, while for Mauritania the share of women has gener-
ally been between 20 and 30 per cent (Figure 2.4).
For Spain, Figure 2.5 illustrates the gender breakdown of newly registered
migrants at municipal offices between 2000 and 2008.13 In Spain, men pre-
dominate recent migration flows for all five countries, especially for Mauri-
tanian and Senegalese nationals. It is only among Moroccan migrants that
the share of women approaches 40 per cent.
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13 This can be seen as an indicator of annual flows of migrants to Spain. Although it is not compulsory to register,
even migrants in irregular situations are given assurances that registering will not have any adverse
consequences with regard to their status.
Figure 2.4 Annual flows of migrants to France by country of origin and gender,
1996-2006
Note: Country of origin is defined by nationality.
Source: Institut National d’études démographiques, France, 2006.
With respect to overall trends, since 2003, newly registered migrants in Spain
have increased from all five countries of origin (in 2008 alone, the number of
Mauritanian migrants doubled according to municipal registries).14 In terms of
overall magnitude, the number of registered Moroccans exceeds the total of all
others: in 2008 newly registered migrants from Morocco reached over 90,000,
more than double the number in 2000.
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14 There appears to be no other factor, e.g. a change in registration practices that would explain the trend
increase since 2003.
Figure 2.5 Annual register of migrants in Spain by country of origin according
to municipal registries, 2000-08
Note: Country of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: IILS estimates based upon Encuesta de Variaciones Residenciales (Instituto National de
Estadistica (INE).
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3. Age
With respect to age and gender composition for each of the five countries
of origin, the most recent figures available date from the year 2000. Never-
theless, the decomposition offers a snapshot of the differences between mi-
grants from the five countries of study to France, Spain and Italy (Figure
2.6):
 Age 16-24: for all five countries of origin, the share of migrant youth is
more pronounced in Spain than in France or Italy. With respect to the
countries of origin, youth as a share of the total migrants ranged from 4
per cent (in the case of Algerian and Tunisian migrants in France) to 19
per cent (in the case of the Moroccan migrants in Spain and Italy). 15
 Age 25-39: in most cases, the largest share of the migrant population falls
within this age range. For the destination countries of Italy and Spain,
this age group accounted for over 50 per cent (of those migrating from
Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal). In France, between 17 per
cent (Tunisian migrants) and 40 per cent (Mauritanian migrants) were in
the 25–39 age group.
 Age 40-59: this age group constituted between 13 and 40 per cent of the
population (Mauritanian emigrants in Spain and Tunisian emigrants in
France, respectively). Men outnumbered women in almost every case,
with the exception of Algerian migrants to France, where the shares of
men and women were equal.
 Age 60+: there were relatively high percentages of Algerian, Moroccan,
and Tunisian emigrants in France aged 60 years and over. This is
probably due to the fact that France has been a migration corridor for a
longer period, so populations which migrated earlier have since aged.
Also, in a “mature” migration corridor such as France-Algeria, the gender
balance is relatively more pronounced.
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15 Considering male and female youth together.
Figure 2.6 North and West African emigrants aged 16 and over in France,
Spain and Italy by country of origin, age and gender, 2000 (percentages)
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Note: Country of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).
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4. Recent changes in age and gender composition
Using labour force survey data from France and Spain, an examination of
recent changes in the age and gender composition of migrants is possible.
In France, it is the older age groups (of the total North and West Afri-
can-born population) that has increased in recent years, with the share
aged 60 and over increasing by over one percentage point for males and
just under one percentage point for females. Meanwhile, the share of the
population in younger age groups declined slightly (Figure 2.7, panel A).
In contrast, for Spain, considering all five North and West African countries
of origin together – but recognizing that the majority of emigrants (approxi-
mately 85 per cent) are from Morocco, the findings suggest that between
2004 and 2009, the share of women age 40 and over fell by nearly 3 per-
centage points to 39.6 per cent; and the share of youth rose by nearly 2 per-
centage points (Figure 2.7, panel B).
In essence, in recent years the composition of the North and West African
emigrant stock in Spain has, on average, become younger and more
male-dominated, while the emigrant stock in France has to some degree
aged.
Figure 2.7 Migrants from North and West Africa in France and Spain by age
and gender (change in percentage points)
Note: Country of origin is defined using country of birth. See Box 2.1 for information regarding the
sample used.
Source: IILS estimates based upon labour force surveys from Spain and France.
39
Ch
ap
te
r2
Chapter 2: Emigration, human capital and labour markets
-0.6
-0.8
-0.6
1.1
-0.3
-0.4
0.8 0.8
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
15-24 25-39 40-59 60+
Men
Women
Panel A.
France, 2004-09 compared to pre-2003
0.5
3.4
0.6
-1.6
1.7 1.5
-2.7
-3.44.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
15–24 25–39 40–59 60+
Men
Women
Panel B.
Spain, 2007 compared to 2003
5. Education, human capital and brain drain16
As discussed above, the educational profile of migrants has important im-
plications for the development of countries of origin, to the extent that it in-
dicates the potential loss of human capital when workers emigrate.17 With
respect to African emigration, data from the year 2000 reveal that, in con-
trast to the United States, for example, where over 50 per cent of African
emigrants have a tertiary education, a much smaller share of those whose
destination is Europe have a university-level education: in France, Italy and
Spain, less than 30 per cent are tertiary educated.18 These findings are rela-
tively consistent with more recent information by gender and education on
emigrants to France and Spain from the five countries of study (Table 2.2):
 Overall (with some exceptions) the largest share of the population has
only a primary level of education;
 Men are generally better educated than women (i.e. they have a higher
share of tertiary-educated);
 Moroccan emigrants to Spain have the smallest share of
tertiary-educated, relative to the shares of tertiary-educated among
emigrants from other countries of origin, and also relative to education
levels of Moroccan emigrants in France, and;
 In every case (except for Tunisian emigrants), a larger share of
individuals with only primary-level education resides in Spain, while a
larger share of tertiary-educated emigrants is found in France.
One important question with respect to the impact on development is
whether migrants are representative of the population in the country of ori-
gin. In other words, to what extent are more educated individuals migrat-
ing. As shown above, only 8 per cent of Moroccan male migrants to Spain
have attained tertiary education (6 per cent for women). However, in 2007,
the overall proportion of tertiary-educated persons in Morocco was about 9
per cent among men and about 5 per cent among women.19 This means that
migrants from Morocco to Spain appear to be a representative cross-section
of the Moroccan population in 2007 in terms of their educational attain-
ment, and therefore no clear pattern of selection (or brain drain) is appar-
ent. This also seems to hold for younger cohorts, at least in the case of
emigrants from Morocco to Spain. For example, based upon a pooled sam-
ple from 2003 to 2009, approximately 8 per cent of Moroccan migrants in
Spain aged 25-39 had tertiary education whereas as among the Moroccan
population in 2007 approximately 9 per cent aged 25-34 were university
educated.
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16 See Annex 2.A for detailed information of educational attainment of emigrants to France, Italy and Spain by
age, gender and country of origin.
17 Education may also have other important implications for development, including its effect on the probability
to remit, likelihood of returning to the country of origin and potential reinforcement of human capital if the
emigrant returns, sometimes referred to as “brain gain” – issues elaborated on in the remainder of the report.
18 Emigrants are defined by country of birth. Source: OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).
19 IILS estimates based upon Moroccan labour force survey.
Table 2.2 Distribution of migrants in Spain and France by gender, education
and country of origin (percentages)
France Spain
Man Women Man Women
Algeria
Primary 34 44 .. ..
Secondary 43 37 .. ..
Tertiary 23 19 .. ..
Total 100 100 .. ..
Algeria and Tunisia
Primary .. .. 37 36
Secondary .. .. 47 42
Tertiary .. .. 16 22
Total .. .. 100 100
Tunisia
Primary 38 44 .. ..
Secondary 44 39 .. ..
Tertiary 18 17 .. ..
Total 100 100 .. ..
Morocco
Primary 40 50 55 64
Secondary 33 30 37 30
Tertiary 27 20 8 6
Total 100 100 100 100
Senegal, Mauritania and rest of Africa
Primary 27 36 58 45
Secondary 38 41 32 43
Tertiary 35 23 10 12
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: Figures refer to 2007 for France, and 2004-09 for Spain. Country of origin is defined by country
of birth. Some countries of origin are grouped together in order to assemble a sample of
sufficient size.
Source: IILS estimates based upon labour force surveys, France and Spain.
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The fact that there is no clear process of skill selection of migrants does not
mean that human capital is not a key dimension to migration or indicative
of the complete absence of any brain drain. Indeed, the possibility for im-
proving one’s human capital through the acquisition of schooling in coun-
tries of destination needs to be taken into consideration. In fact, data from
the Spanish labour force surveys for the years 2005 to 2009 reveal that the
share of North and West Africa migrants receiving vocational training is
similar (in some cases higher) compared to Spanish individuals (Table 2.3).
While it is difficult to assess the impact of the acquisition of further educa-
tion in terms of brain drain, Chapters 3 and 4 will attempt to illustrate the
role of education attained both in the country of origin and destination as it
pertains to the likelihood of remitting or returning to North and West Africa.
Table 2.3 Distribution of persons according to training in the previous four
weeks, by age and place of birth (percentages)
Age 16-29 years
Spain Morocco Algeria and
Tunisia
Mauritania, Senegal
and rest of Africa
Total
Formal education 38.5 10.1 14.7 6.3 36.8
Vocational training 6.8 5.0 3.1 8.2 6.7
Neither 54.7 84.9 82.2 85.5 56.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Age 30-59 years
Spain Morocco Algeria and
Tunisia
Mauritania, Senegal
and rest of Africa
Total
Formal education 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.5
Vocational training 5.6 3.4 3.5 6.5 5.5
Neither 92.9 9.6 96.0 91.7 92.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Data refer to persons who, in the previous 4 weeks, have undertaken one of the above
activities. Those who have undertaken formal education and vocational training simultaneously
are categorized as having participated in formal education.
Source: IILS estimates based upon labour force surveys for Spain (pooled sample), 2005-09.
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B. Labour market performance of migrant workers
The purpose of this section is to establish a clearer picture of how migrant
workers fare in countries of destination, in terms of labour market partici-
pation, unemployment, employment and earnings. The role of labour mar-
kets is critical to understanding how migration might contribute to
development. It is also worth noting that migrant workers’ employment
and income performance – both actual and perceived – are linked to future
migration prospects, in that news of the success of friends and relatives is
often identified as a catalysing factor in the migration decision. This section
analyses micro-data from the labour force surveys of France and Spain to
examine these issues (Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 Analysing the labour market performance of migrants from North and
West Africa
The labour market outcomes of migrants from Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and
Tunisia were analysed for the destination countries of Spain and France (two countries
where such detailed information is gathered and available).
For Spain, a large sample of individuals was obtained by pooling observations from the
quarterly labour force survey (LFS) for the years 1996 to 2009. For France, micro-data
observations for 2003 to 2007 were pooled.
For both survey data sets, country of origin is defined by country of birth. Where possible,
three countries of origin are considered separately (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia).
However, in some cases, due to an insufficient number of observations, Algeria and
Tunisia are considered together (Spanish LFS) and data for Senegal and Mauritania are
grouped together with the rest of Africa. In the case of Spain, information on South
American migrant workers is also included as a way to illustrate the performance of North
and West African migrant workers compared to other migrant workers.
1. Key indicators of labour market performance
Among the North and West African migrant workers in France, labour force
participation rates for men (age 15-59) at 80 to 82 per cent, are higher than
the participation rate of 77.5 per cent observed for French-born men (Table
2.4). In Spain, also, participation rates of migrant workers exceed those of
Spanish-born men by 8 to 10 percentage points. Among women migrant
workers, a smaller share of those born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia par-
ticipate in the labour market relative to the 68 per cent participation rate ob-
served for French-born women. The gap is narrower with respect to female
migrant workers born in Senegal, Mauritania, and the rest of Africa, among
whom 64 per cent are in the labour force. In Spain, a similar pattern is re-
vealed, i.e. a smaller share of female migrant workers from Algeria, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia are active in the labour force relative to Spanish-born
females. For women born in Senegal, Mauritania, and the rest of Africa, the
participation rate of 60 per cent is slightly higher than for Spanish-born
females.
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Table 2.4  Labour market performance of migrant workers age 15-59
(percentages)
Labour force
participation rates
Unemployment
rates
Employment
rates
Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
France
France 77.5 67.9 72.6 8.1 9.9 8.9 71.3 61.2 66.1
Algeria 80.8 59.0 69.4 18.1 19.4 18.7 66.2 47.6 56.4
Morocco 81.0 53.3 66.8 16.8 25.1 20.2 67.3 39.9 53.3
Tunisia 82.4 54.8 69.3 15.2 19.8 16.9 69.9 44.0 57.6
Senegal, Mauritania,
and rest of Africa
82.0 64.2 72.6 19.3 23.1 21.1 66.2 49.4 57.3
Spain
Spain 80.3 56.1 68.2 10.5 18.7 13.9 71.9 45.6 58.7
Morocco 89.6 41.1 69.4 17.7 33.2 21.5 73.8 27.5 54.5
Algeria & Tunisia 88.3 40.5 74.5 25.2 35.4 26.8 66.0 26.2 54.5
Senegal, Mauritania
and rest of Africa
90.7 60.3 82.8 17.1 38.2 21.1 75.2 37.3 65.3
Note: Country of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: IILS estimates based on national labour force surveys.
While engagement in the labour market is relatively high, the unemploy-
ment rates among migrant workers from North and West Africa are approx-
imately double in comparison to those of French-born workers. This is the
case for both men and women. In Spain, unemployment rates of migrant
workers are even higher, approaching nearly 40 per cent for female mi-
grant workers from Senegal, Mauritania and the rest of Africa. The gender
gap is also much larger for migrant workers from North and West Africa in
Spain compared to the corresponding case in France.
With respect to employment rates, both male and female migrant workers
trail the French-born population. Between 66 and 70 per cent of economi-
cally active male migrant workers are employed, compared to over 71 per
cent among French-born. For women, employment rates range from under
40 per cent, in the case of the Moroccan-born, to nearly 50 per cent, for
those born in Senegal, Mauritania and the rest of Africa. In Spain, however,
in some cases the employment rates of male migrant workers exceed that
of the Spanish-born: figures of 73 and 75 per cent were observed for the
Moroccan-born and those from Senegal, Mauritania and the rest of Africa,
whereas the corresponding figure for the Spanish-born was just under
72 per cent. For women, employment rates hover just above 25 per cent for
those migrant workers from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For women
from Senegal, Mauritania and the rest of Africa, the employment rate is
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slightly higher, but at 37 per cent, it still trails that of Spanish-born women.
The gender gap in employment rates for migrant workers from Africa in
Spain is around 40 percentage points and above (compared to the 26 per-
centage point gap between Spanish men and women).
2. Type of employment and impacts of the crisis
In terms of the type of employment held by migrant workers in France and
Spain, some stark differences between the two destination countries
emerge. In Spain, migrant workers from North and West Africa (both men
and women) are over-represented in temporary work compared to Span-
ish-born workers (Figure 2.8, panels A and B). In France, however, al-
though the incidence of temporary employment exceeds that of nationals
in all but one case (Tunisian-born men), the share never exceeds 13 per
cent. Moreover, 70 per cent or more of employed migrant workers in
France born in North Africa or the rest of Africa are in permanent employ-
ment.
Figure 2.8 Distribution of employed workers by employment type and country
of birth (percentages)
Source: IILS estimates based on national labour force surveys. Pooled samples, 1996-2009 for Spain
and 2003-2007 for France.
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In many ways the impacts of the global recession of 2009 are still unfolding
and it may therefore be too early to draw conclusions about the employ-
ment effects. But the limited evidence available from Spain does highlight
the effect of the crisis on male migrant workers (Figure 2.9). The impact of
job losses has been disproportionately borne by migrant workers, espe-
cially from Morocco and other parts of Africa.20,21 In particular, employment
in 2008 fell by over 20 per cent and 23 per cent among male migrant work-
ers from Morocco and rest of Africa, respectively, compared to only 6.9 per
cent for Spanish-born workers.
Figure 2.9 Employment losses among men in Spain by country of origin, 2008
(percentages)
Note: Wage and salary workers who were registered with social security as of 1 December 2008
compared to 1 December 2007. Migrant workers and country of origin are defined using country
of birth, and if missing, nationality.
Source: IILS estimates based upon Continuous Sample of Working Histories, 2008 (Spain).
In terms of sectoral considerations, male migrant workers from Morocco
and other African countries were concentrated in construction and other
business activities: in 2007, almost 50 per cent of Moroccan migrant work-
ers and 35 per cent of rest of African migrant workers were employed in
construction and 7 and 16 per cent respectively were employed in other
business activities. The onset of the crisis was first apparent in the construc-
tion sector, given the connection to the housing market: employment in
construction fell by 25 per cent in Spain in 2008. However, employment
losses were not evenly distributed, with Moroccan male migrant workers
constituting a disproportionate share of the losses compared to their share
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20 Country of origin for migrant workers is defined using country of birth where possible, and if missing,
nationality.
21 Other parts of Africa includes Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cap Verde, Chad, Republic of Congo,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leona, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Egypt,
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.
in total employment (Figure 2.10, panel A). Similar results are evident for
Moroccan male migrant workers in other business activities as well as
among other African male migrant workers (Figure 2.10, panel B).
To explore the labour market performance of migrant workers from Africa
in greater depth, a multivariate analysis was undertaken to estimate how
the probabilities of being employed, unemployed or out of the labour force
vary with personal and other characteristics (see Box 2.2).
Figure 2.10 Employment shares (men) in overall employment and job loss
among migrant workers, by country of origin and sector, 2008
Note: Figures refer to wage and salary workers who were registered with social security as of
1 December 2008 compared to 1 December 2007. Migrant workers and country of origin are
defined using country of birth, and if missing, nationality.
Source: IILS estimates based upon Continuous Sample of Working Histories, 2008 (Spain).
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Box 2.2  Multivariate analysis of labour market performance
A multivariate analysis was undertaken to estimate how the probabilities of being
employed, unemployed or out of the labour force vary with personal and other
characteristics (country of birth, duration of stay, etc.) using a multinomial logit model.
The findings are generally consistent with the descriptive analysis undertaken.
For Spain:
 in general, male migrant workers are significantly more likely to be unemployed and less
likely to be out of the labour market than Spanish workers;
 the probability of unemployment is much higher for more recent arrivals (in particular,
migrant workers who arrived less than two years ago have the highest risk of
unemployment);
 female migrant workers are more likely to be unemployed or inactive than women from
Spain. This higher risk is particularly pronounced for those who had arrived less than
two years before the date of the survey, but improves with duration of stay.
For France:
 more recent migrant workers from Africa and those without French nationality are more
likely to be unemployed or out of the labour force;
 male migrant workers from Algeria who do not have French nationality perform much
worse than any of the other groups, in terms of the likelihood of being unemployed or out
of the labour force. For instance:
 the relative risk of being unemployed to being employed of an Algerian male migrant
worker who arrived in 2001 or later compared to a French male worker is higher by a
factor of 11 (compared to four for Moroccan male migrant workers and five for other
African male migrant workers);
 the labour market performance of female migrant workers who have been resident in
France since 2001 or later and who have not acquired French nationality is strikingly
worse than any of the other categories, in terms of both labour force participation and
employment. Female migrants with French nationality who have been resident in
France since 1970 or earlier appear to be doing relatively well in terms of unemployment
probability, particularly those from Tunisia.
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3. Relative earnings of migrant workers
Analysis of the earnings ratios of migrant workers relative to Spanish na-
tionals by gender, age group and level of education indicate the following
(see also Box 2.3 and the Annex of this chapter for further details):
 With only one exception, the earnings differential between migrant
workers from Africa and Spanish nationals increases with age and, for
each age group, it increases with education. In other words, younger,
less-educated migrant workers perform better compared to Spanish
nationals than do their older, more educated counterparts. For example,
male migrant workers from Africa aged 16-34 with primary education
earn 12 per cent less than their Spanish counterparts. This negative
differential – at 42 per cent – is much higher among university-educated
men of the indicated age group. For workers aged 35-59, the earnings
gap is 27 per cent for those with a primary-level education, rising to 54
per cent among those with a university education.
 Earnings differentials for female migrant workers exhibit similar trends,
although for non-university educated, the differential is small and, in
some cases, it becomes positive.
 Analysis of the log hourly earnings by quintiles shows that the earnings
gap is largest for workers at the top of the earnings distribution. One
reason for this is that more highly educated migrant workers may be
unable to fully use their formal qualifications in the labour market of
their country of origin (see Annex 2.B). This has important economic
implications, as discussed in the previous section on education.
Meanwhile, the results for France suggest that:
 For young workers (aged 16-34), there is no clear pattern with regard to
earnings differential by level of education across countries. Among more
highly educated young males (aged 16-34), however, Algerian migrant
workers seem to do worse, relatively, than those from Tunisia, Morocco
or other African countries.
 Overall, for both men and women, the earnings differential between
migrant workers and French workers is limited compared to the case in
Spain.
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Box 2.3 Structure and dynamics of migrant worker earnings
For Spain, the data source on earnings is the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for 2006
and, for France, information on earnings is derived from the labour force survey for the
period 2003-07.
For Spain, mean monthly gross earnings are used in the reference month, covering
remunerations in cash paid before any tax deductions and social security contributions
during the reference period. More specifically, the measure for earnings refers to usual
earnings for the month of October, divided by the number of hours paid during the same
month, as reported by the employer. The number of hours paid includes normal and
overtime hours. Migrant workers are considered to be those workers having a foreign
nationality. Nationalities, however, are only available for six regions of the world, including
Africa.
For France, monthly net earnings are used as reported by the individual in the labour force
survey. The actual measure used is net monthly earnings divided by the number of hours
worked for the reported earnings. Since the data refer to a pooled sample for the period
2003-07, real hourly earnings in 2008 are calculated using the consumer price index.
Migrant workers are identified in the French labour force survey by country of birth.
The search for employment and better earnings is a key driver of migration,
as mentioned in Chapter 1. Overall, the labour market performance of mi-
grant workers – as suggested by the key indicators of participation, unem-
ployment, and employment rates – tends to trail those of French- and
Spanish-born workers. Migrant workers have also been disproportionately
impacted by job losses stemming from the economic downturn of 2009.
But there are important issues beyond employment performance which im-
pact the economic and social well-being of migrant workers abroad –
namely social protection and earnings potential. In terms of the latter, it is
important to keep in mind that despite their seemingly weaker labour mar-
ket performance in countries of destination, migrant workers abroad do ap-
pear to earn more relative to earnings of workers who remain in their
countries of origin (Figure 2.11). This is particularly the case for women.
For example, Moroccan-born women in France are observed to earn 16
times more than women working in Morocco. This holds for men as well:
male migrant workers in Spain and France stand to earn between 3 and 6
times the average earnings of their counterparts in North and West Africa.
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Figure 2.11 Ratio of earnings of North and West African migrant workers in
France and Spain relative to average earnings in their countries of origin
Note: The ratio of migrant worker earnings to nationals in destination countries is applied to the
estimated earned income (in PPP US$) in those countries of origins and compared to similar
figures in the countries of origin by gender.
Source: IILS estimates based upon Labour force survey, 2003-2007 for France and Continuous Sample
of Working Histories, 2007 for Spain and Human Development Report, 2009.
C. Concluding considerations
The number of emigrants from all five countries increased between 1998
and 2007 with France, Italy and Spain being key destinations. Micro data
from France and Spain were used to assemble a snapshot of the age, gen-
der, and education characteristics of North and West African migrants as
well as their performance in the labour market.
The analysis reveals that recent flows of migrants are relatively more gen-
der balanced and on average much younger than previous cohorts (espe-
cially in the case of Spain). In addition, there appears to be no clear process
of skill selection or brain drain of migrants from North and West Africa, i.e.
the education profile of migrants is similar to the education levels of the
overall population in countries of origin. However, this chapter has illus-
trated that a sizable share of migrant workers receives additional training or
undertakes further education in Spain. And, as will be explained in the fol-
lowing chapters, human capital accumulation is crucial in terms of the con-
tribution that migrant workers can make to development in their countries
of origin.
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This chapter also highlighted that migrants workers face a number of chal-
lenges and that the labour market performance of North and West African
migrant workers in most cases trails that of Spanish and French workers:
 earnings gap rises with education levels (less so in France);
 migrant workers are over-represented in temporary employment,
particularly in Spain, and;
 migrant workers in some cases have been disproportionately affected by
recent employment losses.
Despite these challenges, the potential for higher earnings is substantial.
Migrant worker earnings are several times the amount of average earnings
in the country of origin. Moreover, how migrant workers fare in the labour
markets of destination countries has important implications for understand-
ing how migration can contribute to development in North and West Africa
via the mechanisms of remittances and return migration. The following
chapter looks at the issue of remittances in order to examine these
connections in more detail.
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Annex 2.A: Education levels by age and gender
Table 2A1 Education levels of migrants in France, Spain and Italy by gender,
age and country of origin (percentages)
Country
of origin
Level of
education
Men Women Total
25–39 40–59 Total 25–39 40–59 Total 25–39 40–59 Total
France
Algeria Lower secondary 32.4 48.2 44.0 39.6 53.0 49.1 36.1 50.5 46.5
Upper secondary 42.1 32.8 35.3 37.6 30.1 32.2 39.8 31.5 33.8
Tertiary 25.5 18.9 20.7 22.8 17.0 18.6 24.1 18.0 19.7
Morocco Lower secondary 32.0 56.5 48.4 47.6 59.2 54.8 39.9 57.7 51.5
Upper secondary 38.1 25.7 29.8 31.9 24.3 27.2 35 25.0 28.5
Tertiary 29.9 17.8 21.8 20.5 16.5 18 25.1 17.2 20.0
Mauritania Lower secondary 3.09 71.3 57.1 60.0 71.6 64.1 47.2 71.4 59.2
Upper secondary 26.8 13.3 19.2 22.3 17.9 20.7 25 14.3 19.7
Tertiary 34.3 15.3 23.7 17.8 10.5 15.2 27.8 14.3 21.1
Senegal Lower secondary 31.8 54.7 46.8 49.0 47.8 48.4 41.2 52.2 47.5
Upper secondary 32.4 23.5 26.6 27.0 28.2 27.6 29.4 25.2 27.0
Tertiary 35.8 21.7 26.6 24.0 24.0 24.0 29.3 22.6 25.4
Tunisia Lower secondary 38.6 48.0 45.7 47.2 52.9 51.4 42.6 50.1 48.2
Upper secondary 36.0 33.0 33.7 32.2 30.5 30.9 34.2 31.9 32.5
Tertiary 25.4 19.0 20.5 20.6 16.7 17.7 23.2 18.0 19.3
Spain
Algeria Lower secondary 70.9 62 69.1 57.8 56.6 57.3 68.5 59.8 66.2
Upper secondary 18.2 20.4 18.6 23.4 19.2 21.6 19.1 19.9 19.3
Tertiary 9.9 16.9 11.3 18 24.2 20.7 11.4 19.9 13.6
Unknown 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.8
Morocco Lower secondary 78.9 73.0 76.8 74.7 74.1 74.4 77.5 73.5 75.9
Upper secondary 11.1 11.9 11.4 13.5 12.5 13.0 11.9 12.2 12.0
Tertiary 9.2 14.7 11.2 11.7 13.2 12.4 10 14.1 11.6
Unknown 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5
Mauritania Lower secondary 86.1 79.2 84.8 87.5 100 88.5 86.4 80.8 85.4
Upper secondary 5.9 12.5 7.2 12.5 0.0 11.5 7.2 11.5 7.9
Tertiary 7.9 8.3 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 7.7 6.6
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Country
of origin
Level of
education
Men Women Total
25–39 40–59 Total 25–39 40–59 Total 25–39 40–59 Total
Senegal Lower secondary 80.8 85.2 82.5 72.3 86.4 76.8 79.5 85.4 81.6
Upper secondary 9.4 2.0 6.6 17.0 4.5 13.0 10.6 2.3 7.6
Tertiary 6.9 8.1 7.4 10.6 9.1 10.1 7.5 8.2 7.8
Unknown 2.9 4.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 4.1 3.0
Tunisia Lower secondary 47.1 46.7 46.9 100 50 66.7 52.6 47.4 50
Upper secondary 23.5 26.7 25.0 0.0 25 16.7 21.1 26.3 23.7
Tertiary 29.4 20.0 25.0 0.0 25 16.7 26.3 21.1 23.7
Unknown 0.0 6.7 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 2.6
Italy
Algeria Lower secondary 62.3 53.9 60.7 47.4 45.6 46.6 59.2 50.1 56.8
Upper secondary 28.4 27.2 28.2 34.3 36.0 35.0 29.7 31.2 30.1
Tertiary 9.2 18.8 11.1 18.2 18.5 18.3 11.1 18.7 13.1
Morocco Lower secondary 67.8 83.9 73.4 71.5 85.2 75.4 69.1 84.3 74.1
Upper secondary 24.4 11.9 20.1 21.3 10.9 18.4 23.3 11.6 19.5
Tertiary 7.8 4.2 6.6 7.2 3.9 6.3 7.6 4.1 6.5
Mauritania Lower secondary 65.1 88.2 73.7 65.6 40.0 62.2 65.3 83.9 71.3
Upper secondary 29.1 5.9 20.4 25.0 40.0 27.0 28 8.9 21.8
Tertiary 5.8 5.9 5.8 9.4 20.0 10.8 6.8 7.1 6.9
Senegal Lower secondary 82.8 88.8 85 75.8 76.7 76 81.8 88.1 84.0
Upper secondary 13.2 8.3 11.4 18.2 16.3 17.9 13.9 8.8 12.1
Tertiary 4.1 2.9 3.6 6.0 7.0 6.2 4.3 3.1 3.9
Tunisia Lower secondary 75.6 74.0 75.1 74.3 73.1 73.7 75.3 73.7 74.6
Upper secondary 20.7 21.0 20.8 20.1 21.7 20.9 20.6 21.3 20.9
Tertiary 3.6 4.9 4.1 5.5 5.2 5.4 4.2 5.0 4.5
Note: County of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC). For more details on this database see
OECD, 2008.
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Annex 2.B: Earning difference by country of origin
Table 2B1 Hourly earnings of French-born workers in euros (first panel) and
earnings ratios of African-born workers to French-born workers by country or
region of origin, age and education
Men Women
Primary
or less
Secondary:
first level
Secondary:
second
level
University Total Primary
or less
Secondary:
first level
Secondary:
second
level
University Total
France
16-34 8.1 8.3 9.3 12.1 9.6 7.5 7.7 8.2 11.0 9.2
35-39 10.3 11.4 14.8 19.3 13.2 8.3 9.3 11.7 16.0 11.1
60+ 10.3 12.4 14.0 27.5 18.4 7.6 9.4 18.0 19.6 11.4
Total 9.6 10.3 11.7 15.8 11.8 8.2 8.9 10 13.4 10.4
Algeria
16-34 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0
35-39 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
60+ 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2
Total 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0
Morocco
16-34 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.0
35-39 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
60+ 1.1 1.7 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7
Total 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tunisia
16-34 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.9
35-39 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9
60+ 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.1
Total 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9
Rest of Africa
16-34 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0
35-39 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
60+ 1.4 1.8 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 1.0
Total 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Notes: Country of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: French Labour Force Survey 2003-2007 (Institut national de la statistique et des études
économiques (INSEE)).
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Table 2B2 Hourly earnings of Spanish-born workers in euros (first panel) and
earnings ratios of migrant workers to Spanish workers by country or region of
origin, age and education
Men Women
Primary
or less
Secondary:
first level
Secondary:
second
level
University Total Primary
or less
Secondary:
first level
Secondary:
second
level
University Total
Spain
16-34 7.1 7.1 8.2 11.7 8.3 6.0 6.1 6.7 10.0 7.5
35-59 8.8 8.8 12.3 18.8 11.4 6.5 6.8 8.7 14.1 9.0
60+ 10.1 10.2 13.8 25.8 13.2 7.3 7.5 10.7 17.5 9.7
Total 8.3 8.2 10.6 16.2 10.2 6.4 6.5 7.7 11.9 8.3
European Union (excluding Spain)
16-34 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0
35-59 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1
60+ 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.8
Total 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0
Rest of Europe
16-34 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8
35-59 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6
60+ 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.8
Total 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7
North America
16-34 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1
35-59 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.6
60+ 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Total 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3
Latin America
16-34 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8
35-59 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
60+ 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.7
Total 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7
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Men Women
Primary
or less
Secondary:
first level
Secondary:
second
level
University Total Primary
or less
Secondary:
first level
Secondary:
second
level
University Total
Africa
16-34 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9
35-59 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.7
60+ 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
Total 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.8
Asia and Oceania
16-34 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
35-59 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.7
60+ 0.6 1.7 0.0 0.9 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.1
Total 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7
Note: Country or region of origin is defined by nationality.
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey for Spain, 2006 (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE)).
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Figure 2B1 Earnings differentials by quintiles between Spanish workers and
African migrant workers
Note: Country or region of origin is based upon nationality.
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey for Spain, 2006 (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE)).
Figure 2B2 Earnings differentials by quintiles between French-born workers
and African migrant workers
Note: Country or region of origin is based upon country of birth.
Source: French Labour Force Survey 2003-2007 (Institut national de la statistique et des études
économiques (INSEE)).
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Annex 2.C: Labour market performance of migrant workers
Figure 2C1 Relative risk ratios of being unemployed or out of the labour force
for migrant workers in Spain and France by origin, duration of stay and
residency status (age 25-59)
Spain
France
Note: Results obtained from estimating a multinomial logit model, controlling for gender, age,
education, year of survey and region of residence. The reference labour force status is
“employed” and the omitted variable for country of birth is Spain/France. Full regression results
(available upon request) are not reported. Country of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: IILS estimates based on national labour force surveys. Pooled samples, 1996-2009 for Spain
and 2003-2007 for France.
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Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Chapter 3:
Remittances: determinants and
implications for development
Introduction
Migration has the potential to enhance development by means of a number
of channels, including through financial flows back to the country of origin,
otherwise referred to as “remittances”. Remittances can assist development
on a number of levels. At the individual level they provide an important
boost to household income and can thus increase investments in education
and health. In this respect, there is a positive contribution to development
through the improvement in health, housing, education and, more gener-
ally, family welfare. At the macro level, collective remittances to develop,
for example, community assets such as schools and roads can have a posi-
tive effect on development. In addition, remittances can remove credit con-
straints and provide some risk insurance to households that operate
agricultural micro-enterprises. Remittances can also assist in the improve-
ment of farm production, development of small and micro-enterprises and
promotion of entrepreneurial skills – all of which can contribute to devel-
opment at the micro or local level.
On the other hand, excessive reliance on remittances can mean that coun-
tries postpone or avoid necessary structural reform. The result is a vicious
cycle of inefficient allocation of resources, depressed export-driven growth
and further reliance on remittances. Reliance on remittance receipts can
also make a country’s economy very vulnerable to sudden economic
downturns in destination countries.1 Remittance flows might also reduce la-
bour supply and work effort in so far as they act as a substitute for labour
income. In some cases, this has led to adverse effects on development at
the micro level through reductions in agricultural production. Remittances
have also been shown to contribute to poor export performance by con-
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1 B. Ghosh: Migrants’ remittances and development: Myths, rhetoric and realities (Geneva, IOM and the Hague
Process on Refugees and Migration, 2006), http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/
shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/ghosh_pdf.pdf [accessed 13 February 2010].
tributing to an appreciation of the external value of a country’s currency
and making the economy vulnerable to sudden economic downturns.2
Regardless of some of these caveats, for many developing countries, work-
ers’ remittances are the largest source of foreign financing, after FDI, often
exceeding both official development assistance and portfolio investment
by a wide margin. Given their importance, this chapter seeks to provide a
clearer understanding of the role of remittances in North and West Africa.
Section A will examine recent trends in remittances in the region, taking
into consideration – to the extent possible – the economic and financial cri-
sis. Section B will analyse the underlying determinants of remittances with
a view to understanding better how they might make a positive
contribution to development.
A. Remittance trends
Migrant remittances, compiled principally by the IMF and central banks, are
the sum of: (i) migrant workers’ remittances; (ii) compensation of employ-
ees; and (iii) migrants’ transfers:3
 migrant workers’ remittances: current private transfers from migrant
workers staying abroad for one year or more to recipients in their
country of origin;4
 compensation of employees: wages, salaries and other benefits earned by
seasonal or other short-term workers who are in the country of
destination for less than a year, and;
 migrants’ transfers: the net worth of migrants, which are transferred
from one country to another at the time of migration (for a period of at
least one year).
1. Trend increase in remittance flows
Remittance inflows have been rising globally at a steady pace since the
early 1980s. Between 1985 and 1990 alone, global remittances nearly dou-
bled to over US$68 billion, rising to an estimated US$443 billion in 2008.
Developing countries – with over US$337 billion in remittance inflows – ac-
count for over three-quarters of the total. In North and West Africa, remit-
tances have grown at a similar pace, rising threefold since 1990 alone to
reach over US$12 billion in 2008.5
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2 C. Amuedo-Dorantes and S. Pozo (2006) found that, on average, a doubling of remittances leads to a 22 per
cent appreciation of the real exchange rate. Stagnation in the export market can slow down growth in
employment and lead to further pressure for emigration.
3 World Bank: Global Development Finance 2003, Washington, DC, 2003 and IMF: International Transactions
in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users, Washington, DC, 2009.
4 IMF: Balance of Payment Manual, Washington, DC, 2009.
5 To some extent the increase in remittance flows is due to better measurement practices. Mechanisms for
tracking informal remittances have improved, and thus the official figures have been able to capture an
increasing share of total remittances.
Much of the strong recent growth in remittances (in terms of US$) for the
region is due to developments in Morocco (Figure 3.1):
 since 1998, inward remittances to Morocco more than tripled rising to
nearly US$7 billion;
 remittances to Senegal have grown by approximately US$1 billion over a
decade or by more than a factor of eight;
 in Algeria and Tunisia, growth in remittances has been more tepid
(doubling in the past 10 years), and;
 for Mauritania, estimates for remittances have remained relatively
unchanged and are substantially lower compared to other countries.
Figure 3.1 Evolution of officially recorded inward remittance flows, 1998-2008
(US$ billions)
Source: World Bank, 2009, World Bank Migration and Development Brief, 11, 3 November.
In relative terms, in 2007, in all countries except Mauritania, remittances ex-
ceeded both official development aid (ODA) and foreign direct investment
(FDI) as a percentage of GDP (Figure 3.2). The trend increase in the relative
importance of remittances is particularly evident in Morocco and Senegal
where the gap between remittances and ODA and FDI has risen markedly
in the past decade.
65
Ch
ap
te
r3
Chapter 3: Remittances: determinants and implications for development
2
3
4
5
6
7
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Senegal
1
Figure 3.2 Evolution of officially recorded inward remittance flows, official
development aid (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows in
selected countries, 1997-2007 (percentage of GDP)
Note: The true size of remittances is believed to be larger due to unrecorded flows through a
number of other channels.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
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In fact, Figure 3.3 illustrates that, in comparison to other countries (and re-
gions), both Morocco and Senegal (8.0 and 9.8 per cent, respectively) and,
to a lesser extent, Tunisia, have comparably high inward remittances as
shares of GDP.6 In 2008, Senegal and Morocco ranked 21st and 27th, re-
spectively, among 152 countries with available data. In contrast, in Algeria
and Mauritania, remittances comprise only 1.3 and 0.1 per cent,
respectively, of GDP.
Figure 3.3 Officially reported inward remittance flows as a percentage of GDP,
2008
Note: The true size of remittances is believed to be larger due to unrecorded flows through a number
of other channels.
Source: World Bank, 2009, World Bank Migration and Development Brief, 11, 3 November.
It is important to note that these figures reflect only those remittances sent
through formal channels – which, in some cases, represent only a small
proportion of financial flows. This is particularly the case in North and West
Africa (and Africa in general) since nearly 40 per cent of the population re-
side in rural areas, to which remittances are more likely to flow and where
they are less likely to arrive via formal channels. Indeed, in many remit-
tance-receiving developing countries, financial institutions and other for-
mal channels of remitting do not extend to rural and other remote areas.
This constrains their capacity to transfer funds to households in these areas
and thus encourages the use of informal channels by migrants abroad as an
alternative. Among North and West African migrants in Spain, less than half
of the money is sent via traditional means, such as postal or bank transfer
(see Annex 3.A for further details).
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6 In 2008, among the top receiving countries (e.g. Tajikistan, Tonga, Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic and Lesotho),
remittances exceeded 25 per cent of GDP.
Additionally, limited competition and the strict regulatory framework leads
to increased recourse to informal channels and may even restrict the flows
of remittances where costs are prohibitive or informal channels are less eas-
ily accessed or limited.7 For example, in West Africa it is estimated that over
two-thirds of formal remittance transfers are handled by one source, thus
keeping transfer fees relatively high.8 In fact, the fees associated with send-
ing remittances from France to Algeria or Morocco constitute more than 16
per cent of the total (Figure 3.4). Even for transfers to Senegal and Tunisia
where the fees are much lower, they still represent over 8 per cent of the
total amount of money remitted.
Figure 3.4 Cost of remitting (unweighted average) from France, 2008
(average fees and other costs as a per cent of remittances)
Note: For comparability purposes, the cost is based on the initial reference amount of 200 US$.
Source: World Bank Remittances Prices Worldwide (http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org).
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7 Ghosh (2006) op. cit.
8 IFAD: Sending Money Home: Worldwide Remittance Flows to Developing and Transitions Countries, 2006.
2. Evidence to date regarding the financial crisis
Past crises reveal that remittance flows are often countercyclical, i.e. mi-
grant workers increase their support to family members via remittances to
compensate for adverse economic, labour and social consequences.9 This
is especially the case in developing countries, where basic social security
coverage is often limited or even absent. In particular, past crises were such
that developing countries were impacted most severely and migrant work-
ers abroad – unaffected by the crises – were able to cushion the negative
impact on households in their countries of origin by increasing remittance
flows. In such cases, remittances acted as an automatic stabilizer to smooth
out fluctuations in the business cycle.10
However, the nature of the current crisis – originating in developed coun-
tries – means that, as Chapter 2 illustrated, in many instances migrant work-
ers abroad were disproportionately affected, and were among the first to
endure its effects. In financial crises such as the present one, where mi-
grant-receiving countries suffer economic difficulties, remittances are likely
to play a pro-cyclical role.
Indeed, remittance flows have fallen for the first time in decades (Table
3.1). Worldwide remittance flows are predicted to decrease by 5.3 per cent
during 2009. And compared to all developing countries, the fall in remit-
tances to North and West Africa – close to a 10 per cent reduction – is rela-
tively high. Much of this decline is being driven by falling remittances to
Morocco where flows are estimated to have declined by 17 per cent (Mo-
rocco accounts for over half of the remittances sent to the region, see
above). Although remittances are primarily private transfers, the way in
which they are spent by recipients back home may have important multi-
plier effects on the broader economy.11 Empirical analyses on the role of
the growth potential of remittances point to a multiplier effect in the order
of 1.6.12 For the four African countries analysed (and with available infor-
mation) this implies that the estimated decrease of 1.2 billion US$ in 2009
would translate into a GDP contraction of around 2 billion US$ and may
also have important implications for poverty.13
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9 S. Seyan, Business cycles and workers’ remittances: How do migrant workers respond to cyclical movements of
GDP at home?, Working Paper No. 52 (Washington, DC, IMF, 2006); S. Gupta et al.: Impact of remittances on
poverty and financial development in sub-Saharan Africa, IMF Working Paper No. 38 (Washington, DC, IMF,
2007).
10 ibid.
11 For example, migrant expenditures on housing may create new income and job opportunities for low-income
people working in construction as well as increase sales for firms selling building supplies, etc.
12 See for example, N. Glytsos: “Measuring the Income Effects of Migrant Remittances: A Methodological
Approach Applied to Greece,” in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1993, pp.
131-168; E. Taylor: Micro Economy-Wide Models for Migration and Policy Analysis: An Application to Rural
Mexico, Development Center of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Paris, OECD,
1995); E. Taylor et. al.: “Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of Migration
Perspective from China” in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 52, 2003, pp. 75–101.
13 In developing countries, the poverty-reducing effect of remittances is estimated at 10:1, signifying that a 10 per
cent fall in the remittances-to-GDP ratio is associated with a rise of more than 1 per cent in the share of people
living on less than as US$1 a day. This is based on an empirical analysis using data from 233 poverty surveys in
76 developing countries. S. Gupta Et. al.: “Making Remittances Work for Africa”, in Finance and development,
quarterly magazine of the IMF, Vol. 44, No. 2. 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/ 2007/06/
gupta.htm [accessed 15 Mar. 2010].
Table 3.1 Inward remittance flows, 2007-09 (change from previous year in
percentages)
2007 2008 2009*
World 21.3 15.3 -5.3
All developing countries 22.9 16.7 -6.1
Sub-Saharan
Africa
47.6 13.4 -2.9
North and West Africa 23.8 4.2 -9.8
Algeria 31.7 3.9 -0.4
Morocco 23.3 2.4 -17.0
Senegal 28.9 8.1 -0.9
Tunisia 13.6 9.0 -0.5
Note: Figures for 2009 are preliminary estimates. Mauritania’s inward remittance flow has remained
constant since 1998.
Source: World Bank, 2009, World Bank Migration and Development Brief, 11, 3 November.
B. Determinants of remittances
Much of the theoretical analysis of migration addresses individual decisions
based on prevailing earnings differentials between origin and destination
countries.14 According to this theory, the individuals who could gain more
from migration were the most likely to migrate. The so-called New Eco-
nomics of Labour Migration (NELM) is something of a departure from this
neoclassical approach because it focuses on the household when model-
ling the migration decision.15 In this conceptual framework, the individual
migrates for a variety of economic reasons, among which is the diversifica-
tion of risk or insurance against future adverse events – in which
remittances can play an important role.
In recent analyses of determinants, altruism and exchange have been con-
sidered as the main reasons for remitting. The altruism motive is considered
in the models based on the assumption that migrants obtain some benefit
from the use of remittances by family members at home, whose welfare im-
proves in turn. The exchange reason refers to an agreement or contract be-
tween the migrant and the recipient of remittances for specific uses of the
funds transferred. Those intended uses range from the purchase of goods,
services or assets to payments for child-care provisions. This contractual
foundation for remitting underlines the fact that part of the money which
the migrant sends goes to compensate the family member for their effort in
taking care of the absentee’s interests at home. The family member be-
comes a special agent who, by rendering a trustworthy service (e.g. child
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14 M.P. Todaro: “Internal Migration and Urban Employment: Comment/Reply”, in American Economic Review,
Vol. 77, 1986, pp. 566-572.
15 O. Stark and D. Bloom: “The New Economics of Labor Migration”, in American Economic Review, Vol. 75,
1985, pp. 173-178.
care), elicits a particularly altruistic response from the migrant. Of course,
these two motivations should not be considered independently from one
another; indeed, the NELM approach emphasizes the household-based,
mutually beneficial contractual relationship in the decision to remit.
With that in mind, the purpose of this next subsection is to shed light on the
interactions between migration, remittances and their impact on develop-
ment in general, and more specifically the well-being of relatives and fam-
ily in the country of origin with whom they retain some ties.
1. Macroeconomic factors: overview
A number of macroeconomic factors are said to influence the extent to
which migrant workers send remittances. In the first instance, the total vol-
ume of remittances would probably be a function of the number of mi-
grants abroad. A simple bivariate analysis of emigrants as a share of the
population and remittances as a share of GDP, however, reveals only a very
weak link (Figure 3.5, panel A). Such a weak relationship holds for the re-
gion: for example, whereas Senegal and Algeria have similar shares of mi-
grants outside their respective countries of origin (between 4 and 5 per
cent), the latter has more than 5 times the remittances as a share of GDP.
Others have suggested that migrants from less developed countries are
likely to send more remittances back to their country of origin. But there
appears to be an even weaker link between remittances as a share of GDP
and human development index (HDI) value (Figure 3.5, panel B). Similarly,
Adams (2008) finds that the level of poverty in a labour-sending country
has no (positive) impact on the amount of remittances received by a coun-
try. The author establishes an inverted-U shaped curve between the level of
per capita GDP income in a country and receipt of remittances, and finds
that middle-income countries receive proportionately more remittances
than low- or high-income countries.
71
Ch
ap
te
r3
Chapter 3: Remittances: determinants and implications for development
Figure 3.5 Officially recorded inward remittance flows: emigrants and HDI,
2008 (percentage of GDP)
Source: World Development Indicators, 2009.
A number of other macro factors are also said to influence remittances
flows, e.g. costs of remitting, interest rate differentials and exchange rate
movements between country of origin and country of destination curren-
cies, but with mixed results (Sayan, 2006).
Overall, according to Chami et al. (2008), once the cross-country heteroge-
neity in remittances is taken into account, the relationship between remit-
tances and macroeconomic variables and performance is complex, and
there are likely to be a variety of factors influencing remittance flows. As
such, the purpose of the following subsection is to examine a number of in-
dividual or micro-level determinants of remittances from Spain.
2. Micro-level determinants of remittances
The analysis of micro level determinants might prove more insightful, given
that remittances are, for the most part, a flow of funds between households
and therefore have an intrinsic micro-economic nature. In addition,
microanalysis of the determinants and effects of remittances can be very
useful in understanding the economic behaviour of migrant workers and
the impact of that behaviour on the well-being of those with whom they
retain some ties.
To investigate the determinants of remittances more effectively, micro-level
data from individuals and households which remit are needed. For this pur-
pose, the Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) is used to examine this
issue (Box 3.1). In addition to a large series of questions related to the indi-
vidual’s experience before and after migrating, basic characteristics are col-
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lected for all members of the household, including labour market outcomes
such as employment and earnings of migrant workers.16
Box 3.1 Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007
The survey which was carried out between November 2006 and February 2007 is based
on a nationwide representative sample of migrant workers in Spain. It covers the
foreign-born population aged 16 or older and comprises 15,465 individuals who, during
the survey, lived in Spain for at least one year or planned to live in Spain for at least one
year. One individual is randomly selected in each sampled household.
The survey has a number of limitations with regard to establishing levels of remittances.
First, around 20 per cent of individuals did not specify the amount of remittances sent and,
second, the questionnaire does not distinguish clearly between money sent by the
individual and money sent by other members of the household. As a result, it is not
possible to obtain a complete picture of the volume of remittances. Nevertheless, the
survey is a good resource for the study of migrants’ economic behaviour in Spain,
including estimating the probability of remitting money to countries of origin.
Descriptive analysis
In examining the descriptive statistics of the survey, the number of migrant
workers and source countries is generally consistent with the information
presented in Chapter 2. In particular, according to the survey, the dominant
group of migrants in Spain are from Morocco, constituting nearly 12 per
cent of all migrant workers (followed by Romania, Ecuador and Colombia).
Algerian and Senegalese migrants together represent over 2.5 per cent,
while the share of Tunisian and Mauritanian migrants in Spain is limited.
In terms of the likelihood of sending remittances to North and West Africa,
there are notably large differences between men and women (Table 3.2).
For example, just over 51 per cent of Moroccan men send money to Mo-
rocco compared to 22 per cent of Moroccan women. Similar differences –
roughly 30 percentage points – are present in other North and West African
countries. Although gender gaps are present in all other countries (with the
exception of Romania), the difference is notably less (e.g. less than 7 per-
centage points in the case of Ecuador and only 1.4 percentage points in the
case of Colombia). Interestingly, the share of Mauritanian and Senegalese
migrants remitting is comparatively high, at 90 and 80 per cent, respectively
(compared to 40 and 20 per cent for Moroccan and Algerian migrants).
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16 Similar approaches were undertaken in Botswana, Germany and Mexico. See, for example, Lucas and Stark
(1985); Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006); and E. Holst et. al.: Gender, migration, remittances: Evidence from
Germany, German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) paper No. 111 (Berlin, Deutsches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2008).
Table 3.2 Share of migrants who remit from Spain, by country of origin and
gender, 2007 (percentages)
Men Women Total
Algeria 39.0 6.7 29.1
Morocco 51.3 22.4 40.8
Mauritania 93.5 50.8 89.8
Senegal 84.6 57.1 80.2
Tunisia 75.4 0.0 54.9
Colombia 64.2 62.8 63.4
Ecuador 70.8 64.5 67.5
Romania 61.8 62.4 62.1
All countries 41.1 36.7 39.0
Note: In this and other tables of the chapter, “all countries” refers to all migrants.
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
The average amount of remittances sent each year also varies considerably
by country, with an average of 1,900 euros sent per person each year with
men remitting slightly more on average (approximately 2,000 euros by men
and 1,700 euros by women (Table 3.3). The gap between men and women
also varies but is present across all countries. In terms of amounts, among
North and West African countries, Mauritanian and Senegalese migrants
send the most, on average, per annum. Remittances are also sent on a fre-
quent basis – the overwhelming majority being sent at least once a month,
or every three months.17
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17 See Annex 3.A. for more detailed information on frequency of remitting
Table 3.3 Average annual migrant remittances from Spain, by gender, 2007
(euros)
Mean amount sent by person
Men Women Total
Algeria 1 220 722 1 179
Morocco 1 381 1 168 1 340
Mauritania 2 587 1 200 2 484
Senegal 1 507 1 135 1 439
Tunisia 1 112 – 1 112
Colombia 2 778 2 066 2 361
Ecuador 2 376 2 183 2 279
Romania 1 664 1 380 1 536
All countries 2 026 1 737 1 895
Note: In this and other tables of the chapter, “all countries” refers to all migrants.
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
Between two-thirds and three-quarters of all remittances are destined for
either the spouse/partner or parent (Table 3.4). Some interesting results
emerge in analysing the distribution among North and West African coun-
tries. For example, Algerian and Moroccans migrants remit principally to
their parents, suggesting perhaps a younger cohort of migrants (consistent
with the findings in Chapter 2). For other countries, the distribution of re-
cipients is more evenly shared between spouses and parents. Indeed, some
of the reasons behind individuals’ decisions to remit and their choice of re-
cipient are linked to a series of individual characteristics, such as age, fam-
ily composition and labour market performance – the examination of
which is the purpose of the next subsection.
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Table 3.4 Person to whom the money was sent, 2007
Men Women
Spouse or
partner
Parent Other Spouse or
partner
Parent Other
Algeria 17.7 76.6 5.7 0.0 30.9 69.1
Morocco 18.4 67.0 14.5 0.0 75.8 24.2
Mauritania 64.9 35.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Senegal 55.8 41.5 2.7 0.0 69.1 30.8
Tunisia – – – – – –
Colombia 10.7 56.3 33.0 3.9 58.9 37.2
Ecuador 11.1 59.4 29.5 2.6 61.6 35.7
Romania 11.0 62.4 26.7 2.7 68.3 29.0
All countries 16.1 57.3 26.5 3.8 59.5 36.7
Note: In this and other tables of the chapter, “all countries” refers to all migrants.
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
Multivariate analysis of the probability of remitting
To estimate the probability of remitting, a probit model is used in order to
control for a large set of variables related to the individual characteristics of
the migrants and those of the sending household (see Box 3.2 and Annex
3.A). While it was not possible to include in the analysis probabilities asso-
ciated with the amount remitted, the analysis sheds light on the important
issue of the characteristics associated with remitting.
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Box 3.2  Multivariate analysis and model specifications
Six probit models, in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual
indicated they sent money outside of Spain and zero otherwise, were specified. The first
two regressions refer to both men and women, differentiating individuals by their labour
force status (total sample and only employed individuals considered). The other four
regressions consider each gender separately in order to identify possible differences
between men and women in their behaviour in terms of remittances. In all regressions
sampling weights were used.
An individual’s labour force status is taken into consideration by including variables that
consider whether the person holds a job (self-employed, salaried or other situation), is
searching for work (11.7 per cent); is studying (5 per cent) or falls into another category,
mainly inactivity (7 per cent of men and 23 per cent of women).
Residents in Spain born in the following countries were excluded from the sample:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
See Annex 3.A for more details regarding the regression results.
Consistent with many other studies, the results presented here point to a
mixture of motives for remitting. The results are summarized according to
the following grouping of explanatory variables: (i) labour force status and
work-related variables; (ii) personal and demographic variables, including
education; (iii) marital status and household composition; (iv) year of ar-
rival and residency status; (v) migration experience related variables; and,
(vi) country of origin and other variables (see Annex 3.A for detailed results).
 Labour force status and work-related variables
While some of the employment status-related variables are not statistically
significant in terms of predicting remittance behaviour, a number of
work-related variables reveal some interesting findings:
 employment security (temporary versus permanent contract) does not
seem to influence the remittance probability;
 working in the same job since arriving in the country of destination has a
negative and very significant effect on the probability of migrant workers
remitting. This may be due to the fact that those with more job stability
may be more likely to stay in the country of destination and thus perhaps
remit less, and;
 individuals who arrived in the destination country with a job offer are 8
per cent more likely to remit (the positive marginal effect is much higher
for women at 14.2 per cent versus 5.4 per cent for men).
77
Ch
ap
te
r3
Chapter 3: Remittances: determinants and implications for development
However, being jobless drastically reduces the probability of remitting. In
particular, unemployed migrants are 12 per cent less likely to remit than
wage and salary workers. In particular, earnings appear to be a strong indi-
cator of the likelihood to remit (Figure 3.6). Very low earnings (500-750 eu-
ros per month) have a negative impact on the probability of remitting. The
threshold seems to be around 750 euros per month, after which the likeli-
hood of remitting for men increases with monthly earnings. For example,
male migrant workers who earn a monthly salary of 1,500 euros or more
are 16.2 per cent more likely to remit than men who earn in the range of
500-750 euros. For female migrants workers, remitting and earnings are
negatively associated but the results are not statistically significant.
Figure 3.6 Marginal effects of earnings on the probability of remitting money to
countries of origin, by gender (percentages)
Note: Coefficients of earnings dummies in the regression for women are not statistically significant.
The omitted earnings bracket is 500-750 euros per month. See Table 3A5.
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
 Personal and demographic characteristics, including education
In terms of age and education, a number of results emerge regarding the
likelihood to remit. Firstly, younger migrants are less likely to remit, espe-
cially if they are male. Secondly, the first level of tertiary education is asso-
ciated with a significantly lower probability of remitting although earnings
and education are highly correlated (3.7). Finally, migrants who finished
their studies in Spain or who have received recognition for previous educa-
tion activities show a much lower probability of remitting than others.
78
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
10.2 10.8
12.7
16.2
-5.9
-3.1
-1.0
-8.9 -8.4
-27.7
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
less than 500 750-1,000 1,000-1,250 1,250-1,500 more than 1,500
M
ar
gi
na
le
ffe
ct
s
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
Men Women
Figure 3.7 Marginal effects of education levels on the probability of remitting
money to countries of origin by human capital-related variables (percentages)
Note: The only dummy significantly different from zero is tertiary first level. The omitted dummy is
primary education. For educational levels, see Table 3A5.
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
 Marital status and household composition
In terms of remitting behaviour, married migrants behave differently to
those who are single. In particular, if the spouse is in the country of origin,
the probability of remitting is 23 per cent higher than that for a single per-
son. This effect is equally strong for men and women. However, if the mi-
grant worker is married and the spouse is in the country of destination, the
probability of remitting is lower than that of single men, but it is not the
case for single women.
A set of variables is also included in order to assess the influence of house-
hold composition and family structure. In particular, a series of dummies is
created to reflect the number of adults (16 years and over) and children in
the household in the country of destination. The hypothesis – which turns
out to be correct – is that the probability of remitting by a given migrant
worker decreases with the number of other emigrants from the same
household.
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 Year of arrival and residency status
With respect to year of arrival and residency status (two highly correlated
variables), migrant workers who arrived in the period between 2003 and
2004 are the most likely to remit, regardless of gender. Generally, the re-
sults regarding year of arrival are mixed; however, the evidence with re-
spect to residency status is more conclusive. Moroccan migrants in Spain
with permanent or temporary residency status are more likely to remit com-
pared to nationalized citizens or other types of status, e.g. irregular, with
the latter being statistically significant. Similarly, for migrants in Spain from
the other four countries of origin, those with permanent residency status
demonstrate the highest propensity to remit. Moreover, the propensity of
women to remit is more negatively affected by Spanish citizenship than that
of men. In addition, temporary residents are significantly more likely to
remit when compared to permanent residents.
 Variables related to the migration experience and future plans
Some interesting results in the probit analysis are obtained when control-
ling for a variety of measures intended to capture the migrant workers’ ex-
perience and reasons for migrating. For example, migrants who left either
to find employment or to improve their working conditions (who constitute
the majority of migrants), are 14 per cent more likely to remit money than
people who migrated for other reasons. In addition, and consistent with
theory, migrants who had to finance their migration are significantly more
likely to remit when compared with those who did not. Similarly, male mi-
grants who transited through another country before arriving in Spain were
significantly more likely to remit. This latter result may be associated with
higher financing costs associated with migrating.
A crucial determinant of remittances is the intention of the migrant to return
to their country of origin, which is also a relevant issue for the development
of origin countries (Durand et al., 1996).18 Some studies have found that re-
mittances can be motivated by the desire to accumulate resources that can
then be used for setting up a business on returning to the country of origin.
Thus, plans to return should encourage the migrant to remit part of their
savings (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002).19 Interestingly, in the ENI sur-
vey, those who do have a clear intention are significantly more likely to
send remittances (for women without any clear intentions, the probability
of remitting remains positive and highly significant).
 Country of origin and other variables
The final set of variables refers to the country of origin and the region
within the country of destination. The result is that there are significant dif-
ferences in the propensity to remit by country of origin. In particular, for
the five countries of interest in this report, migrants from Algeria are less
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18 J. Durand et al: “International migration and development in Mexican communities”, in Demography, Vol. 33,
No. 2, 1996, pp. 249–264.
19 C. Dustmann and O. Kirchkamp: “The optimal migration duration and activity choice after remigration” in
Journal of Development Economics, 2002, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 351-372.
likely to remit than migrants from Mauritania, Senegal and Tunisia (these
three countries were aggregated due to sample size) and Morocco.
Additionally, there are significant differences in the coefficient associated
with country of origin when estimating regressions for each gender sepa-
rately. For instance, the coefficient for Moroccan migrants is strongly signif-
icant but positive for men and negative for women. Although Algerian
migrants yield negative signs for both genders, it is much more significant
for women. Note that, in general, the country of origin specific effect tends
to be less positive, or more negative, among women than among men, but
that differences in country-specific effects on the probability of remitting
deserve more attention in future research.
C. Concluding considerations
Over the past decade, remittance flows to North and West Africa have in-
creased rapidly – reaching over 12 billion US$ in 2008. However, the onset
of the financial and economic crisis has brought a number of challenges
with remittance flows falling substantially in 2009 compared to 2008. These
trends have highlighted the importance of remittances in the context of
development.
The purpose of this chapter was to shed light on the nature with which mi-
grants from remit money from Spain, with a view to better understanding
the implications for development. The analysis illustrated that remittances
are principally financial flows between family members – between
two-thirds and three-quarters of remittances to North and West Africa are
destined for either the spouse/partner or parent. Not surprisingly, the lim-
ited evidence suggests that the bulk of remittances are used to support
household subsistence. For example, a 2007 survey by the African Devel-
opment Bank found that priority in most cases for remittances is given to
household consumption (essential goods and services) and health. For in-
stance, 69 and 98 per cent of family expenses are financed from remittances
in Morocco and Senegal respectively (Table 3.5). Similarly, the MIREM re-
port of Maghreb countries found that two-thirds of the remittances were in-
tended to provide for immediate family needs.20
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20 However, 20 per cent went to helping with children’s education, while 10 per cent went into business
investment and 7 per cent towards investment in agricultural equipment (J. P. Cassarino: Return migrants to the
Maghreb Countries: Reintegration and development challenges, MIREM Global Report, Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies (Florence, European University Institute, 2008)).
Table 3.5 Utilization ratios per budget item of remittances (percentages)
Senegal Mali Morocco
Family expenses 98 94 69
Health 81 87 30
Education/training 55 59 26
Family construction 19 47 10
Individual 14 29 6
Productive investments 11 46 13
Social project 5 25 1
Source: African Development Bank (AfDB) survey, 2007.
The more influential factors determining the remittance decision seem to
be found at the micro level, notably likelihood of remitting increases with
the levels of earnings but falls, generally, with education. Another crucial
determinant of remittances, which has significant development implica-
tions, is that migrant workers who have the intention to return to the coun-
try of origin are more likely to remit.
For North and West African countries, these micro-level insights are impor-
tant because of the linkages between the macro and micro dimensions of
remittances in terms of implications for development. Indeed, positive wel-
fare improvements at the household level (e.g. poverty reduction) can im-
prove overall development via multiplier and macroeconomic effects – as
well as having important distributional implications.21
To ensure the mutually reinforcing nature of remittances, a number of pos-
sible considerations merit attention. First, consider ways in which remit-
tances can be leveraged to enhance the overall multiplier effects. To do
this, efforts are needed to strengthen the linkages between remit-
tance-sending households, receiving households, communities, and na-
tional authorities in countries of origin. Second, and related, is that without
the necessary economic infrastructure, remittances will be unable to realise
their full potential at the national level. Third, there are important connec-
tions – potentially mutually reinforcing in terms of development – to be
made between remittances and return migration, the latter of which is dis-
cussed in the following chapter. And finally, permanent residency status
(and in some cases temporary residency) is associated with a higher proba-
bility of remitting and as such, consideration should be given to how a
more orderly or regulated migration process could benefit both countries
of origin and destination. Chapter 5 considers a number of ways the
address these challenges.
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21 See also A. Mansoor and B. Quillin: Migration and remittances: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006).
Annex 3.A Detailed results of micro-level determinants of
remitting.
Table 3A1 Amount of annual remittances from Spain to selected countries,
2007
Total amount remitted by population
(Non-missing amount in million Euros)
Median amount sent by individuals
(Euros)
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Algeria 13.4 0.7 14.1 1 200 600 1 000
Morocco 193.0 38.8 231.7 1 000 600 1 000
Mauritania 12.4 0.5 12.9 1 100 1 200 1 200
Senegal 17.0 2.9 19.9 1 200 1 500 1 200
Tunisia 0.9 0.0 0.9 300 0 300
Colombia 173.0 182.0 355.0 2 000 1 500 1 800
Ecuador 249.0 230.7 479.7 1 440 1 400 1 440
Romania 194.0 131.3 325.0 1 000 700 800
All countries 1549.0 1102.0 2651.0 1 200 1 000 1 000
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
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Table 3A2  With what frequency do you send the money overseas?
Once a
week
At least
once a
month
At least
one
every
three
months
At least
once
every
four
months
At least
once a
year
Less
than
once
a year
Occasionally,
when it is
possible or
needed
Total
Men
Algeria 1.5 24.6 28.1 8.2 2.4 0.6 34.4 100
Morocco 0.3 41.9 24.7 4.7 3.5 0.9 24.0 100
Mauritania 0.0 11.1 6.8 20.1 12.6 0.0 49.4 100
Senegal 2.6 62.4 5.5 0.3 4.4 0.0 24.7 100
Tunisia 0.0 8.7 0.0 16.1 52.1 0.0 23.2 100
Colombia 1.7 62.6 15.3 3.9 1.4 0.0 15.0 100
Ecuador 1.4 65.6 12.4 5.4 1.6 0.2 13.5 100
Romania 0.8 35.6 14.2 9.9 5.3 0.7 33.5 100
All countries 1.1 48.1 18.8 6.6 3.5 0.5 21.5 100
Women
Algeria 0.0 25.0 31.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.7 100
Morocco 0.7 38.0 27.5 8.5 6.3 0.5 18.5 100
Mauritania 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Senegal 0.0 1.0 0.0 17.5 59.6 0.0 21.8 100
Tunisia – – – – – – – –
Colombia 2.6 66.3 10.0 3.5 1.9 0.0 15.7 100
Ecuador 1.4 65.2 12.8 5.6 1.6 0.2 13.3 100
Romania 0.2 31.3 27.0 8.9 5.8 0.3 26.5 100
All countries 1.0 49.0 18.2 7.1 5.1 0.6 19.0 100
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
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Table 3A3  What was the most frequent way of sending the money?
Postal transfer Bank transfer Other agency Other people Other way Total
Men
Algeria 15.8 7.8 20.3 49.2 7.0 100
Morocco 16.8 11.9 62.5 6.9 1.9 100
Mauritania 9.1 10.0 68.3 12.6 0.0 100
Senegal 14.4 10.5 75.2 0.0 0.0 100
Tunisia 23.2 52.1 24.7 0.0 0.0 100
Colombia 15.0 29.2 54.5 0.9 0.4 100
Ecuador 13.9 28.2 57.4 0.4 0.0 100
Romania 15.7 19.1 58 6.1 1.1 100
All countries 13.6 27.3 52.8 4.9 1.4 100
Women
Algeria 36.1 0.0 23.3 40.4 0.0 100
Morocco 26.8 14.9 50.1 4.8 3.5 100
Mauritania 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100
Senegal 59.6 30.9 9.5 0.0 0.0 100
Tunisia – – – – – –
Colombia 14.9 25.5 57.7 0.6 1.3 100
Ecuador 10.7 35.6 52.1 0.9 0.8 100
Romania 15.6 19.3 57.8 6.2 1.0 100
All countries 14.1 29.3 51.1 3.7 1.8 100
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
Table 3A4 Propensity to remit money by country of origin and residency
status (percentages)
Morocco Rest of Africa
Nationalized Spanish 9.1 17.8
Other EU-25 0.0 4.8
Resident, permanent 47.7 66.2
Resident, temporary 52.2 60.5
Resident, with EU card 26.7 61.1
Resident, other 31.3 45.5
Total 36.4 50.2
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) 2007; Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) 2009.
85
Annexes
86
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Ta
bl
e
3A
5
Pr
ob
it
es
tim
at
es
o
ft
he
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
o
fs
en
di
ng
m
o
n
ey
to
ho
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
-
A
ll
m
ig
ra
nt
s
by
ge
nd
er
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Pe
rs
on
al
an
d
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
v
ar
ia
bl
es
Fe
m
al
e
0.
03
4
*
*
0.
01
5
0.
47
5
Ag
ed
16
-1
9
-
0.
21
4
*
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
06
3
-
0.
25
5
*
*
*
0.
06
0
0.
06
6
-
0.
18
5
*
*
*
0.
05
6
0.
05
9
20
-2
4
-
0.
04
7
*
0.
02
8
0.
11
1
-
0.
09
1
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
10
1
-
0.
03
1
0.
03
6
0.
12
2
25
-2
9
0.
02
6
0.
02
3
0.
17
5
0.
02
3
0.
03
4
0.
18
4
0.
01
6
0.
03
0
0.
16
5
30
-3
4
0.
17
3
0.
18
0
0.
16
4
35
-3
9
0.
01
8
0.
02
3
0.
14
9
-
0.
01
0
0.
03
4
0.
15
9
0.
04
9
0.
03
1
0.
13
9
40
-4
4
0.
04
2
0.
02
7
0.
10
9
0.
06
7
*
0.
04
0
0.
10
4
0.
02
9
0.
03
5
0.
11
4
45
-4
9
0.
04
5
0.
03
0
0.
07
9
0.
06
6
0.
04
5
0.
07
8
0.
03
4
0.
03
9
0.
08
0
50
or
m
or
e
-
0.
03
9
0.
02
8
0.
14
1
-
0.
02
1
0.
04
5
0.
12
8
-
0.
04
5
0.
03
4
0.
15
6
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Le
ss
th
an
pr
im
ar
y
-
0.
04
8
0.
04
4
0.
03
3
-
0.
09
1
0.
05
8
0.
04
1
0.
04
6
0.
06
4
0.
02
4
Pr
im
ar
y
0.
25
1
0.
25
5
0.
24
8
Se
co
nd
ar
yf
irs
tl
ev
el
-
0.
02
0
0.
02
4
0.
16
3
-
0.
01
0
0.
03
6
0.
17
3
-
0.
02
4
0.
03
2
0.
15
1
Se
co
nd
ar
ys
ec
on
d
le
ve
l
0.
02
3
0.
02
0
0.
37
2
0.
03
0
0.
02
9
0.
36
6
0.
01
6
0.
02
6
0.
37
8
Te
rti
ar
y
fir
st
le
ve
l
-
0.
04
7
*
0.
02
5
0.
16
6
-
0.
07
1
*
0.
03
9
0.
14
9
-
0.
03
8
0.
03
1
0.
18
5
Te
rti
ar
y
se
co
nd
le
ve
l
-
0.
01
8
0.
05
9
0.
01
5
0.
02
8
0.
08
5
0.
01
6
-
0.
05
5
0.
08
4
0.
01
5
87
Annexes
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Fi
ni
sh
ed
st
ud
ie
s
in
Sp
ai
n
-
0.
11
2
*
*
*
0.
02
4
0.
14
5
-
0.
09
6
*
*
0.
03
9
0.
14
3
-
0.
12
1
*
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
14
8
Cr
ed
en
tia
lr
ec
og
ni
tio
n
-
0.
08
5
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
07
3
-
0.
02
8
0.
04
4
0.
06
6
-
0.
12
7
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
08
1
M
ar
ita
ls
ta
tu
s
Si
ng
le
0.
48
8
0.
47
6
0.
50
1
M
ar
rie
d,
sp
ou
se
ho
m
e
co
un
try
0.
23
4
*
*
*
0.
03
3
0.
06
7
0.
22
4
*
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
09
6
0.
18
9
*
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
03
4
M
ar
rie
d,
sp
ou
se
ho
st
co
un
try
-
0.
02
1
0.
01
6
0.
44
6
-
0.
09
2
*
*
*
0.
02
5
0.
42
8
0.
04
3
*
*
0.
02
1
0.
46
5
Ho
us
eh
ol
d
co
m
po
si
tio
n 1
ad
ul
t
0.
03
9
0.
04
3
0.
03
6
2
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
03
3
0.
03
1
0.
06
7
-
0.
01
2
0.
05
2
0.
04
4
-
0.
07
7
*
0.
04
1
0.
09
2
2
m
em
be
rs
,2
ad
ul
ts
0.
01
3
0.
03
2
0.
09
9
0.
07
0
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
10
7
-
0.
06
1
0.
04
5
0.
09
1
3
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
05
1
0.
03
3
0.
05
0
-
0.
01
1
0.
05
6
0.
03
6
-
0.
11
1
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
06
6
3
m
em
be
rs
,2
or
3
ad
ul
ts
0.
00
6
0.
03
1
0.
17
5
0.
08
1
*
0.
04
3
0.
17
9
-
0.
09
0
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
17
1
4
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
12
4
*
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
03
6
-
0.
16
1
*
*
*
0.
05
6
0.
03
3
-
0.
13
8
*
*
*
0.
04
9
0.
03
9
4
m
em
be
rs
,2
or
m
or
e
ad
ul
ts
-
0.
06
1
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
20
5
-
0.
00
1
0.
04
5
0.
21
3
-
0.
14
2
*
*
*
0.
04
1
0.
19
7
5
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
10
3
*
0.
05
1
0.
01
2
-
0.
14
7
0.
09
0
0.
00
9
-
0.
11
5
*
0.
06
3
0.
01
5
5
m
em
be
rs
,2
or
m
or
e
ad
ul
ts
-
0.
05
4
0.
03
3
0.
13
8
-
0.
02
0
0.
04
8
0.
14
1
-
0.
10
5
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
13
5
6+
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
06
5
0.
06
2
0.
00
6
-
0.
17
9
0.
13
1
0.
00
4
-
0.
05
3
0.
07
5
0.
00
9
6+
m
em
be
rs
,2
+
ad
ul
ts
-
0.
04
6
0.
03
4
0.
17
2
0.
03
3
0.
04
8
0.
19
2
-
0.
14
6
*
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
15
0
88
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Ye
ar
o
fa
rr
iv
al
Ar
riv
ed
in
19
80
or
be
fo
re
-
0.
07
3
*
0.
04
4
0.
08
5
-
0.
06
6
0.
06
3
0.
08
5
-
0.
09
9
*
0.
05
6
0.
08
5
19
81
-1
99
0
-
0.
04
9
0.
03
8
0.
06
4
-
0.
08
8
0.
05
5
0.
06
6
-
0.
04
0
0.
05
2
0.
06
1
19
91
-2
00
0
-
0.
01
1
0.
02
4
0.
28
0
-
0.
05
0
0.
03
7
0.
29
2
0.
00
9
0.
03
1
0.
26
6
20
01
-2
00
2
-
0.
03
9
*
0.
02
2
0.
22
8
-
0.
08
9
*
*
*
0.
03
4
0.
21
8
0.
00
0
0.
02
8
0.
23
9
20
03
-2
00
4
0.
19
2
0.
18
5
0.
20
0
20
05
-2
00
7
-
0.
09
7
*
*
*
0.
02
5
0.
15
1
-
0.
11
7
*
*
*
0.
03
9
0.
15
3
-
0.
07
3
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
14
9
Re
si
de
nc
y
st
at
us
Na
tio
na
lis
ed
Sp
an
ish
-
0.
15
4
*
*
*
0.
02
5
0.
18
9
-
0.
17
4
*
*
*
0.
03
8
0.
17
1
-
0.
13
8
*
*
*
0.
03
3
0.
21
0
Re
sid
en
t,
pe
rm
an
en
t
0.
16
9
0.
35
5
Re
sid
en
t,
te
m
po
ra
ry
0.
02
4
0.
02
2
0.
36
8
0.
01
4
0.
03
2
0.
38
4
0.
02
2
0.
03
0
0.
35
0
Re
sid
en
t,
w
ith
EU
ca
rd
0.
02
3
0.
03
6
0.
05
5
0.
07
5
0.
06
1
0.
04
7
-
0.
01
7
0.
04
3
0.
06
4
Re
sid
en
t,
ot
he
r
-
0.
03
7
0.
02
9
0.
17
4
-
0.
02
8
0.
04
4
0.
16
9
-
0.
06
6
*
0.
03
7
0.
18
0
O
th
er
EU
-2
5
-
0.
24
3
*
*
*
0.
03
9
0.
04
5
-
0.
23
3
*
*
*
0.
05
9
0.
04
6
-
0.
26
1
*
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
04
4
M
ig
ra
tio
n
ex
pe
rie
nc
e
M
ig
ra
te
d
fo
rw
or
k
0.
14
0
*
*
*
0.
01
7
0.
55
7
0.
14
1
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
62
5
0.
12
8
*
*
*
0.
02
2
0.
48
2
M
ig
ra
te
d
fa
m
ily
re
un
ific
at
io
n
-
0.
06
9
*
*
*
0.
01
8
0.
31
0
-
0.
09
1
*
*
*
0.
02
9
0.
23
7
-
0.
05
3
*
*
0.
02
2
0.
39
2
M
ig
ra
te
d
fo
ro
th
er
re
as
on
s
0.
13
3
0.
13
8
0.
12
7
Di
d
n
ot
pa
y
fo
rt
rip
0.
29
9
0.
28
7
0.
31
2
89
Annexes
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Ye
s,
pa
id
by
in
st
al
lm
en
ts
0.
14
3
*
*
*
0.
03
0
0.
07
6
0.
12
0
*
*
*
0.
04
8
0.
06
2
0.
15
6
*
*
*
0.
03
8
0.
09
1
Ye
s,
pa
id
ca
sh
di
d
n
ot
bo
rro
w
0.
08
9
*
*
*
0.
02
0
0.
49
9
0.
08
0
*
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
53
5
0.
09
3
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
46
0
Ye
s,
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
ba
nk
0.
18
4
*
*
*
0.
06
4
0.
00
9
0.
07
5
0.
10
3
0.
00
8
0.
27
6
*
*
*
0.
07
4
0.
01
1
Ye
s,
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
fa
m
ily
0.
27
0
*
*
*
0.
05
5
0.
01
2
0.
27
7
*
*
*
0.
07
5
0.
01
2
0.
27
9
*
*
*
0.
08
1
0.
01
3
Ye
s,
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
m
on
ey
le
nd
er
0.
16
6
*
*
*
0.
02
8
0.
09
2
0.
11
1
*
*
0.
04
4
0.
08
8
0.
23
2
*
*
*
0.
03
4
0.
09
6
Ye
s,
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
ot
he
rs
0.
27
1
*
*
*
0.
05
5
0.
01
3
0.
37
8
*
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
00
9
0.
23
4
*
*
*
0.
07
6
0.
01
8
W
en
tt
o
ot
he
rc
ou
nt
ry
be
fo
re
Sp
ai
n
0.
02
8
0.
02
4
0.
11
7
0.
07
7
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
14
0
-
0.
03
9
0.
03
2
0.
09
1
No
tg
oi
ng
ba
ck
in
5
ye
ar
s
0.
79
8
0.
80
6
0.
78
9
Ye
s,
go
in
g
ba
ck
in
5
ye
ar
s
0.
11
0
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
07
7
0.
12
5
*
*
*
0.
04
3
0.
07
0
0.
10
3
*
*
*
0.
03
3
0.
08
6
Do
n’
tk
n
ow
if
go
in
g
ba
ck
0.
04
1
*
0.
02
2
0.
12
5
-
0.
00
4
0.
03
2
0.
12
4
0.
08
9
*
*
*
0.
03
0
0.
12
5
La
bo
ur
fo
rc
e
st
at
us
an
d
w
o
rk
re
la
te
d
v
ar
ia
bl
es
W
or
kin
g,
se
lf-
em
pl
oy
ed
-
0.
03
8
0.
02
8
0.
07
5
-
0.
04
3
0.
04
1
0.
07
9
-
0.
03
1
0.
03
7
0.
07
1
W
or
kin
g,
sa
la
rie
d
0.
57
9
0.
66
9
0.
48
1
W
or
kin
g,
ot
he
rs
itu
at
io
n
0.
18
1
*
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
03
1
0.
20
3
*
*
*
0.
07
1
0.
02
3
0.
15
3
*
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
03
9
Se
ar
ch
in
g
fo
r
w
or
k
-
0.
11
8
*
*
*
0.
02
1
0.
11
8
-
0.
12
2
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
11
3
-
0.
11
7
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
12
3
St
ud
yin
g
-
0.
35
2
*
*
*
0.
02
8
0.
05
0
-
0.
43
3
*
*
*
0.
04
1
0.
04
5
-
0.
28
8
*
*
*
0.
03
6
0.
05
5
O
th
er
sit
ua
tio
n
-
0.
19
5
*
*
*
0.
02
0
0.
14
8
-
0.
22
6
*
*
*
0.
03
9
0.
07
1
-
0.
17
7
*
*
*
0.
02
3
0.
23
2
90
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Co
un
try
o
fo
rig
in
O
th
er
co
un
tri
es
of
bi
rth
0.
29
8
0.
27
7
0.
32
1
Bu
lg
ar
ia
-
0.
09
7
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
02
8
-
0.
06
8
0.
06
7
0.
02
8
-
0.
11
8
*
*
*
0.
05
6
0.
02
8
Po
la
nd
0.
12
8
*
0.
07
1
0.
01
3
0.
22
9
*
*
0.
09
1
0.
01
4
0.
05
2
*
0.
09
4
0.
01
3
Ro
m
an
ia
0.
06
3
*
*
0.
02
5
0.
12
2
0.
07
1
*
0.
03
8
0.
12
5
0.
07
0
*
*
*
0.
03
4
0.
12
0
Uk
ra
in
e
0.
04
0
0.
05
4
0.
01
9
0.
12
5
0.
08
3
0.
01
7
-
0.
05
1
*
*
*
0.
06
3
0.
02
1
Ru
ss
ia
n
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
-
0.
05
8
0.
08
2
0.
01
0
0.
19
7
0.
15
0
0.
00
6
-
0.
19
8
*
*
*
0.
05
8
0.
01
4
M
ex
ico
-
0.
20
1
*
*
*
0.
06
5
0.
00
9
-
0.
30
8
*
*
0.
10
1
0.
00
7
-
0.
18
0
*
*
*
0.
07
2
0.
01
1
Co
lo
m
bi
a
0.
15
6
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
08
5
0.
21
2
*
*
*
0.
04
1
0.
06
6
0.
11
8
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
10
6
Ec
ua
do
r
0.
12
3
*
*
*
0.
02
7
0.
10
6
0.
21
1
*
*
*
0.
03
6
0.
09
7
0.
05
0
*
0.
03
6
0.
11
5
Pe
ru
0.
14
6
*
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
03
9
0.
21
9
*
*
*
0.
05
1
0.
04
0
0.
07
1
*
0.
05
0
0.
03
9
Ur
ug
ua
y
-
0.
10
5
*
*
0.
04
7
0.
02
3
-
0.
08
9
0.
07
3
0.
02
2
-
0.
09
4
*
0.
05
9
0.
02
4
Ve
ne
zu
el
a
-
0.
19
2
*
*
*
0.
03
9
0.
03
0
-
0.
21
1
*
*
*
0.
06
6
0.
02
8
-
0.
17
2
*
*
*
0.
04
7
0.
03
2
Al
ge
ria
-
0.
18
9
*
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
01
5
-
0.
10
5
0.
06
8
0.
02
0
-
0.
34
5
*
*
*
0.
05
1
0.
01
0
M
or
oc
co
0.
01
7
0.
02
6
0.
15
3
0.
12
5
*
*
*
0.
03
6
0.
18
6
-
0.
14
6
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
11
7
M
au
rit
an
ia
,T
un
isi
a,
Se
ne
ga
l
0.
31
5
*
*
0.
06
1
0.
01
2
0.
35
9
*
*
*
0.
05
4
0.
01
9
0.
08
2
*
0.
19
6
0.
00
4
O
th
er
Af
ric
an
co
un
tri
es
0.
12
6
*
*
*
0.
03
8
0.
03
8
0.
11
4
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
05
1
0.
15
7
*
*
*
0.
05
2
0.
02
4
Pr
op
or
tio
n
of
sa
m
pl
e
re
m
itt
in
g
0.
49
0
0.
51
3
0.
46
4
Pr
ed
.p
ro
ba
bi
lity
(at
m
ea
ns
)
0.
46
9
0.
49
2
0.
43
8
91
Annexes
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Nu
m
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
11
60
7
52
00
64
07
Ps
eu
do
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
23
8
0.
26
0
0.
24
3
Lo
g
ps
eu
do
lik
el
ih
oo
d
-
61
28
-
26
65
-
33
52
No
te
:
Si
gn
ific
an
tle
ve
ls:
*
0.
05
<=
p<
0.
1;
*
*
0.
01
<=
p<
0.
05
;*
*
*
p<
0.
01
So
ur
ce
:
En
cu
es
ta
Na
cio
na
ld
e
In
m
igr
an
te
s(
EN
I)2
00
7;
In
st
itu
to
Na
tio
na
ld
e
Es
ta
di
st
ica
(IN
E)
20
09
.
92
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Ta
bl
e
3A
6
Pr
ob
it
es
tim
at
es
o
ft
he
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
o
fs
en
di
ng
m
o
n
ey
to
ho
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
-
A
ll
em
pl
oy
ed
w
o
rk
er
s
by
ge
n
de
r
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Pe
rs
on
al
an
d
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
v
ar
ia
bl
es
Fe
m
al
e
0.
04
9
*
*
0.
02
0
0.
41
0
Ag
ed
16
-1
9
-
0.
13
5
*
0.
07
5
0.
02
4
-
0.
17
1
*
0.
10
1
0.
02
5
-
0.
09
1
0.
11
0
0.
02
4
20
-2
4
-
0.
06
6
*
0.
03
5
0.
10
6
-
0.
09
0
*
0.
04
8
0.
10
2
-
0.
05
2
0.
04
8
0.
11
2
25
-2
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
7
0.
19
1
0.
01
3
0.
03
7
0.
19
7
0.
02
0
0.
03
7
0.
18
4
30
-3
4
0.
19
1
0.
19
9
0.
18
1
35
-3
9
0.
03
0
0.
02
6
0.
16
7
0.
01
2
0.
03
6
0.
17
6
0.
05
5
0.
03
6
0.
15
4
40
-4
4
0.
04
4
0.
03
0
0.
12
1
0.
08
0
*
0.
04
1
0.
11
4
0.
01
9
0.
04
2
0.
13
0
45
-4
9
0.
05
7
*
0.
03
3
0.
09
0
0.
06
3
0.
04
6
0.
08
6
0.
06
2
0.
04
5
0.
09
4
50
or
m
or
e
0.
02
0
0.
03
3
0.
11
0
0.
02
9
0.
04
8
0.
10
1
0.
02
6
0.
04
3
0.
12
2
Ed
uc
at
io
n L
es
s
th
an
pr
im
ar
y
-
0.
07
8
0.
05
7
0.
02
9
-
0.
08
3
0.
06
8
0.
03
8
-
0.
10
4
0.
09
4
0.
01
6
Pr
im
ar
y
0.
22
5
0.
24
3
0.
20
0
Se
co
nd
ar
yf
irs
tl
ev
el
-
0.
02
3
0.
02
9
0.
15
3
0.
01
9
0.
03
9
0.
16
5
-
0.
07
2
*
0.
04
2
0.
13
7
Se
co
nd
ar
ys
ec
on
d
le
ve
l
0.
00
0
0.
02
4
0.
40
0
0.
02
7
0.
03
2
0.
38
7
-
0.
03
8
0.
03
4
0.
41
8
Te
rti
ar
y
fir
st
le
ve
l
-
0.
06
4
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
17
5
-
0.
05
0
0.
04
5
0.
15
0
-
0.
08
5
*
*
0.
04
1
0.
21
0
Te
rti
ar
y
se
co
nd
le
ve
l
0.
00
4
0.
06
5
0.
01
8
0.
04
4
0.
09
1
0.
01
7
-
0.
06
1
0.
10
2
0.
01
9
93
Annexes
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Fi
ni
sh
ed
st
ud
ie
s
in
Sp
ai
n
-
0.
13
0
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
12
1
-
0.
10
5
*
*
0.
04
7
0.
11
4
-
0.
14
9
*
*
*
0.
04
3
0.
13
1
Cr
ed
en
tia
lr
ec
og
ni
tio
n
-
0.
11
1
*
*
*
0.
03
3
0.
07
2
-
0.
06
2
0.
04
9
0.
06
5
-
0.
14
8
*
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
08
3
M
ar
ita
ls
ta
tu
s
Si
ng
le
0.
48
1
0.
45
0
0.
52
6
M
ar
rie
d,
sp
ou
se
ho
m
e
co
un
try
0.
20
5
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
08
1
0.
18
7
*
*
*
0.
04
4
0.
10
5
0.
20
0
*
*
*
0.
04
8
0.
04
6
M
ar
rie
d,
sp
ou
se
ho
st
co
un
try
-
0.
04
5
*
*
0.
01
9
0.
43
8
-
0.
11
7
*
*
*
0.
02
8
0.
44
5
0.
02
4
0.
02
6
0.
42
7
Ho
us
eh
ol
d
co
m
po
si
tio
n
1
ad
ul
t
0.
03
8
0.
04
2
0.
03
3
2
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
05
7
0.
03
8
0.
06
2
-
0.
02
9
0.
05
8
0.
03
6
-
0.
11
4
*
*
0.
05
5
0.
10
1
2
m
em
be
rs
,2
ad
ul
ts
0.
01
9
0.
03
7
0.
10
4
0.
08
9
*
0.
04
8
0.
10
7
-
0.
07
0
0.
06
0
0.
10
0
3
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
06
9
*
0.
04
2
0.
04
7
0.
00
9
0.
06
5
0.
03
2
-
0.
15
4
*
*
*
0.
05
9
0.
06
8
3
m
em
be
rs
,2
or
3
ad
ul
ts
0.
02
8
0.
03
5
0.
18
4
0.
09
5
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
18
8
-
0.
07
8
*
*
0.
05
7
0.
17
7
4
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
17
1
*
*
*
0.
04
7
0.
03
8
-
0.
23
0
*
*
*
0.
06
7
0.
03
7
-
0.
17
8
*
*
0.
06
9
0.
04
0
4
m
em
be
rs
,2
or
m
or
e
ad
ul
ts
-
0.
04
0
0.
03
7
0.
21
2
0.
01
6
0.
04
9
0.
22
2
-
0.
14
0
*
*
0.
05
7
0.
19
7
5
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
10
1
*
0.
06
1
0.
01
1
-
0.
21
1
*
*
0.
09
8
0.
00
9
-
0.
04
6
0.
08
7
0.
01
3
5
m
em
be
rs
,2
or
m
or
e
ad
ul
ts
-
0.
03
1
0.
04
1
0.
13
1
0.
01
2
0.
05
4
0.
13
3
-
0.
12
2
*
0.
06
3
0.
12
8
6+
m
em
be
rs
,1
ad
ul
t
-
0.
04
1
0.
07
5
0.
00
6
-
0.
19
5
0.
17
1
0.
00
3
-
0.
02
5
*
0.
09
8
0.
01
0
6+
m
em
be
rs
,2
+
ad
ul
ts
-
0.
02
5
0.
04
1
0.
16
7
0.
05
3
0.
05
2
0.
19
2
-
0.
13
7
*
*
0.
06
5
0.
13
2
94
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Ye
ar
o
fa
rr
iv
al
Ar
riv
ed
in
19
80
or
be
fo
re
-
0.
06
7
0.
05
4
0.
07
0
-
0.
08
0
0.
07
3
0.
07
0
-
0.
07
4
0.
07
8
0.
07
0
19
81
-1
99
0
-
0.
04
9
0.
04
8
0.
05
9
-
0.
11
5
*
0.
06
5
0.
06
5
-
0.
01
2
0.
07
1
0.
05
0
19
91
-2
00
0
-
0.
03
9
0.
03
0
0.
29
9
-
0.
06
9
*
0.
04
1
0.
31
6
-
0.
01
6
0.
04
1
0.
27
4
20
01
-2
00
2
-
0.
05
5
*
*
0.
02
7
0.
25
3
-
0.
09
5
*
*
0.
03
8
0.
23
8
-
0.
02
8
0.
03
6
0.
27
4
20
03
-2
00
4
0.
19
0
0.
18
6
0.
19
6
20
05
-2
00
7
-
0.
02
3
0.
03
3
0.
12
9
-
0.
00
6
0.
04
7
0.
12
4
-
0.
03
2
0.
04
5
0.
13
6
Re
si
de
nc
y
st
at
us
Na
tio
na
liz
ed
Sp
an
ish
-
0.
13
0
*
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
17
3
-
0.
13
8
*
*
*
0.
04
4
0.
15
6
-
0.
11
8
*
*
*
0.
04
4
0.
19
6
Re
sid
en
t,
pe
rm
an
en
t
0.
34
8
0.
19
6
0.
14
5
Re
sid
en
t,
te
m
po
ra
ry
0.
05
3
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
40
9
0.
03
4
0.
03
4
0.
42
0
0.
07
4
*
0.
03
8
0.
39
2
Re
sid
en
t,
w
ith
EU
ca
rd
0.
06
8
0.
04
3
0.
04
7
0.
11
0
0.
06
4
0.
04
3
0.
01
7
0.
05
7
0.
05
2
Re
sid
en
t,
ot
he
r
0.
02
2
0.
03
6
0.
15
1
0.
01
6
0.
05
0
0.
13
7
0.
04
1
0.
05
0
0.
17
0
O
th
er
EU
-2
5
-
0.
20
3
*
*
*
0.
05
7
0.
04
6
-
0.
22
4
*
*
*
0.
07
1
0.
04
8
-
0.
20
7
*
*
0.
08
1
0.
04
4
M
ig
ra
tio
n
ex
pe
rie
nc
e
M
ig
ra
te
d
fo
rw
or
k
0.
11
4
*
*
*
0.
02
1
0.
64
0
0.
14
9
*
*
*
0.
03
0
0.
67
4
0.
06
3
*
*
0.
02
8
0.
59
1
M
ig
ra
te
d
fa
m
ily
re
un
ific
at
io
n
-
0.
04
7
*
*
0.
02
2
0.
23
8
-
0.
09
3
*
*
*
0.
03
3
0.
19
5
-
0.
01
2
0.
02
9
0.
30
1
M
ig
ra
te
d
fo
ro
th
er
re
as
on
s
0.
12
2
0.
13
2
0.
10
8
Di
d
n
ot
pa
y
fo
rt
rip
0.
24
9
0.
25
2
0.
24
5
Ye
s
pa
id
by
in
st
al
lm
en
ts
0.
14
1
*
*
*
0.
03
2
0.
08
7
0.
12
3
*
*
0.
04
9
0.
06
7
0.
14
5
*
*
*
0.
04
3
0.
11
5
95
Annexes
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Ye
s
pa
id
ca
sh
di
d
n
ot
bo
rro
w
0.
08
6
*
*
*
0.
02
5
0.
52
4
0.
07
7
*
*
0.
03
4
0.
55
9
0.
07
6
*
*
0.
03
5
0.
47
3
Ye
s
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
ba
nk
0.
15
9
*
*
0.
07
0
0.
00
9
0.
13
3
0.
10
6
0.
00
8
0.
17
2
*
0.
08
7
0.
01
2
Ye
s
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
fa
m
ily
0.
27
9
*
*
*
0.
04
4
0.
01
5
0.
26
9
*
*
*
0.
06
2
0.
01
3
0.
29
2
*
*
*
0.
06
2
0.
01
8
Ye
s
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
m
on
ey
le
nd
er
0.
16
9
*
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
10
0
0.
09
3
*
0.
04
8
0.
09
1
0.
24
2
*
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
11
2
Ye
s
pa
id
ca
sh
bo
rro
w
ot
he
rs
0.
26
5
*
*
*
0.
04
8
0.
01
6
0.
37
2
*
*
*
0.
02
7
0.
01
0
0.
21
6
*
*
0.
06
9
0.
02
4
W
en
tt
o
ot
he
rc
ou
nt
ry
be
fo
re
Sp
ai
n
0.
03
4
0.
02
7
0.
12
0
0.
09
5
*
*
*
0.
03
4
0.
14
1
-
0.
08
0
*
0.
04
2
0.
08
9
No
tg
oi
ng
ba
ck
in
5
ye
ar
s
0.
80
2
0.
82
0
0.
77
6
Ye
s,
is
go
in
g
ba
ck
in
5
ye
ar
s
0.
13
3
*
*
*
0.
02
9
0.
07
9
0.
11
4
*
*
0.
04
3
0.
06
8
0.
14
7
*
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
09
5
Do
n’
tk
n
ow
if
go
in
g
ba
ck
0.
04
2
0.
02
5
0.
11
9
0.
00
2
0.
03
5
0.
11
2
0.
08
4
*
*
0.
03
5
0.
12
9
La
bo
ur
fo
rc
e
st
at
us
an
d
w
o
rk
re
la
te
d
v
ar
ia
bl
es
W
or
kin
g,
se
lf-
em
pl
oy
ed
-
0.
02
9
0.
03
1
0.
10
9
-
0.
04
0
0.
04
6
0.
10
2
-
0.
01
7
0.
04
2
0.
12
0
W
or
kin
g,
sa
la
rie
d
0.
84
6
0.
86
8
0.
81
4
W
or
kin
g,
ot
he
rs
itu
at
io
n
0.
15
1
*
*
*
0.
03
9
0.
04
5
0.
20
6
*
*
*
0.
06
4
0.
03
0
0.
11
9
*
*
0.
04
6
0.
06
7
Ho
ld
s
2
or
m
or
e
job
s
0.
03
4
0.
03
5
0.
05
7
-
0.
02
3
0.
06
5
0.
03
7
0.
06
8
*
0.
03
9
0.
08
6
Ho
ld
s
in
de
fin
ite
co
nt
ra
ct
-
0.
01
5
0.
01
9
0.
39
8
-
0.
01
3
0.
02
6
0.
40
3
-
0.
00
3
0.
02
7
0.
39
0
W
or
ks
st
ill
in
sa
m
e
job
-
0.
08
0
*
*
*
0.
01
9
0.
34
7
-
0.
07
2
*
*
*
0.
02
7
0.
33
5
-
0.
09
1
*
*
*
0.
02
6
0.
36
4
Ca
m
e
w
ith
a
job
of
fe
r
0.
08
2
*
*
*
0.
02
2
0.
15
3
0.
05
4
*
0.
03
1
0.
16
4
0.
14
2
*
*
*
0.
03
1
0.
13
9
96
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Fo
un
d
w
or
k
af
te
r3
m
on
th
s
se
ar
ch
-
0.
03
2
0.
07
0
0.
04
8
0.
04
9
0.
09
9
0.
04
0
-
0.
09
6
0.
08
9
0.
06
0
Ha
s
be
en
job
les
sf
or
a
ye
ar
or
lo
ng
er
-
0.
01
9
0.
05
9
0.
06
4
-
0.
00
1
0.
08
8
0.
05
2
-
0.
03
8
0.
07
6
0.
08
1
Ea
rn
in
gs
Ea
rn
in
gs
is
m
iss
in
g
-
0.
00
2
0.
05
8
0.
03
2
0.
08
2
0.
07
6
0.
03
7
-
0.
01
9
0.
07
7
0.
02
6
>
0
&
<
50
0
-
0.
07
4
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
06
9
-
0.
27
7
*
*
*
0.
09
8
0.
01
9
-
0.
05
9
0.
03
8
0.
14
2
>
=
50
0
&
<
75
0
0.
15
7
0.
07
1
0.
28
2
>
=
75
0
&
<
10
00
0.
00
8
0.
02
7
0.
29
9
0.
10
2
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
27
4
-
0.
03
1
0.
03
1
0.
33
4
>
=
10
00
&
<
12
50
0.
01
6
0.
03
0
0.
23
5
0.
10
8
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
31
2
-
0.
01
0
0.
03
9
0.
12
4
>
=
12
50
&
<
15
00
0.
01
4
0.
03
7
0.
09
0
0.
12
7
*
*
0.
05
1
0.
12
4
-
0.
08
9
0.
06
4
0.
04
1
>
=
15
00
0.
03
0
0.
03
6
0.
11
8
0.
16
2
*
*
*
0.
05
0
0.
16
4
-
0.
08
4
0.
06
2
0.
05
1
Co
un
try
o
fo
rig
in
an
d
o
th
er
v
ar
ia
bl
es
O
th
er
co
un
tri
es
of
bi
rth
0.
29
7
0.
25
9
0.
32
8
Bu
lg
ar
ia
-
0.
11
7
*
*
0.
05
6
0.
03
1
-
0.
11
7
0.
07
3
0.
03
1
-
0.
13
6
*
0.
07
5
0.
03
0
Po
la
nd
0.
06
3
0.
08
2
0.
01
3
0.
18
2
*
0.
09
2
0.
01
3
-
0.
11
4
0.
11
3
0.
01
3
Ro
m
an
ia
0.
06
1
*
*
0.
02
8
0.
13
4
0.
05
7
0.
04
0
0.
13
3
0.
05
4
0.
03
9
0.
13
7
Uk
ra
in
e
0.
03
7
0.
05
8
0.
02
2
0.
08
4
0.
08
2
0.
02
0
-
0.
02
4
0.
07
7
0.
02
6
Ru
ss
ia
n
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
-
0.
06
0
0.
11
5
0.
00
8
0.
18
4
0.
15
7
0.
00
6
-
0.
24
2
*
*
0.
09
6
0.
01
2
M
ex
ico
-
0.
34
6
*
*
*
0.
08
4
0.
00
8
-
0.
36
4
*
*
0.
11
9
0.
00
8
-
0.
37
9
*
*
*
0.
08
5
0.
00
8
97
Annexes
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
M
ar
gi
na
l
Ef
fe
ct
Ro
bu
st
St
d.
Er
ro
r
M
ea
n
of
co
va
ria
te
Co
lo
m
bi
a
0.
16
7
*
*
*
0.
02
7
0.
08
9
0.
19
4
*
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
06
4
0.
15
0
*
*
*
0.
03
5
0.
12
4
Ec
ua
do
r
0.
13
9
*
*
*
0.
02
8
0.
11
7
0.
21
0
*
*
*
0.
03
6
0.
10
3
0.
06
0
0.
04
2
0.
13
8
Pe
ru
0.
13
7
*
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
04
3
0.
20
4
*
*
*
0.
04
5
0.
04
2
0.
03
8
0.
06
0
0.
04
5
Ur
ug
ua
y
-
0.
11
5
*
*
0.
05
5
0.
02
4
-
0.
12
7
0.
07
8
0.
02
4
-
0.
06
4
0.
07
8
0.
02
5
Ve
ne
zu
el
a
-
0.
24
8
*
*
*
0.
04
9
0.
03
0
-
0.
26
6
*
*
*
0.
07
5
0.
02
8
-
0.
22
9
*
*
*
0.
06
6
0.
03
2
Al
ge
ria
-
0.
17
3
*
*
0.
07
5
0.
01
2
-
0.
09
7
0.
08
8
0.
01
5
-
0.
30
9
*
*
0.
12
7
0.
00
7
M
or
oc
co
0.
05
0
0.
03
1
0.
12
3
0.
12
2
*
*
*
0.
03
7
0.
17
1
-
0.
11
9
*
*
0.
05
2
0.
05
4
M
au
rit
an
ia
,T
un
isi
a,
Se
ne
ga
l
0.
37
4
*
*
*
0.
02
7
0.
01
0
0.
35
4
*
*
*
0.
04
4
0.
01
6
O
th
er
Af
ric
an
co
un
tri
es
0.
11
8
*
*
*
0.
04
2
0.
03
8
0.
13
4
*
*
0.
05
2
0.
06
7
0.
08
4
0.
06
9
0.
02
0
Pr
op
or
tio
n
of
sa
m
pl
e
re
m
itt
in
g
0.
57
9
0.
57
7
0.
58
2
Pr
ed
.p
ro
ba
bi
lity
(at
m
ea
ns
)
0.
59
0
0.
58
9
0.
59
4
Nu
m
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
77
51
40
04
37
47
Ps
eu
do
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
20
1
0.
23
0
0.
21
4
Lo
g
ps
eu
do
lik
el
ih
oo
d
-
42
13
-
21
02
-
20
02
No
te
:
Si
gn
ific
an
tle
ve
ls:
*
0.
05
<=
p<
0.
1;
*
*
0.
01
<=
p<
0.
05
;*
*
*
p<
0.
01
So
ur
ce
:
En
cu
es
ta
Na
cio
na
ld
e
In
m
igr
an
te
s(
EN
I)2
00
7;
In
st
itu
to
Na
tio
na
ld
e
Es
ta
di
st
ica
(IN
E)
20
09
.
Bibliography
Adams, R. (Jr.) 2008. The demographic, economic and financial determi-
nants of international remittances in developing countries, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 4583 (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Agunias, D.R. 2006. Remittances and development: Trends, impacts, and
policy options. A review of the literature (Washington, DC, Migration Policy
Institute).
Amuedo-Dorantes C.; Pozo, S. 2006. “Migration, remittances, and male and
female employment patterns”, in The American Economic Review, Vol. 96,
No. 2, pp. 222-226.
—. 2006. “Remittances as insurance: Evidence from Mexican immigrants”,
in Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 227-254.
Barajas, A. et al. 2009. Do workers remittances promote economic growth?,
Working Paper No. 153 (Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund
(IMF)).
Beck, T.; Pería, M.S.M. 2009. What explains the cost of remittances? An ex-
amination across 199 country corridors, Policy Research Working Papers
Series No. 5072 (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Cassarino, J.-P. (ed.). 2008. Return migrants to the Maghreb Countries: Re-
integration and development challenges, MIREM Global Report, Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (Florence, European University
Institute).
Carling, J. 2005. Migrant remittances and development cooperation, Report
No. 1 (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute).
Chami, R. et al. 2008. Macroeconomic consequences of remittances, Occa-
sional Paper No. 259 (Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund
(IMF)).
Durand, J.; Kandel, W.; Parrado, E.A.; Massey, D.S. 1996. “International mi-
gration and development in Mexican communities”, in Demography, Vol.
33, No. 2, pp. 249-264.
Dustmann, C.; Kirchkamp, O. 2002. “The optimal migration duration and
activity choice after remigration”, in Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 351-372.
Frankel, J.A. 2009. Are bilateral remittances countercyclical?, Working Pa-
per No. 15419 (Washington, DC, National Bureau of Economic Research).
Ghosh, B. 2006. Migrants’ remittances and development: Myths, rhetoric
and realities (Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and
The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration). Available at:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsit
e/published_docs/books/ghosh_pdf.pdf [10 Feb. 2010].
98
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Glytsos, N. 1993. “Measuring the Income Effects of Migrant Remittances: A
Methodological Approach Applied to Greece,” in Economic Development
and Cultural Change, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 131-168.
Gupta, S.; Pattillo, C.; Wagh, S. 2007. Impact of remittances on poverty and
financial development in sub-Saharan Africa, IMF Working Paper No. 38
(Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund (IMF)).
—. 2007. “Making Remittances Work for Africa”, in Finance and develop-
ment, quarterly magazine of the IMF, Vol. 44, No. 2. Available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/06/gupta.htm [15 Mar.
2010].
Holst, E.; Schäfer, A.; Schrooten, M. 2008. Gender, migration, remittances:
Evidence from Germany. German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) pa-
per No. 111 (Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung).
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2006. Sending
money home: Worldwide remittance flows to developing and transitions
countries. Available at: http://www.ifad.org/remittances/maps/index.htm
[7 Feb. 2010].
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1993. Balance of Payment Manual,
fifth edition (Washington, DC). Available at: http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf [7 Feb. 2010].
—. 2009. International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers
and Users (Washington, DC).
Lucas, R.E.B.; Stark, O. 1985. “Motivations to remit: Evidence from Bot-
swana”, in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 5. pp. 901-918.
Mansoor, A.; Quillin, B. 2006. Migration and remittances: Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Orozco, M. 2003. Worker remittances: Issues and best practices (Washing-
ton, DC, Inter-American Dialogue).
Ratha, D.; Xu, Z. 2008. Migration and remittances fact book 2008 (Wash-
ington, DC, World Bank).
—; Mohapata, S.; Silwal, A. 2009. Migration and Development Brief, Vol. 11,
No. 3 November (Washington, DC, World Bank). Available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/
334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf
[16 Feb. 2010].
Sander, C.; Maimbo, S.M. 2003. Migrant labour remittances in Africa: Re-
ducing obstacles to developmental contributions, Africa Region Working
Paper Series No. 64 (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Sayan, S. 2006. Business cycles and workers’ remittances: How do migrant
workers respond to cyclical movements of GDP at home?, Working Paper
No. 52 (Washington, International Monetary Fund).
99
Ch
ap
te
r3
Chapter 3: Remittances: determinants and implications for development
Stark, O.; Bloom, D. E. 1985. “The New Economics of Labor Migration”, in
American Economic Review, vol. 75, pp. 173-178.
Taylor, E. J. 1995. Micro Economy-Wide Models for Migration and Policy Anal-
ysis: An Application to Rural Mexico, Development Centre of Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (Paris, Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD)).
—; Rozelle, S.; de Brauw, A. 2003. “Migration and Incomes in Source Com-
munities: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China”, in Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 52, pp. 75–101.
Todaro, M. P. 1986. “Internal Migration and Urban Employment: Comment/
Reply”, in American Economic Review, vol. 77, pp. 566-572.
World Bank. 2003. Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability
in Development Finance (Washington, DC). Available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GDFINT/
Resources/334952-1257197848300/GDF_vol_1_web.pdf [10 Mar. 2010].
100
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Chapter 4:
Leveraging return migration for development
Introduction
The return of migrants can contribute to development through the promo-
tion, mobilization and utilization of productive resources.1 In practice,
however, gauging the extent to which return migrants contribute to devel-
opment is complex, and much consideration needs to be given to under-
standing: (i) the composition (e.g. in terms of age and skill level) and the
motivation of return migrants; and (ii) their ability to reintegrate into the
labour markets of their countries of origin.
In general, the contribution of return migration to development will de-
pend on a number of factors. In particular, the prevailing circumstances in
countries of origin, such as local labour market conditions and the business
climate, can play an important role in determining the success of return mi-
grants. It is also a function of a number of important individual factors, in-
cluding their employability and the relevance of their skills (notably those
attained in countries of destination) to their country of origin.
The focus of this chapter will be on the individual characteristics associated
with improved labour market performance upon return, with the principal
assumption being that one of the main channels through which return mi-
grants can contribute to development of countries of origin is via produc-
tive employment. Using data from Spain, the first section of this chapter
briefly examines the characteristics associated with the intention of mi-
grants to return to their countries of origin. Section B contains a descriptive
analysis of return migration to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, including an
analysis of the factors that are associated with positive labour market
outcomes.
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1 In line with recent studies in this area, the definition of “returnee” used here is someone who is “returning to
his or her country of origin within the period of ten years, having been an international migrant in another
country. Return may be permanent or temporary and independently decided by the migrant or forced by
unexpected circumstances” (Source: MIREM, European University Institute).
A. Intentions to return to North and West Africa:
case of Spain
1. Overview of the intention to return to North and West Africa
The 2007 Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI)2 includes information on
the extent to which migrants residing in Spain intend to return to their
countries of origin, stay in Spain or move to another country.3
The survey shows that the overwhelming majority (81 per cent) of migrants
from the five countries of North and West Africa did not intend to return to
their countries of origin. Only 6 per cent indicated that they had plans to re-
turn, with the remainder unsure. There were minor country-level and gen-
der-related variations in the responses (Figure 4.1):
 men were more uncertain about the intention to return, especially those
of Mauritanian origin, among whom over 40 per cent did not have any
firm plans covering the next five years;
 at just over 15 per cent, male migrants from Senegal were reported as
having the highest likelihood or firmest plans to return; and,
 women from Mauritania and Tunisia were reported as having no
intentions of returning to their countries of origin.
There were no substantial differences in the intention to return by labour
market status. Looking at the region as a whole, 85 per cent of those work-
ing indicated that they had no plans to return, compared with 75 per cent
for unemployed migrant workers (the figure for those migrants who are
studying or involved in other pursuits is 87 per cent).
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2 The Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (National Immigrant Survey) 2007 aims to study the demographic and
social characteristics of individuals (aged 16 and over) born outside Spain, including their migratory itineraries,
as well as work and residential history (see Box 3.1 of Chapter 3 for more information).
3 Information is only available on the return intention not on the planned duration of stay.
Figure 4.1 Responses to the question “Are you going back home in the next
five years?”, by gender and country of origin, 2007 (percentages)
Note: Country of origin is defined by country of birth.
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI), 2007.
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2. Multivariate analysis of the intention to return
While the overwhelming majority of migrants from North and West Africa
have no plans to return to their countries of origin, this section examines
the characteristics that are associated with those who do plan to return (by
comparison, section B examines characteristics and determinants of labour
force outcomes among a sample of returned migrants).4 In particular, the
following factors are considered:5 (i) labour market status; (ii) gender, age
and education; (iii) marital status and household composition; and, (iv)
year of arrival, residency status, remittances and country-specific effects.
Labour market status
With respect to labour force status, being unemployed or studying has the
most positive impact on the intention to return. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, be-
ing unemployed increases the likelihood of plans to return by 4.6 per cent
and studying by 9.4 per cent, although the former is only statistically signifi-
cant for men. On the other hand, male migrant workers who are self-em-
ployed are significantly less likely to have plans to return to their countries
of origin.
Figure 4.2 Likelihood of planning to return in 5 years by labour force status,
2007 (percentages)
Note : See Annex 4.A for detailed results.
Source: IILS estimates based on Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI), 2007.
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4 A probit regression was estimated where the dependent variable equals one if the migrant is intending to
return to his or her country of birth within the coming five years (see Annex 4.A for detailed results). Due to
sample size, migrants from North and West Africa are grouped together with other migrants but country of
origin effects are captured in country-specific dummy variables.
5 Residents in Spain who are born in the following countries are excluded from the sample: Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
Gender-, age- and education-related variables
Holding other observed characteristics constant, women are more likely
than men to have plans to return to their country of origin in five years’
time.
Interestingly, education levels also seem to be good predictors of plans to
return; notably, those with tertiary education, but also those with less than
primary education (especially among men, Figure 4.3), seem most likely to
plan to return. However, those who completed their studies in Spain are
less likely to plan on returning.
Figure 4.3 Likelihood of planning to return in 5 years time, by education, 2007
(percentages)
Note: Only tertiary first level is statistically significant. See Annex 4.A for detailed results.
Source: IILS estimates based on Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI), 2007.
Marital status and household composition
Consistent with the literature, family structure is an important determinant
of migration plans. In particular, when the family is reunited, returning is a
less attractive option.6 The results indicate that, if the spouse continues to
live in the country of origin, the probability of return migration is 8.2 per
cent higher (slightly higher among men than among women). Similarly,
household size and composition are important factors in migrants’ plans to
return: compared to households composed of just one individual, the re-
turn intention declines with the number of children present.
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6 The ENI 2007 contains a question about the migrant’s plan for bringing some family members to Spain – 30 per
cent of individuals answered “yes”.
Year of arrival, residency status, remittances and country-specific effects
The results also indicate that the longer the stay in the country of destina-
tion, the less the interest in returning.7
Controlling for year of arrival, the residency status reveals that not yet hav-
ing a residence permit (17.5 per cent of the sample) makes women very
likely to indicate that they are planning to return – but this is not the case
for men. In addition, possession of Spanish citizenship decreases the prob-
ability of having plans to return, but the results are statistically insignificant
when estimated by gender.
Migrant workers who had paid cash for their migration expenses are less
likely to have intentions to return. In addition, having remitted money in
the previous increases reduces the likelihood of return within five years.
B. Evidence on return migration: Algeria, Morocco and
Tunisia
This section presents empirical findings regarding characteristics and la-
bour market outcomes associated with return migrants.
1. Descriptive overview
The information available on return migrants (e.g. levels, patterns and
trends) is generally quite limited; even less is known about the factors shap-
ing migrants’ patterns of reintegration in their country of origin. However,
the survey Migration de Retour au Maghreb (MIREM), undertaken between
September 2006 and January 2007, gathered information on profiles of re-
turn migrants to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and their patterns of labour
market reintegration.8 In particular, the survey contains questions related to
three phases of the migration process: (i) composition of the return migrant
population; (ii) conditions before migration; and, (iii) the conditions faced
by the returned migrants in the country of origin.9,10
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7 The results show that year of arrival is correlated to duration of stay and, taking individuals who arrived in the
period 2003-04 as the reference category, it is found that those who arrived earlier are less likely to report plans
to return within the next 5-year period.
8 For this study, the micro data provided through the following link is used: http://www.mirem.eu/
donnees/enquete/donnees-brutes.
9 For more methodological details see J.-P. Cassarino (ed.) (2008).
10 The sample distribution by age may not be considered representative of the whole population of migrants who
have returned to these three countries.
Bearing in mind that the sample distribution by gender and age may not be
considered representative of the whole population of migrants who have
returned to these three countries, significant differences in the gender dis-
tribution among the returnees are apparent. In particular, the vast majority
were men – a pattern consistent across all three countries: 86.4 per cent in
Algeria, 87.3 per cent in Morocco and 88.5 per cent in Tunisia (Table 4.1).
In contrast, only around 13 per cent of the returnees in those countries
were women.
Table 4.1 Gender distribution of returnees (percentages)
Algeria Morocco Tunisia
Male 86.4 87.3 88.5
Female 13.6 12.7 11.5
Total 100 100 100
Source: MIREM, European University Institute.
With respect to age (at time of return), more than half of the return migrants
were over the age of 40 (Table 4.2). At 16.3 per cent, migrant workers un-
der 30 years of age appear less likely to return to their countries of origin.
Even among youth who do return, limited evidence from Morocco suggests
that a high proportion (86 per cent) of young return migrants would con-
sider migrating again.11
Table 4.2 Returnees by age group (percentages)
Age group %
Up to 30 16.3
31-40 years old 26.9
41-50 years old 21.7
5-64 years old 21.1
65 + 14.0
Total 100
Source: MIREM, European University Institute.
The motivation of migrants to return to their country of origin can play a
significant role in their stability and success and, as discussed above, their
contribution to development. While the primary reasons for returning were
rather diverse, Table 4.3 shows that retirement was one of the major decid-
ing factors (22.9 per cent among Algerian returnees and 16.1 per cent
among Tunisian returnees). This is perhaps not surprising, given the age
distribution of return migrants. At the same time, for Moroccan and Tuni-
sian return migrants, one of the main reasons was to engage in a business
activity or for reasons of investment.
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11 Poll Ass. Maroc Entrepreneurs in “Return Migration in Maghreb Countries”. PowerPoint presentation prepared
by Abdesselam El Ftouh for the Metropolis conference, Bonn, 27–31 Oct. 2008.
108
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Table 4.3 Return motivations of migrants who made the decision to return to
their country of origin, 2007
Algeria Morocco Tunisia
Decided return % (number) 79.8 (265) 70.0 (231) 80.3 (265)
Employment-oriented 7.5 4.2 10.3
Family-oriented 16.8 9.7 12.1
Retirement 22.9 4.2 16.1
Investment/business management 7.5 19.1 18.8
Problem integrating into the immigration country 11.4 13.3 11.8
End of education/training 7.2 3.0 3.9
Other 6.3 16.4 7.2
Compelled return % (number) 20.2 (67) 30.0 (99) 19.7 (65)
Total % (number) 100.0 (332) 100.0 (330) 100.0 (330)
Source: MIREM, European University Institute.
In looking at the principal status of return migrants to Algeria, Morocco and
Tunisia, the majority (approximately 60 per cent) were employed in the
country of destination when they decided to return (Figure 4.4, panel A). A
little more than 14.3 per cent were unemployed just before returning, while
another 17.7 per cent were considered to be retired. And, while Table 4.3 il-
lustrates that employment-oriented reasons figured less prominently in the
decision to return, economic activity actually rose marginally upon return –
by nearly 6 percentage points – to two-thirds. This was accompanied by a
fall in the share of those looking for work to 10.6 per cent from 14.3 per
cent. The share of retirees among return migrants rose to 18.2 per cent.12
Figure 4.4 Status of return migrants to country of origin (percentages)
Source: MIREM, European University Institute.
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12 These are compositional shifts and should not be interpreted as individuals moving from one status to another.
As for economic activity within the share of those employed, there is a siz-
able increase in the number of individuals running a business and those
with an indeterminate contract (Figure 4.5). Conversely, the share of
part-time, seasonal and fixed-term contracts decreased after a period of
time (back) in the country of origin.
Figure 4.5 Employment status of return migrants to country of origin, 2007
(percentages)
Source: MIREM, European University Institute.
2. Multivariate analysis of factors underlying labour market
performance
The preceding subsection illustrated the fact that approximately 60 per cent
of return migrants were engaged in an economic activity at the time of the
survey. The purpose of this subsection is to examine some of factors that
help explain or predict the probability of being economically active (see
Annex 4.B for more detailed results).
One of the strongest predictors of employment status upon return is, in
fact, whether the person is unemployed upon returning to the country of
origin. The results show that over 65 per cent of those who reported being
unemployed at the time of returning were still unemployed at the time of
the survey.13 The analysis also reveals that women and workers aged 55 and
over are less likely to be employed.14 The latter aligns with the analysis of
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13 The survey contains a variable that takes the value of 1 if the person reported that they were unemployed and
had been seeking work since returning to the country of origin. However, the length of job search since
returning is unavailable.
14 Note, however, that, as discussed earlier, women represented only 13 per cent of the sample.
intentions to return, i.e. for many the motivation to return is to retire. In ad-
dition, having returned to North Africa involuntarily is negatively associated
with being employed. It is therefore not surprising that involuntary return is
associated with the likelihood of migrating again. In this survey, half of
return migrants report contemplating the possibility of re-migrating
With respect to labour force status at survey date, to provide a clear under-
standing of the factors contributing to successful labour market integration
back in the country of origin, four categories are considered: (i) employed
as wage and salary workers; (ii) self-employed individuals with employees;
(iii) self-employed individuals without employees; and (iv) non-employed.
A multinomial logit model is used taking non-employed as the reference
category (Annex 4.B presents the results in form of relative risk ratios).
Wage and salary workers
The education level of participants in the MIREM survey was generally
high: 65 per cent had completed at least secondary education and 27 per
cent had completed tertiary education. Education-related variables are
strong predictors of being employed as a wage and salary worker (Figure
4.6). Those with a tertiary education are 4.6 times more likely to be em-
ployed as wage and salary workers (see note to Figure 4.6 for a definition
of relative “risk” ratios”.
Interestingly, recognition of credentials and education – in both countries
of destination and origin (upon return) – are important determinants of suc-
cessful integration. If educational qualifications are recognized in the coun-
try of destination during the migration process, the individuals are 3.4 times
more likely to be employed upon return. Similarly, among those who un-
dertook educational-related activities in the country of destination that are
recognized when the migrant returns, the individual is 2.7 times more likely
to be employed. This is an important consideration given that, as Chapter 2
illustrated, a good number of migrant workers in Spain partake in training
activities. It also appears that among return migrants, many acquired further
education abroad. In fact, more than one-third of persons with secondary
education obtained additional education in the country of destination. The
indicated proportion is almost half for persons who migrated with tertiary
education. In this respect, recognition (and applicability) of the newly ac-
quired skills is an important element to consider in the migration process.15
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15 In terms of family characteristics, an analysis was undertaken, based on questions about marital status before
migrating and whether migration was undertaken with or without family members. The results indicate that
migrating without family members strongly increases the odds of being employed as a wage and salary worker
on returning to the country of origin.
Figure 4.6 Factors influencing employment as wage and salary workers after
returning to North Africa, 2007 (relative “risk” ratios)
Note: A relative risk ratio is a ratio of the probability of an event occurring to one group compared to
another group. For example, the figure above illustrates that having a tertiary education is
associated with a relative risk ratio of being a wage and salary worker of 4.6. This means that an
individual is 4.6 times more likely to be employed (as a wage and salary worker) if they have a
tertiary education compared to those who do not. A ratio of 1 means there is no difference in risk
between the two groups See Annex 4.A for detailed results.
Source: IILS estimates based on Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI), 2007.
Self-employed: with and without employees
With respect to being self-employed (with or without employees), educa-
tional factors again play an important role, but so does previous experi-
ence. As shown in Figure 4.7, a tertiary education level increases the
likelihood of a migrant becoming self-employed with employees on return-
ing to the country of origin by a factor of 6.3 (4.0 in the case of those
without employees).
As was the case with wage and salary workers, education received while in
the country of destination that is recognized upon return increases the
chance of being self-employed by a factor of 5.3 (with employees) and 3.8
(without employees). Receiving training in the country of destination is
also pertinent but seemingly only for self-employed persons with
employees.
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Figure 4.7 Factors influencing self-employment after returning to North Africa
(relative “risk” ratios), 2007
Note: See note to Figure 4.6 for a definition of relative “risk” ratios. See Annex 4.B for detailed
results.
Source: IILS estimates based on Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI), 2007.
Prior professional-related experience also proves to be an important ele-
ment associated with opening a business upon returning. Experience
gained in the country of destination is important for those with and without
employees (relative risk ratios are 2.5 and 4.2, respectively); whereas expe-
rience before emigrating is relevant for self-employed persons operating
without employees.
Some important linkages to remittances are also found. Remitting more
than 1,000 euros (on average per year) increases the likelihood of self-em-
ployment, especially with employees. But even remitting less than 1,000
euros per year means that the return migrant is 2.7 more likely to be
self-employed than non-employment.
In terms of other factors, returning with a spouse is positively associated
with being self-employed with employees, as is returning to Tunisia.16 This
country of origin specific effect suggests that there are unobserved charac-
teristics associated with return migrants to Tunisia that may make them
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5.3
6.3
2.7
2.1
3.6
4.2
2.8
3.8
4.0
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
Received training in country
of destination
Remitted less than 1000 euros
Resides in rural area upon return
Self-employed in country of origin
before migrating
Self-employed in country of destination
before returning
Remitted more than 1000 euros
Diploma in country of destination
recognized upon return
Tertiary education
Without employees
With employees
16 Inferred from a coefficient that is significantly greater than zero at a 1 per cent significance level. Dummies for
country of origin and country of destination were included in the multinomial logit model (see Annex 4.A).
more entrepreneurial. This country-of-origin specific effect suggests that
there are unobserved characteristics associated with return migrants to Tu-
nisia that potentially make them more entrepreneurial – a finding which
merits further investigation.
C. Concluding considerations
One of the main assumptions underlying the analysis presented here is that
one of the principal ways in which return migrants can contribute to devel-
opment in North and West Africa is through productive employment. In-
deed, the chapter shows that returnees are relatively well educated and
their education is a key determinant of being economically active upon re-
turn. Returnees also demonstrate a high propensity for entrepreneurship, at
close to one-fifth, with their likelihood of being self-employed significantly
improved by tertiary education, up-skilling in countries of destination and
previous sending of remittances to their country of origin. In addition, the
empirical findings revealed that having acquired educational qualifications
in the country of destination recognized upon return was a key factor
underpinning the degree to which return migrants were self-employed.
However, the region also faces a number of challenges. First, very few mi-
grants indicate that they have any plans to return – at least in the foresee-
able future. Moreover, the likelihood of returning seems to decline the
longer the migrant stays in the country of destination. Second, migrants
who are less successful in terms of labour market performance in the coun-
try of destination (i.e. unemployed), are more prone to return and, on their
return, likely to remain unemployed. Third, one of the primary reasons for
returning to the region is to retire and thus the contribution of those mi-
grants in terms of development is limited (albeit potentially positive).
The above analysis suggests that, in order to harness the development po-
tential of return migration, a number of considerations need to be borne in
mind, including, but not limited to: (i) more work needs to be done in the
region to promote an environment that facilitates return migration; (ii) rec-
ognition of skills upon return is key to labour market reintegration (as is ini-
tial education); (iii) there are important connections between remitting
behaviour and entrepreneurial activity; and, (iv) providing support to un-
employed return migrants could reduce the instances of persistent
unemployment and discourage another spell of migration.
Chapter 5 suggests some preliminary ideas for policies to promote the pro-
ductive reintegration of return migrants and to leverage these resources
most effectively in an effort to drive development in North and West Africa.
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Chapter 5:
Making migration, employment and
development mutually supportive
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss policies which can enhance the
interlinkages between migration, employment and development. Section A
discusses specific policy initiatives which might enhance these
interlinkages in North and West Africa. The assessment is based on the em-
pirical findings of earlier chapters.
Section B discusses areas which merit further development, especially con-
cerning policy coherence, and suggests where improvements can be made.
A global policy framework that considers migration as a critical component
of development strategies and planning is already in place. However, in
some respects this lacks the necessary mechanisms to leverage migration in
a way that promotes development and takes into consideration the impor-
tant role of labour markets and human capital more generally.1 Many of the
issues are complex and involve a range of challenges (and interactions) in-
cluding, for example, human rights, family reunification, labour markets,
education and governance. This means that policy action is required on
many fronts and a coherent and coordinated approach is necessary if these
actions are to be mutually reinforcing.
Section B also puts forward a new partnership between the agents respon-
sible for designing and executing migration and related policies on the one
hand, and the agents in charge of setting up and implementing economic
development programmes, including those related to labour markets, on
the other hand. Policy innovations are badly needed in order to move grad-
ually away from rules of thumb and to achieve a more pragmatic approach
based on experimentation and monitoring.2
127
1 2009 Annual report on OECD work on policy coherence for development (OECD, 2009) contains a discussion of
the state of the art in policy coherence for development, from a developed country’s perspective.
2 D. Rodrik: One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions, and economic growth (Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press, 2007).
A. Policy opportunities: insights from the empirical analysis
and international examples
The five countries all face net emigration, i.e. the number of emigrants from
these countries each year exceeds the number migrating inwards. In fact,
the stock of emigrants from the region in developed countries is estimated
to be close to 3 million – with Europe being the primary destination.
Migration has important potential externalities, notably with regard to the
country of origin. In many developing countries there is concern about the
risks associated with brain drain, notably the loss of skilled workers and re-
lated impact on growth in the domestic economy. But there is also a per-
ception that rewards will accrue from emigration, notably via the return of
capital, either financial (remittances) or human (return migration). Indeed,
the underlying fundamental question is how to make migration a contribut-
ing factor to development for these countries of origin. This section will
tease out some of the empirical findings as they relate to North and West
Africa and discuss relevant practices and programmes undertaken else-
where with respect to these issues.3
1. Leveraging remittances to the benefit of all
As already mentioned, consideration should be given to maximizing the
benefits of remittances in a way that extends beyond the individual family
unit. Some examples for consideration include special deposit accounts
and matching funds.
Special deposit accounts and matching funds
The purpose of special deposit accounts is to encourage greater remit-
tances by offering added benefits. In Bangladesh and India, commercial
banks have introduced accounts in which migrants can deposit their sav-
ings with preferential interest rates and/or exchange rates. Other incentives
include accounts that are denominated in the currency of the country of or-
igin, or accounts where the interest is exempt from tax, as is the case in
Egypt and Sudan.4
Matching funds attempt to tap and leverage remittances by offering to
match funds with government funding (often development assistance)
from countries of destination. Such schemes are often particularly success-
ful if undertaken with the active participation of migrant networks or asso-
ciations.5 This is due to the fact that the networks in countries of destination
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the purpose of this project (Geneva, 2009). Available at: http://www.ilo.org/inst-migration [30 Mar. 2010].
4 C. Sander and S.M. Maimbo: Migrant labour remittances in Africa: Reducing obstacles to developmental
contributions, Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 64 (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2003).
5 See for example, D.R. Agunias: Remittances and development: Trends, impacts, and policy options. A review of
the literature (Washington, DC, Migration Policy Institute, 2006).
are often working collaboratively with communities in countries of origin,
as is the case in Senegal.
For example, the Sous le Sahel Solidarité Sénégal (SSSS) is an association fo-
cused on improving the living conditions of the people of the Sahel. The
members of the association are a dynamic mix of migrants (principally from
the Sahel region) and Senegalse residents. In total, the association has over
1,500 members (including 200 in Dakar, 520 in France and 30 in the United
States). Approximately 10 per cent of members contribute financially (1,000
CFA per month or 1.50 euros for Senegalse residents) and, for migrant
workers, special contributions are levied to finance specific projects. For
example, migrants contributed 50 euros every 3 months (over 2 years) to
raise close to 20 million CFA to build a school in the Sahel (an additional
65 million was co-financed by co-development initiatives in France). Cur-
rently, the association is engaged in several projects, such as the expansion
of the town’s market.6
Another example is the Mexican Iniciativa Ciudadana 3x1, under which
every dollar remitted by Mexican Hometown Associations is matched with
three dollars, one each from the federal, state and municipal governments.7
As is the case in Senegal, these pooled resources are often used for infra-
structure-related investment activities, such as the renovation of churches
and schools. The emphasis on infrastructure projects appeals to migrant
workers because such projects are tangible and are directly linked with the
community of origin. Other schemes attempt to tap directly into investment
via preferential prices for property ownership (e.g. Egypt, Moldova, the
Philippines and Sudan).
A key element to consider in the case of Mexico is that the governments
which are leveraging the remittances are national and local governments of
countries of origin. On the one hand, ownership on the part of govern-
ments of origin can enhance the success of the programme in terms of, for
example, implementation and sustainability, but, on the other hand, it is
important to consider that such programmes could potentially distort the
use of public funds if local governments shift their investments from com-
munities with fewer migrant networks and smaller remittance inflows to fo-
cus on communities where such practices are widespread. In this respect,
and similar to the use of special deposit accounts and preferential asset
pricing, trust in local governments – as well as in the migrant networks and
associations – is at the heart of the development impact.
Reducing transfer costs
There is also the issue of the cost of sending remittances, which seems
comparatively high for the region. For example, the fees associated with
sending remittances from France to Algeria or Morocco constitute more
than 16 per cent of the total, and thus also partly explain why more than
half of all transfers occur outside formal institutional channels. In this re-
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7 J. Carling: Migrant remittances and development cooperation (Oslo, PRIO, 2005).
spect, there may be scope for policies in the region – in cooperation with
countries of destination – to help reduce such costs. This measure is in both
private and public interests, given that, as discussed earlier, remittances can
have important multiplier and countercyclical effects.8
While receiving countries with relatively large rural populations and limited
access to financial institutions will inevitably face higher remittance costs,
competition among the providers and the extent of bank participation are
important determining factors.9There are a number of ways to reduce trans-
fer costs and improve the use of formal channels for remittances, not only
by fostering greater competition (as is the case in the United States) but also
through the use of more efficient technology and partnerships.10
One of the most prominent examples of the use of technology is that of the
Philippines, where Smart Communications and Globe Telecom (two
telecom companies) offer remittance transactions by mobile phone. Mobile
phone users register themselves by entering personal information, such as
a mother’s maiden name, for identification purposes. Their relatives abroad
can visit an authorized outlet in their neighbourhood, fill in a form and
present identification, and money is credited to their phone account. Apart
from ease of use, the fee per transaction is approximately 1 per cent of the
transfer amount – compared to double-digit fees for many North and West
African countries. The money can also be transferred to another phone in
the Philippines using the sender’s PIN, a simple code and the recipient’s
phone number.
Partnerships can also be very effective in reducing transfer costs. For exam-
ple, three French banks (the Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal, the Banque
de l’Habitat du Mali and the Banque des Ivoiriens de France) offer signifi-
cantly lower costs than money transfer agencies for remittances to Senegal,
Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. These low rates increased the volume of remittances
going through this formal channel and, by 2002, these banks were handling
more than 400 money transfers a day.11
2. Encouraging and maximizing benefits of return migration
Overly strict controls on migration flows can have a negative impact on re-
turn and circular migration. The policies implemented as a response to the
global crisis of 2008 have focused narrowly on limiting the direction of
flows to one way – often forcing return migrants to give up all possibilities
of ever returning to their countries of destination (see Annex 5A). Such pol-
icies are short-sighted, stifling the potential benefits of return and circular
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8 J. Frankel: Are bilateral remittances countercyclical?, NBER Working Paper No. 15419 (2009).
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(Washington, DC, World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, 2009).
10 Between 1999 and 2003, the number of companies dominating the remittance market to Latin America from
the United States doubled (from three to six) and the price charged for transferring US$200 fell from US$22 to
US$10 (M. Orozco: Worker remittances: Issues and best practices (2003)).
11 IOM: Managing Migration- Challenges and Responses of People on the Move, Geneva, 2003; O. Enogo:
“Transferts d’argent bon marché”, in Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent, No. 2164, 1-7 July 2002.
migration and operate to the detriment of development in countries both of
origin and of destination over the long run. To counter this, ILO Conven-
tions No. 97 and No. 143 and their accompanying Recommendations pro-
vide a framework for the basic components of a comprehensive labour
migration policy, the protection of migrant workers, the development of
their potential and measures to facilitate as well as to regulate migration
movements.12
While one of the main challenges facing North and West Africa is the small
number of migrants intending to return, among those that do return, there
is a high propensity to be self-employed.13 Two elements associated with
being self-employed include: (i) having undertaken training during the pe-
riod of migration; and, (ii) having the qualifications recognized upon re-
turn. These findings should not be understated; while many have proposed
theoretical arguments for the benefits of circular migration, the evidence
from return migrants to North and West Africa illustrates definitively how
successful it can be.
Interesting links have also emerged between the issues of return migration
and remittances. The findings in Chapter 4 indicate that, among returnees,
those who have set up a business were more likely to have remitted money
in the past. This suggests that there might be potential benefits in encourag-
ing entrepreneurship among migrant workers. This could come in the form
of providing entrepreneurial support e.g. training or through remittance
matching (discussed above) – all of which maximizes the probability of
their return and their chances of success. Policies and programmes can thus
harness the impact of return migrants on development by providing sup-
port throughout the migration “cycle”. More research is needed to under-
stand more fully the policy design implications of the links between return
migration, remittances and entrepreneurship, but examples of efforts to en-
courage return migrants, in particular entrepreneurs, might shed light on
some of the considerations.
Return migration of entrepreneurs
In 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) launched the Vol-
untary Return Migration Model Based on Entrepreneurship Development
to encourage migrants in Spain to start businesses in their home countries.14
The approach is based on a small, successful programme that was
launched by the Galician Regional Government and the Consolidación Ru-
ral de Empresas Agropecuarias (CREA) foundation.
131
Ch
ap
te
r5
Chapter 5: Making migration, employment and development mutually supportive
12 See Chapter 1 for more information on ILO Conventions.
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14 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB): Voluntary return migration model based on entrepreneurship
development, 2006.
The IADB project proceeds in five distinct steps. First, a network of institu-
tions is created to operate and market the project’s objectives and goals.
Second, a business start-up programme is launched and participants are se-
lected and trained to develop business plans and adapting them to local
conditions. This includes an examination of the business idea via fieldwork
to gather information on the local market. Third, participants obtain credits
from local banks in Spain or use remittances to finance businesses in coun-
tries of origin. Fourth, an online platform is set up to coordinate a business
network between business start-ups in countries of origin and established
companies in Spain. Fifth, a database and monitoring system are set up to
evaluate and improve businesses and to disseminate experiences. The
IADB project aims to create 525 businesses, 1,050 jobs and 4,200 indirect
jobs.
In 2005, the IADB also launched the Dekassegui15 entrepreneurs project,
which targets Brazilians in Japan who have saved money and would like to
open a business in Brazil.16 The project is limited to three states in Brazil
with large Brazilian-Japanese communities. Potential entrepreneurs are se-
lected and trained in Japan. Entrepreneurs are chosen on the basis of
self-assessment tests to determine their technical, management and leader-
ship skills. Entrepreneurs undergo three training blocks on basic business
know-how and business planning. Training is complemented by an online
guide on doing business in Brazil, as well as regular networking sessions
among participating entrepreneurs. After each training block, entrepre-
neurs are evaluated to see whether they meet the criteria necessary to pro-
ceed. Of 10,000 eligible entrepreneurs, 5,000 will receive basic training.
The top 10 per cent will receive advanced training and 150 will eventually
develop a business plan in Japan. Entrepreneurs are trained in Brazil to as-
sist in the reintegration process and new entrepreneurs receive legal advice
from a network of Dekassegui entrepreneurs. The total cost of the project
amounts to US$3.1 million, half of which is financed by local institutions.
In the Philippines, the Unlad Kabayan Migrant Service Foundation has suc-
ceeded in linking community development with migration and entrepre-
neurship.17 The Foundation helps returnees to invest in businesses in poor
communities and, at the same time, encourages local residents to work
with or for returnees in those businesses. Most businesses are in food pro-
cessing and food production, such as rice production, seed trading and
coco plantations. The core of Unlad Kabayan is the “Migrant Savings for Al-
ternative Investment”, which was created in the 1990s to channel migrant
savings into microfinance institutions in the Philippines, enabling both re-
turnees and local entrepreneurs to tap these resources. For example, a loan
of US$89,000 from 55 expatriates in Korea and Taiwan financed a rice cen-
tre that supported 139 farm households and employed 23 regular workers.
The Foundation also works with other migrant networks, such as Migrant
Forum in Asia and Migrant Rights International.
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Return of skilled labour
Many countries have established programmes that provide scholars and
skilled workers with financial incentives to return and help them find em-
ployment at home. In China, universities and government-funded research
units, particularly the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), actively encour-
age expatriate scholars to return and provide financial support for visiting
lectures.18 In 1994, the Chinese Academy of Sciences started the Hundred
Talents Programme (bairen jihua) to recruit young scientists from abroad.
Over three years, the programme funded 240,000 US$ in research, which
was complemented by subsidized housing and a moderate salary. As of
September 2002, 839 academics had received funding (95 per cent of these
had studied abroad). For universities, the most important programme is the
Cheung Kong Scholars Programme (Changjiang xuezhi jiangli jihua). Be-
tween 1998 and 2004, it brought 537 scholars from overseas to become
leaders in key research fields. Most scholars who receive funding have ei-
ther studied, worked or still work abroad. Rapid economic growth has also
helped attract people back to China despite the previous brain drain.
In terms of skilled worker retention, the Albanian Government and the
UNDP jointly launched the Brain Gain Programme to encourage the return
of students and academics on both permanent and temporary bases.19 The
aim is to improve the quality of universities and research by attracting aca-
demics and management staff from abroad with competitive incentive
packages. Returnees with a master’s or a doctorate degree are eligible to re-
ceive 3,000-7,000 euros to cover the costs of return and settlement in Alba-
nia, as well as low-interest mortgages for housing. The strength of this
programme lies in tying funding to specific job openings that returnees
would fill. The funding amounts to 540,000 euros and could support at least
100 positions, including 30 department chairs, 40 lectureships, ten visiting
lectureships and 20 research leaders. In the first round of applications in
2008, the programme succeeded in filling more than 70 positions, which
ranged from lectureships to research positions in Albanian universities.
Similarly, a programme that encourages circulation migration was launched
in Mali. The Malaria Research and Training Centre established a scheme to
attract African scientists who are working on malaria research. Part of the
programme sends promising young graduates in Mali to leading foreign
universities that cooperate with the centre. Students can return during their
studies for vacations and to undertake research. The aim is to integrate stu-
dents with international and local academics and to provide a stimulating
environment.20
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academics”, in Asian Population Studies Vol. 4, No. 3, 2008, pp. 331-345.
19 B. Zeneli and M. Tafaj: Brain gain programme: Engaging the diaspora in Albania’s development (2008).
20 Malaria Research and Training Centre: http://obtoure.africa-web.org [accessed 17 Feb. 2010].
Migrant associations or diaspora networks
Migrant associations can also play a role in encouraging return migration
and promoting entrepreneurship. For example, Afford is a think tank and
consultancy agency that seeks to mobilize the African diaspora and busi-
nesses for African development. It runs a series of programmes to support
local entrepreneurs and informs the British business community about op-
portunities in Africa. Afford also seeks to combine efforts and disseminate
best practices of diaspora networks across the United Kingdom. Another
Afford programme, Supporting Entrepreneurs and Enterprise Development
in Africa (SEEDA), helps African entrepreneurs to expand their operations
and create jobs by giving advice and providing capital. Afford supports
600 businesses in Sierra Leone and Ghana by providing training in market-
ing, bookkeeping and customer service.
Angel Africa aims to support entrepreneurship in Africa by matching busi-
ness professionals in the diaspora with local entrepreneurs. The former can
help the latter with management, financing and marketing. This consul-
tancy service is voluntary. The network also provides information about in-
vestment opportunities in Africa and acts as a platform for national
investment agencies.
One potential challenge linked to the diaspora network approach however
is that the networks often exist only for a short time. For example, of the 61
networks reviewed by Powell and Gerova (2004), 31 per cent were inac-
tive.
3. “Would be” migrant workers: some considerations
Remittances and return migration, however, should be viewed as a comple-
ment to development rather than a substitute. Moreover, policies to pro-
mote a well-functioning labour market (among others), notably
employment and decent work in countries of origin are not only good for
development but are also supportive of an environment that encourages re-
turn migration and investments in North and West Africa via remittances.
In the case of North and West Africa, the labour market is characterized by
informality, high inactivity among women and high unemployment among
youth – the latter being of particular concern in the context of migration. As
the evidence in the previous chapters demonstrated, the youth cohort in
North and West Africa is growing rapidly, while employment opportunities
for many remain scarce. It is then perhaps not surprising that the evidence
from Spain indicates that recent migrant flows from North and West Africa
are increasingly younger.
The problem is not unique to North and West Africa – youth unemploy-
ment is widespread and has exacerbated in the context of the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis that started in 2008. For example, in December
2009, more than one-fifth of youth under the age of 25 in the EU-27 were
looking – albeit unsuccessfully – for work. In sub-Saharan Africa it is esti-
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mated that three in five of the total unemployed are youth and 72 per cent
of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 live on less than US$ 2 a
day.21
With the vast majority of the African youth population residing in rural ar-
eas, the issue is intrinsically linked to harnessing rural development, includ-
ing focusing on employment-intensive investments in agriculture and other
rural non-farm activities.22 It also means ensuring increased access to basic
skills and education for youth and promoting decent work opportunities.
Promoting youth education and decent work
In terms of improving educational outcomes, measures such as flexible
schooling can help to reduce drop-out rates or provide “second chances” to
youth to upgrade skills. This is particularly useful in rural areas where stu-
dents may work at home part-time and attend school at other times. For ex-
ample, in Guatemala students who do farm work in the morning, are
allowed to start school later and compensate the time with independent
study or they can complete 1,000 hours of schooling with no time restric-
tions. Gambia and Lesotho have implemented a programme that also tar-
gets school drop-outs and trains them to carry out environmental
rehabilitation and income-generating activities in both rural and urban areas.
Activities include ecotourism, soil conservation, and market gardening.23
Entrepreneurial programmes have been proven to be particularly success-
ful in improving employment and earnings of young people.24 Evidence
suggests that a significant proportion of young people in West Africa would
actually prefer to be self-employed rather than salaried.25 In fact, many of
the young people in African countries are already working in small family
businesses or are self-employed in the agriculture sector. Developing these
young peoples’ entrepreneurial skills is an important opportunity for
growth. A good example is “The Youth Dairy Farm Project” in Uganda. The
programme supports youth entrepreneurship by training youth in the man-
agement of husbandry and farm products that they then sell.
Informal apprenticeships are another major provider of skills for poorer
and uneducated youth who work in the informal economy. A successful
example is Kenya's Jua Kali voucher programme to give unemployed
youth training opportunities. Of course governments must ensure that such
programmes have sufficient guidance and regulations to avoid exploita-
tion. Part of the success of the programme was derived by leveraging pub-
lic and private partnership.26
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24 The World Bank (2008) op. cit.
25 UNOWA (2008) op. cit.
26 The World Bank, (2008) op. cit.
Improvements could also be in terms of labour market information, i.e.
providing adequate collection, analysis, and dissemination of labour mar-
ket information to inform young jobseekers of opportunities. This includes
the sometimes harsh realities that migrant workers face in countries of des-
tination. This could be part of a longer-term strategy to develop proper
public employment services that provide labour market support, active
(e.g. vocational training) but also passive (e.g. unemployment benefits).
Other efforts can focus on retaining workers who are already engaged in
productive employment. A number of countries have introduced programmes
to encourage “potential migrants” to stay, or at least extend the time they
remain, in countries of origin.
Worker retention: incentives and bonding
In Zimbabwe, health professionals indicated a desire to migrate due to eco-
nomic instability, low wages and poor working conditions.27 Workers, es-
pecially those in rural areas, also complained about a lack of recognition of
their work, the absence of further training and unclear career objectives.28
As a result, in 2005, the Health Service Board launched an incentive
programme to motivate health professionals to remain in Zimbabwe. Sala-
ries were raised, notably by 10 per cent in rural areas. In addition, workers
were offered bursaries and loans at low rates of interest to pay for further
studies and training, and salaries were reviewed more frequently to reward
those staff with records of good performance. Other incentives included
state-provided transportation, housing, child-care services, family
healthcare, subsidized staff canteens and improved security equipment.
Moreover, bureaucratic structures were streamlined to give key staff more
autonomy and increase cost efficiency.
The impact of the programme has been mixed.29 Although the number of
general staff has increased, the outflow of experienced staff remains high.
Survey results indicated that the general retention package was still not suf-
ficiently attractive. The main problems were hyperinflation, which eroded
the salary increase, and budget constraints that limited the financial support
available for housing, canteens, transport and other incentives.
Kenya has also implemented a similar programme to stem the loss of its
health-care workers.30 In general, Kenyan workers demanded better work-
ing conditions, better training and better living conditions as incentives to
remain in the country. The programme has proved reasonably successful
but, unlike in Zimbabwe, the roll-out was not widespread and, conse-
quently, rural areas still suffer from staff shortages. Similar initiatives were
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launched in other African countries.31 In Zambia, for example, more train-
ing opportunities have led to higher retention rates.32 In Ethiopia, more
qualification opportunities, housing support and better career structures
have worked well.
Although the success of some of these programmes is rather limited and
poor data collection hinders a comprehensive evaluation of many, a num-
ber of potential lessons emerge that might prove pertinent in the case of
North and West Africa. The first is that, in some instances, non-financial in-
centives (e.g. career development) are an important consideration when
fiscal budgets are limited. Second, given the financial realities (i.e. much
higher wages elsewhere), there may be scope for countries of origin to co-
ordinate efforts with destination countries to promote temporary stay and
return for workers of all skill categories.
B. Policy coherence and the role of ILO
1. The global recession and policy responses: country of
destination
The global crisis that began in 2008 has highlighted the important role that
countries of destination play in the migration process. In particular, the cri-
sis has disproportionately affected migrant workers in many countries. The
case of Moroccan migrants working in Spain, analysed in an earlier chapter,
provides a vivid illustration of this.33
With many countries confronted by massive increases in unemployment
across most sectors, a number of programmes have been introduced to, for
example, limit further migration, encourage return migration and even re-
strict stimulus spending measures to non-migrant workers (Annex 5.A).
The programmes have had limited success, at least in terms of encouraging
return migration. This is probably due to the fact that returning might mean
losing access to social benefits (rare or non-existent in some countries of
origin) or because it might entail relinquishing the possibility of re-emigrat-
ing.
More fundamentally, there is a need for moving away from short-term mea-
sures and adopting a more comprehensive and orderly migration strategy,
including stronger cooperation between countries of origin and destina-
tion.
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2. Data collection and programme evaluation
There is also a case for strengthening institutional capacity in North and
West Africa and improving data collection and availability. Throughout this
report, the challenges associated with being able to access the information
which would enable a clearer understanding of the dynamic relationship
between migration, development and labour markets have been repeatedly
stressed. More specifically, the scarcity of reliable sources of information
has hindered efforts to address crucial issues of policy response and coher-
ence. This challenge is not new. The issue of migration data and statistics
has been raised in previous work undertaken by the ILO in the region. 34
The Spanish ENI survey is a great step forward in compiling much-needed
data on the migration experience. Likewise, data from the MIREM project
has made a helpful contribution. Sustained, practical efforts are needed to
fill this gap. A recent report issued by the Commission on International Mi-
gration Data for the Center for Global Development, provides a number of
guidelines on this issue: (i) ask basic census questions, and make the tabu-
lated answers publicly available; (ii) compile and release existing adminis-
trative data; (iii) centralize labour force surveys; (iv) provide access to
micro-data, not just tabulations; and, (v) include migration modules on a
greater number of existing household surveys.35
The reality is that migration data can be made available at a relatively low
cost and without any new surveys, offices or initiatives. Many of the recom-
mendations of the Commission’s report are timely, given that many coun-
tries are expected to collect census data in 2010. But more can be done to
address the short-term needs for data, such as including migration-related
questions within existing surveys (in countries of both origin and destina-
tion).36
The experience of practices undertaken elsewhere also highlights the need
to gather programme-related information systematically in order to prop-
erly evaluate effectiveness of the measures. To achieve this, programmes
need to set out clear and measurable objectives to improve monitoring and
evaluation. However, the marginal cost of gathering such information is
quite low since it can be embodied in the design and implementation of the
programme itself.
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3. Global governance and placing labour markets and human
capital on the agenda of migration and development
Policy-makers are faced with both great opportunities and daunting chal-
lenges when it comes to taking advantage of international migration as a
real tool for development. Economic growth is a necessary condition for
improving the well-being of people through the creation of jobs and the re-
duction of poverty. Migration emerges as a key element linking human cap-
ital formation, labour market performance and economic development.
Development assistance should set aside rhetoric and move, in a program-
matic way, to place migration, decent work and human capital at the centre
of human development for economic growth.
The growing concern over the need to integrate migration and develop-
ment strategies is manifested in the actions undertaken by bodies such as
the European Union and the United Nations. With respect to the ILO, in its
92nd Session, in June 2004, the ILO’s International labour Conference
adopted the Resolution on a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in a Global
Economy. It states that:
Promotion of policies that maximize the contribution of migration to
development is another essential component of a comprehensive
policy to address the global context of migration. Among urgent re-
quired components are measures to reduce the costs of remittance
transfers as well as developing incentives to promote productive in-
vestment of remittances. Equitable measures need to be explored to
mitigate the loss of critically skilled workers, particularly in the pub-
lic sectors of developing countries. Consideration may be given to
allocating development assistance to projects and programmes gen-
erating or increasing employment in decent conditions. Facilitating
training and return of migrants, transfer of capital and technology by
migrants, and migrant transnational business initiatives are other op-
tions that could be promoted [p. 22].
This underscores the two main channels through which labour migration
can influence the economic development of sending countries: remittances
and return migration. Moreover, the ILO’s Multilateral Framework on La-
bour Migration’s Principle IX states that “the contribution of labour migra-
tion to employment, economic growth, development and the alleviation of
poverty should be recognized and maximized for the benefit of both origin
and destination countries”.37 The guidelines developed remain relevant in
the context of this report and highlight the main policy concerns over the
medium term (Box 5.1).
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Box 5.1   Guidelines of the ILO’s Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration
(i) Integrating and mainstreaming labour migration in national employment, labour
market and development policy.
(ii) Expanding analyses of the contribution of labour migration and migrant workers to the
economies of destination countries, including employment creation, capital formation,
social security coverage and social welfare.
(iii) Promoting the positive role of labour migration in advancing or deepening regional
integration.
(iv) Promoting and providing incentives for enterprise creation and development,
including transnational business initiatives and micro-enterprise development by men and
women migrant workers in origin and destination countries.
(v) Providing incentives to promote the productive investment of remittances in the
countries of origin.
(vi) Reducing the costs of remittance transfers, including by facilitating accessible
financial services, reducing transaction fees, providing tax incentives and promoting
greater competition between financial institutions.
(vii) Adopting measures to mitigate the loss of workers with critical skills, including by
establishing guidelines for ethical recruitment.
(viii) Adopting policies to encourage circular and return migration and reintegration into
the country of origin, including by promoting temporary labour migration schemes and
circulation-friendly visa policies.
(ix) Facilitating the transfer of capital, skills and technology by migrant workers, including
through providing incentives to them.
(x) Promoting linkages with transnational communities and business initiatives.
The ILO’s Global Jobs Pact – adopted by the 98th Session of the Interna-
tional Labour Conference on 19 June 2009 as a response to the global crisis
– is particularly salient in moving in the right direction in the near term. The
Global Jobs Pact is a wide-ranging crisis response framework guided by the
Decent Work Agenda (Box 5.2). It is designed for national and international
policies aiming at economic recovery, job creation and social protection
measures for workers and their families. The framework ensures linkages
between social progress and economic development and calls for priority
to be given to protecting and growing employment through sustainable en-
terprises, quality public services and building adequate social protection
for all as part of ongoing international and national action to aid recovery
and development.
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Box 5.2  The ILO’s Global Jobs Pact
As the ILO’s response to the global financial and economic crisis, a Global Jobs Pact was
adopted by the 98th Session of the International Labour Conference on 19 June 2009.
The Global Jobs Pact is a wide-ranging crisis response framework guided by the Decent
Work Agenda.
The principles of the Global Jobs Pact are the following:
 protecting employment and building social protection;
 supporting vulnerable women and men hit hard by the crisis including youth at risk,
low-wage, low-skilled, informal economy and migrant workers;
 facilitating job transitions and access to labour market for the jobless;
 avoiding protectionist solutions;
 promoting core labour standards and other international labour standards that support
the economic and jobs recovery and reduce gender inequality;
 engaging in social dialogue, tripartism and collective bargaining;
 ensuring economic, social and environmental sustainability;
 regulating market economies to enable sustainable enterprises and employment; and,
 strengthening policy coherence at the international level.
In this respect, the Decent Work Country Programmes – one of the main
vehicles for delivering ILO support to countries – are unique opportunities
to integrate migration, in practical terms, into the Decent Work Agenda,
where its potential as a strategic component for economic development
can best be realized.38
The ILO, however, cannot act alone. In the wake of the global crisis, it is an
opportune time to give a global perspective to migration-related issues.
One of the most encouraging aspects of international migration is its poten-
tial for development of countries of origin. And it is precisely this potential
that can be leveraged in existing and new tools for global governance of
migration.
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38 In 2006, there was a particularly busy African agenda for official declarations on the development potentials of
migration, e.g., two ministerial-level European/African conferences (Rabat and Tripoli) and the Seventh
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Union Heads of State and Government (Banjul). A year later, the
ILO published a document (The Decent Work Agenda in Africa: 2007–2015) that acknowledged the need to
take concrete action on the issue (see part II, section 5). Also relevant in this respect is Success Africa
Partnership for Decent Work – Improving Peoples’ Lives, second volume, which contains descriptions of
cooperation projects in specific African countries, but little precedence is placed on the role of migration in
development (see pages 16–18).
Annex 5.A: Migration policies in the context of the global
recession of 2009
Asia and Oceania
Australia: The Government plans to cut quotas for skilled workers by 14
per cent to protect jobs for Australians. This is the first move of its kind in 10
years. The quota will be reduced from 133,500 to 115,000. The new perma-
nent skilled migration programme would bar bricklayers, plumbers, car-
penters and electricians – fields that have suffered substantial numbers of
redundancies and experienced a significant drop-off in demand.
Malaysia: The Government instructed employers to use foreign workers
only when necessary. On 15 March 2009, the Government revoked 60,000
work visas belonging to Bangladeshis, and officials are threatening to
round up illegal aliens for deportation.
Philippines: The Government has launched a programme to lend 50,000
pesos to help Filipinos who are overseas and out of work to set up business
enterprises abroad. The loan carries an interest rate of 5 per cent and is ac-
companied by a 10,000 peso grant for business training and counselling. To
receive money from the programmes, workers must complete the training.
Japan: The Government has started to offer cash to jobless migrants of Jap-
anese descent as an incentive to return to their countries of origin. Most mi-
grants within this category are from Brazil and Peru. These migrants will
receive 300,000 yen or approximately US$4,565 on their return plus an ad-
ditional 200,000 yen for each dependent family member. Migrants who ac-
cept the money agree not to return to Japan on special work visas. For
migrants who intend to stay in the country, the Government has set aside
1 billion yen for vocational training.39
Europe
Spain: In October 2008, the Spanish Government implemented the Plan of
Voluntary Return. Under this plan, legal migrants can receive unemploy-
ment benefits in a lump sum if they agree to leave the country. Participants
receive 40 per cent of their unemployment benefit before leaving Spain and
60 per cent after returning to their country of origin. In return, the migrants
must give up their residence permit and work visas and agree not to return
to Spain for 3 years.40
United Kingdom: The Government responded to the economic crisis by
tightening admission requirements for migrants. All low-skilled migration
schemes were suspended, including the Seasonal Agriculture Workers
Scheme (SAWS).41 The United Kingdom also raised the criteria for highly
142
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
39 “Migrants paid to go home” in The Strait Times, 1 Apr. 2009. Available at
: http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_357321.html [accessed 17 Feb. 2010].
40 “Spain tries to buy out immigrants”, in TIME Magazine, 20 Oct. 2008. Available at: http://www.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,1852000,00.html [accessed 17 Feb. 2010].
41 “United Kingdom:Ó A reluctant country of immigration”, in Migration Information Source, July 2009. Available
at : http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=736 [accessed 17 Feb. 2010].
skilled migrants seeking entry. Highly skilled migrants are now required to
have a master’s degree and must make a minimum salary of 20,000 euros.
All jobs must also be advertised through the national employment service
before a worker can be brought in from outside Europe. 42
Italy: In July 2009, Italy passed a bill that prevented undocumented mi-
grants from accessing public services, such as education and emergency
medical care.
Czech Republic: The Government implemented a voluntary return programme
in February 2009. The programme covers the cost of return and provides a
repatriation bonus to legal non-EU workers who have lost their jobs. In ex-
change, the migrants must give up their Czech documents. The Govern-
ment also stopped renewing work permits as they expired and rejected
new permit applications from abroad.43
Latin America
Ecuador: The Government is trying to encourage Ecuadorians, many of
whom have migrated to Spain and the United States, to return home during
the economic crisis. The Welcome Home Plan offers business subsidies,
customs breaks and low-interest loans to those migrants who return
home.44
North America
United States: The Government has restricted three channels of legal migra-
tion. Companies receiving federal bailout money face increased obstacles if
they want to hire highly-skilled foreign workers on H-1B visas. The State
Department has also asked industries that rely heavily on seasonal migrant
labour, such as tourism and agriculture, to cut back on their dependence
on foreign workers. The Government is also considering suspending the
H-2A visas, which allowed guest farm workers to stay in the country for 10
months at a time. The current H-2A programme requires that growers try to
fill jobs with nationals first.45
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42 Migration and the global recession, Migration Policy Institute, Sept. 2009. Available at:
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-BBCreport-Sept09.pdf [accessed 17 Feb. 2010].
43 ibid.
44 “Reverse migration: Ecuador lures immigrants back home from U.S. and Spain”, in Feet in 2 Worlds, 4 Sept. 2009.
Available at: http://feetin2worlds.wordpress.com/2009/09/04/reverse-migration-ecuador-lures-immigrants-
back-home-from-u-s-and-spain/ [accessed 17 Feb. 2010].
45 S.M. Kalita: “U.S. deters hiring of foreigners as joblessness grows”, in The Wall Street Journal, 27 Mar. 2009.
Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123810912615352681.html?mod=googlenews_wsj [accessed
17 Feb. 2010].
Bibliography
Agunias, D.R. 2006. Remittances and development: Trends, impacts, and
policy options. A review of the literature (Washington, DC, Migration Policy
Institute).
Al-Jazeera.net. 2009. China aid plan for jobless migrants, 12 Mar. Available at:
http://engish.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/03/20093127406773260.
html [7 Feb. 2010].
Awad, I. 2009. The global economic crisis and migrant workers: Impact and
response (Geneva, International Labour Office). Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/
global_crisis.pdf [20 Oct. 2009].
Barré, R. et al. 2003. Scientific diasporas (Paris, Institut de recherche pour le
développement (IRD)).
Beck, T.; Peria, M. 2009. What explains the cost of remittances? An exami-
nation across 119 country corridors, World Bank Policy Research Working
Papers (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Brinkerhoff, J.M. 2006. “Digital diasporas and conflict prevention: The case
of Somalinet.com”, in Review of International Studies, Vol. 32, pp. 25–47.
Brown, K. 2003. Stemming the tide: Third world network and global gover-
nance, Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Devel-
opment (YBICED) 2003/04 (Lysaker, Fridtjof Nansen Institute), pp. 73–77.
Buffet, F.N.; Othily, G. 2006. Rapport de la commission d’enquête sur
l’immigration clandestine: Créée en vertu d’une résolution adoptée par le
Sénat le 27 Octobre 2005 (Paris, Sénat).
Cao, C. 2008. “China’s Brain Drain at the High End: Why government poli-
cies have failed to attract first rate academics”, in Asian Population Studies
Vol. 4, No. 3 pp. 331-345.
Carling, J. 2005. Migrant remittances and development cooperation (Oslo,
International Peace research Institute (PRIO)).
Castles, S. 2000. “The impacts of emigration on countries of origin”, in Y.
Shahid; W. Weiping; S. Evenett (eds): Local dynamics in the era of global-
ization (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Chimbari, M.J.; Madhina, D.; Nyamanagara, F.; Mtandwa, H.; Damba, V.
2008. Retention incentives for health workers in Zimbabwe, EQUINET Dis-
cussion Paper 65. Available at: http://www.equinetafrica.org/bibl/docs/
DIS65HRchimbari.pdf [9 Feb. 2010].
Commander, S.; Kangasniemi, M; Winters, L.A. 2003. Brain drain: Curse or
boon?, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 809 (Bonn, Institute for the Study of
Labour).
Enogo, O. 2002. “Transferts d’argent bon marché”, in Jeune Afrique/
L’Intelligent, No. 2164, 1-7 July (Paris).
144
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Esguerra, C.; Guinto, J. 2009. “Filipinos may work again in Lebanon, Jor-
dan”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 Apr. Available at: http://globalnation.in-
quirer.net/news/news/view/20090401-197348/Govt-lifts-deployment-ban-t
o-Lebanon-Jordan [9 Feb. 2010].
EU Business. 2009. Rome Calls for Urgent EU–Libya Immigration Accord,
17 June. Available at:
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1245271621.53 [9 Feb. 2010].
Frankel, J. 2009. Are Bilateral Remittances Countercyclical?, NBER Working
Paper No. 15419 (Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research).
Freinkman, L. 2002. Role of the diasporas in transition economies: Lessons
from Armenia (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Programme for the Study of Global Migration, Graduate Institute. 2009. A
Review of International Migration Policies, Background paper undertaken
for the purposes of this study. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/inst-migra-
tion [30 Mar. 2010].
Godfrain, J.; Cazenave, R. 2007. Rapport sur le codéveloppement (Paris, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs). Available at: http://www.richardcazenave.com/
media/Rapport_codeveloppement.pdf [7 Feb. 2010].
Gulf Times. 2009. “Dhaka seeks damages for workers sent home”, 28 Mar.
Available at: http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=
2&item_no=281302&version=1&template_id=44&parent_id=24
[7 Feb. 2010].
Ilahi, N. 1998. “Return migration and occupational change”, in Review of
Development Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 170–186.
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). 2005. Brazil: Dekassegui entre-
preneurs. Available at: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?
docnum=498867 [7 Feb. 2010].
International Organization for Migration. 2003. Managing Migration- Chal-
lenges and Responses of People on the Move. (Geneva).
—. 2006. Voluntary return migration model based on entrepreneurship de-
velopment. Available at: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getsdocument.
aspx?docnum=88965.
International Labour Office (ILO). 2006. ILO’s multilateral framework on la-
bour migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based
approach to labour migration, International Migration Programme
(Geneva). Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/
106B09_343_engl.pdf [9 Feb. 2010].
Johnson, B.; Sedaca, A. 2004. Diasporas, emigrés and development: Eco-
nomic linkages and programmatic responses (Washington, DC, The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)).
145
Ch
ap
te
r5
Chapter 5: Making migration, employment and development mutually supportive
Kalita, S.M. 2009. “U.S. deters hiring of foreigners as joblessness grows”,
The Wall Street Journal, 27 Mar. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB123810912615352681.html?mod=googlenews_wsj [9 Feb. 2010].
Kapur, D. 2001. “Diasporas and technology transfer”, in Journal of Human
Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 265–286.
Ketkar, S.; Ratha, D. 2009. Innovative financing for development (Washing-
ton, DC, World Bank).
Lucas, R. 2008. Integrating migration issues into development planning, In-
ternational migration papers (Geneva, ILO).
Martin, P.L.; Martin, S.F.; Weil, P. 2006. Managing migration: The promise of
cooperation (Lanham, MD, Lexington Books).
Mathauer, I.; Imhoff, I. 2006. “Health worker motivation in Africa: The role
of non-financial incentives and human resource management tools”, in Hu-
man Resources for Health, Vol. 4, p. 24.
McCormick, B.; Wahba, J. 2001. “Overseas work experience, savings and
entrepreneurship amongst return migrants to LDCs”, in Scottish Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 164–178.
Meldrum, A. 2003. “Mugabe says we are being stolen. All we want is better
pay”, in The Observer, London. Available at: http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/uk/2003/aug/10/zimbabwe.nhs [9 Feb. 2010].
Meyer, J.-B. 2007. Building sustainability: The new frontiers of diaspora
knowledge networks, Working Paper No. 35 (Bielefeld, Center on Migra-
tion, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD)).
—.; Wattiaux, J.P. 2006. “Diaspora knowledge networks: Vanishing doubts
and increasing evidence”, in International Journal on Multicultural Societ-
ies, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 4–24.
Migration Information Source. 2009. United Kingdom: A reluctant country
of immigration. Available at: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Pro-
files/display.cfm?ID=736 [9 Feb. 2010].
Migration Policy Institute (MPI). 2009. Migration and the global recession.
Available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-BBCreport-Sept09.pdf
[9 Feb. 2010].
Musekamp, S. 2008. Migranten, migration und entwicklungspolitik-die
Französische politik des codeveloppement, Working Paper No. 50 (Bielefeld,
Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD)).
146
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Ndetei, D.-M.; Khasakhala, L.; Omolo, J.-O. 2008. Incentives for health
worker retention in Kenya: An assessment of current practice, Discussion
Paper 62 (Harare, Regional Network for Equity in Health in East and South-
ern Africa (EQUINET)). Available at: http://www.equinetafrica.org/bibl/
docs/DIS62HRndetei.pdf [9 Feb. 2010].
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2009.
2009 Annual Report on OECD Work on Policy Coherence for Development
(Paris).
Orozco, M. 2003. Worker remittances: Issues and best practices (Washing-
ton, DC, Inter-American Dialogue).
Pool, M.; Kopanja, J. 2009. “Reverse migration: Ecuador lures immigrants
back home from U.S. and Spain”, Feet in 2 Worlds, Sept. Available at:
http://feetin2worlds.wordpress.com/2009/09/04/reverse-migration-ecua-
dor-lures-immigrants-back-home-from-u-s-and-spain [9 Feb. 2010].
Powell, L.B.; Gerova, S.G. 2004. Diasporas and economic development:
State of knowledge (Washington, DC, World Bank). Available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2006/Resources/LowellDiaspora.doc
[7 Feb. 2010].
Reid, S. 2002. “Community service for health professionals”, in South Afri-
can Health Review (Durban, Health Systems Trust).
Rodrik, D. 2007. One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions,
and economic growth (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).
Sander, C.; Maimbo, S.M. 2003. Migrant labour remittances in Africa: Re-
ducing obstacles to developmental contributions, Africa Region Working
Paper Series No. 64 (Washington, DC, World Bank).
Schachter, J. 2008. Enhancing data on migration in West and Central Af-
rica (Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM)).
Selden, M. 2009. “China prepares for next surge”, in Asia Times, 3 Apr.
Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KD03Cb01.html
[7 Feb. 2010].
Tan, K.-J. 2009. Qatar introduces labor law to protect Filipino workers,
GMANews.TV, 1 Apr. Available at: http://www.gmanews.tv/story/155161/
Qatar-introduces-labor-law-to-protect-Filipino-workers [7 Feb. 2010].
Thanroor, I. 2009. “Migrant workers: A hard life gets harder”, TIME Maga-
zine, 1 Apr. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/arti-
cle/0,8599,1888774,00.html [7 Feb. 2010].
The Strait Times, 2009. Migrants paid to go home, 1 Apr. Available at:
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_357321.
html [9 Feb. 2010].
TIME Magazine. 2008. “Spain Tries to Buy Out Immigrants”, 20 Oct. Avail-
able at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852000,00.html
[9 Feb. 2010].
147
Ch
ap
te
r5
Chapter 5: Making migration, employment and development mutually supportive
Tomas, P.; Summers, L. 2009. Migrants count: Five steps toward better mi-
gration data (Washington, DC, Center for Global Development). Available
at: http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422146Orozco 2003
[9 Feb. 2010].
Understanding Children’s Work (UCW). 2009. Understanding Children’s
Work and Youth Employment outcomes in Mongolia, Country Report.
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). 2008. Youth Unemploy-
ment and Regional Insecurities in West Africa, Issue Papers.
The World Bank. 2008. “Youth and Employment in Africa: The Potential,
the Problem, the Promise” (Washington).
Zeneli, B.; Tafaj, M. 2008. Brain gain programme: Engaging the diaspora in
Albania’s development. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTALBANIA/Resources/B_Zeneli_Brain_gain.pdf [7 Feb. 2010].
Zweig, D.: Fung C.S.: Rosen S. 2005. Reverse Migration and Regional Inte-
gration:Scientists and Entrepreneurs in PRC. University of California,
Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies.
148
Making migration a development factor: The case of North and West Africa
Statistics Appendix:
Country Profiles
Country profile – Algeria
Capital Algiers
Area 2 381 741 sq km
Borders Libya (982 km)
Mali (1 376 km)
Mauritania (463 km)
Morocco (1 559 km)
Niger (956 km)
Tunisia (965 km)
Western Sahara (42 km)
Urbanization 64.6% (2007)
Land use 3.1% arable land
0.3% permanent crops
96.5% other (2005)
Membership in ILO Since 19 October 1962
Regional organizations • Arab Bank for Economic Development Africa since 1974
• African Development Bank since 1964
• Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development since 1968.
• Arab Monetary Fund since 1976
• Arab Maghreb Union since 1989
• African Union since 1963
• Islamic Development Bank since 1974
• League of Arab States since 1962
• Organization of the Islam Conference since 1969
• Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries since 1970
Economic (2008) Social (2009)
GDP (million US$) 170 452 Population (in
thousands)
34 895.5
GDP per capita (US$) 4 959 Population growth rate 1.5% (2005-2010)
GDP real growth rate 3% Population density
(inhabitants per sq km)
14.4
Major sector 1 (% GDP) Mining, manufacturing,
utilities: 53%
Age structure 0-14
15-64
65+
25.4%
69.5%
5.1%Major sector 2 (% GDP) Other activities: 13%
Major sector 3 (% GDP) Wholesale, retail trade,
restaurants and hotels:
10%
Inflation rate (GDP
deflator)
17.2% Age dependency ratio2 32.4%
Exports (US$ and % of
GDP)
52.0% Gender ratio
(men/100 women)
102
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Imports (US$ and % of
GDP)
30.0% Life expectancy at birth 72 (2007)
Household
consumption
expenditure
29.0% Under-5 mortality rate 3 37 (2007)
General government
final consumption
expenditure
13.0% Languages Arabian (official),
French, Berber dialects
Exchange rate
(IMF-based rate)
64.5 Human Development
Index rank
104th
Revenue, excluding
grants (% of GDP) 1
40.4% (2007) Poverty (% less than
US$1.25 per day) 4
6.8%(1995)
Cash surplus/deficit (%
of GDP)
6.2% (2007) Literacy (% of people
15 or over)
75% (2007)
Merchandise trade (%
of GDP)
67.5% Educational attainment
(primary and secondary
school enrolment
ratio, net) 5
Primary – male 96%
External debt stocks
(million US$)
5 541 (2007) Primary –
female
94%
Foreign direct
investment, net inflows
(million US$)
1 665 (2007) Secondary –
male
65%
Official development
assistance and official
aid (million US$)
390 (2007) Secondary –
female
68%
Labour market (2008) Migration
Labour force 14 268 000 Stock of emigrants
(% of population)
1 783 476 (2005)
(5.4%)
Economically active
(male) 6
77.0% Top destination
countries
France, Spain, Israel,
Italy, Germany,
Canada, Tunisia, United
Kingdom and BelgiumEconomically active(female)
37.7%
Employment rate 40.9% (2007) Emigration rate of
tertiary educated
6.5% (2000)
Informal employment
rate 7
45.0% (2000s)
Primary sector
employment
13.6% (2007) Inward remittances
(million US$)
2 202 (2008)
Unemployment rate 13.8% (2007) Inward remittances
( % of GDP)
1.3% (2008)
Urban unemployment
rate
14.2% (2007)
Rural unemployment
rate
13.1% (2007) Stock of immigrants
(% of population)
242 446 (2005)
(0.7%)
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151
Youth unemployment
rate (unemployment
less than 25 years old)
Total 27.4% (2007) Refugees (%
of immigrants)
69.7%
(2005)
Male – Top source
countries
–
Female –
NOTES:
1. Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues such as fines,
fees, rent and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue, but are
excluded here.
2. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population defined as dependent (the population aged
0-14 and 65 and over) divided by the total population.
3. Under-5 mortality rate is the probability of dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age
expressed per 1,000 live births.
4. Poverty is the percentage of the population living in households with consumption or income
per person below US$1.25 per day.
5. School enrolment ratio is the number of children enrolled in primary (secondary) school who
belong to the age group that officially corresponds to primary (secondary) schooling, divided by
the total population of the same age group.
6. Economically active male and female includes the economically active males and females as a
percentage of the total men and women, respectively.
7. Definition of informal employment here is slightly different than ILO Convention defined.
Statistics Appendix
Country profile – Mauritania
Capital Nouakchott
Area 1 030 700 sq km
Borders Algeria (463 km)
Mali (2 237 km)
Senegal (813 km)
Western Sahara (1 561 km)
Urbanization 40.7% (2007)
Land use 0.2 % arable land
0.0 % permanent crops
99.8% other (2005)
Membership in ILO Since 20 June 1961
Regional organizations • Arab Bank for Economic Development Africa since 1974
• African Development Bank since 1964
• Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development since 1968
• Arab Monetary Fund since 1976
• Arab Maghreb Union since 1989
• African Union since 1963. Suspended in 2008
• Council of Arab Economic Unit since 1964
• Economic Community of West African States from 1975-2000
• Islamic Development Bank since 1974
• League of Arab States since 1973
• Organization of the Islam Conference since 1969
Economic (2008) Social (2009)
GDP (million US$) 3 270 Population (in
thousands)
3 290.6
GDP per capita (US$) 1 017 Population
growth rate
2.4% (2005-2010)
GDP real growth rate 2.2% Population
density
(inhabitants per
sq km)
3.1
Major sector 1 (% GDP) Mining,
manufacturing,
utilities: 29%
Age structure 0-14
15-64
65+
41%
55.7%
3.4%
Major sector 2 (% GDP) Other activities: 28%
Major sector 3 (% GDP) Agriculture, hunting,
forestry, fishing: 18%
Inflation rate (GDP
deflator)
-2.6 (2007) Age
dependency
ratio 2
43.1%
Exports (US$ and % of
GDP)
58.0% Gender ratio
(men/100
women)
103
Imports (US$ and % of
GDP)
78.0% Life expectancy
at birth
64 (2007)
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153
Household consumption
expenditure
76.0% Under-5
mortality rate 3
119 (2007)
General government
final consumption
expenditure
23.0% Languages Arabic (official), Pulaar, Soninke,
Wolof, French, Hassaniya
Exchange rate
(IMF-based rate)
241.1 Human
Development
Index rank
154th
Revenue, excluding
grants (% of GDP) 1
- Poverty (% less
than US$1.25
per day) 4
21% (2000)
Cash surplus/deficit
(% of GDP)
- Literacy (% of
people 15 or
over)
56% (2007)
Merchandise trade
(% of GDP)
122.5% Educational
attainment
(primary and
secondary
school
enrolment
ratio, net) 5
Primary – male 78%
External debt stocks
(million US$)
1 704 (2007) Primary -
female
82%
Foreign direct
investment, net inflows
(million US$)
153 (2007) Secondary -
male
16%
Official development
assistance and official
aid (million US$)
364 (2007) Secondary -
female
15%
Labour market (2008) Migration
Labour force 1 358 000 Stock of
emigrants
(% of
population)
105 315 (2005)
(3.4%)
Economically active
(male) 6
79.7% Top destination
countries
Senegal, Nigeria, France, Spain,
Gambia, United States, Republic
of Congo, Italy Germany and
Guinea-BissauEconomically active(female)
60.3%
Employment rate 40.0% (2004) Emigration rate
of tertiary
educated
23.1% (2000)
Informal employment
rate 7
80.0% (1990s)
Primary sector
employment
34.0% (2004) Inward
remittances
(million US$)
2 (2008)
Unemployment rate 32.5% (2004) Inward
remittances
( % of GDP)
0.1% (2008)
Urban unemployment
rate
35.4% (2004)
Statistics Appendix
Rural unemployment
rate
30.2% (2004) Stock of
immigrants
(% of population)
65 889 (2005)
(2.2%)
Youth unemployment
rate (unemployment
less than 25 years old)
Total
Male
Female
-
50.8% (2004)
69.0% (2004)
Refugees
(% of
immigrants)
0.7% (2005)
Top source
countries
Senegal, Mali,
Guinea,
Algeria, France,
Guinea-Bissau,
Benin,
Cameroon,
Morocco and
Saudi Arabia
NOTES:
1. Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues such as fines,
fees, rent and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue, but are
excluded here.
2. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population defined as dependent (the population aged
0-14 and 65 and over) divided by the total population.
3. Under-5 mortality rate is the probability of dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age
expressed per 1,000 live births.
4. Poverty is the percentage of the population living in households with consumption or income
per person below US$1.25 per day.
5. School enrolment ratio is the number of children enrolled in primary (secondary) school who
belong to the age group that officially corresponds to primary (secondary) schooling, divided by
the total population of the same age group.
6. Economically active male and female includes the economically active males and females as a
percentage of the total men and women, respectively.
7. Definition of informal employment here is slightly different than ILO Convention defined.
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Country profile – Morocco
Capital Rabat
Area 446 550 sq km
Borders Algeria (1 559 km)
Western Sahara (443 km)
Spain (15.9 km)
Urbanization 55.7% (2007)
Land use 19% arable land
2% permanent crops
79% other (2005)
Membership in ILO Since 13 June 1956
Regional organizations • Arab Bank for Economic Development Africa since 1974
• African Development Bank since 1964
• Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development since 1968
• Arab Monetary Fund since 1976
• Arab Maghreb Union since 1989
• Islamic Development Bank since 1974
• League of Arab States since 1958
• Organization of the Islam Conference since 1969
Economic (2008) Social (2009)
GDP (million US$) 86 590 Population (in
thousands)
31 992.6
GDP per capita (US$) 2 740 Population growth rate 1.2%
GDP real growth rate 5.4 % Population density
(inhabitants per sq
km)
70.8
Major sector 1 (% GDP) Other activities: 38% Age structure 0-14 30%
Major sector 2 (% GDP) Mining, utilities: 20% 15-64 64.7%
Major sector 3 (% GDP) Manufacturing: 15% 65+ 5.2%
Inflation rate
(GDP deflator)
3.1% Age dependency
ratio 2
34.1%
Exports
(US$ and % of GDP)
38% Gender ratio (men/100
women)
97
Imports
(US$ and % GDP)
53% Life expectancy at
birth
71 (2007)
Household consumption
expenditure
64% Under-5 mortality
rate 3
34 (2007)
General government
final consumption
expenditure
19% Languages Arabic, Berber dialects,
French, Spanish
Statistics Appendix
Exchange rates
(IMF-based rate)
7.7 Human Development
Index rank
130th
Revenue, excluding
grants
(% of GDP) 1
34.8% (2007) Poverty (% less than
US$1.25 per day) 4
2.5% (2007)
Cash surplus/deficit
(% of GDP)
2.5% (2007) Literacy (% of people
15 or over)
56% (2007)
Merchandise trade
(% of GDP)
71.5%
Educational
attainment (primary
and secondary school
enrolment ratio, net) 5
Primary –
male
91%
External debt stocks
(million US$)
20 255 (2007) Primary –
female
85%
Foreign direct
investment, net inflows
(million US$)
2 807 (2007) Secondary
– male
37%
Official development
assistance and official
aid (million US$)
1 090 (2007) Secondary
– female
32%
Labour market (2008) Migration
Labour force 11 561 000 Stock of emigrants
(% of population)
2 718 665 (2005)
(8.6%)
Economically active
(male) 6
79.8% Top destination
countries
France, Spain, Italy, Israel,
Netherlands, Germany,
Belgium, United States,
Canada and Saudi ArabiaEconomically active(female)
24.7%
Employment rate 51.0% Emigration rate of
tertiary educated
10.3% (2000)
Informal employment
rate 7
67.1% (2000s)
Primary sector
employment
43.2% Inward remittances
(million US$)
6 891 (2008)
Unemployment rate 9.6% (2007) Inward remittances
(% of GDP)
8.0% (2008)
Urban unemployment
rate
15.4% (2007)
Rural unemployment
rate
3.7% (2007) Stock of immigrants
(% of population)
131 564 (2005)
(0.4%)
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Youth unemployment
rate (unemployment
less than 25 years old)
Total 31.5% (2007) Refugees
(% of
immigrants)
1.6% (2005)
Male 40.5% (2007) Top source
countries
–
Female 35.9% (2007)
NOTES:
1. Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues such as fines,
fees, rent and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue, but are
excluded here.
2. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population defined as dependent (the population aged
0-14 and 65 and over) divided by the total population.
3. Under-5 mortality rate is the probability of dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age
expressed per 1,000 live births.
4. Poverty is the percentage of the population living in households with consumption or income
per person below US$1.25 per day.
5. School enrolment ratio is the number of children enrolled in primary (secondary) school who
belong to the age group that officially corresponds to primary (secondary) schooling, divided by
the total population of the same age group.
6. Economically active male and female includes the economically active males and females as a
percentage of the total men and women, respectively.
7. Definition of informal employment here is slightly different than ILO Convention defined.
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Country profile – Senegal
Capital Dakar
Area 196 722 sq km
Borders The Gambia (740 km)
Guinea (330 km)
Guinea Bissau (338 km)
Mali (419 km)
Mauritania (813 km)
Urbanization 42.0% (2007)
Land use 12.5 % arable land
0.2 % permanent crops
87.3 % other (2005)
Membership in ILO Since 4 November 1960
Regional organizations • African Development Bank since 1964
• African Union since 1963
• Economic Community of West African States since 1975
• Islamic Development Bank since 1974
• Organization of the Islam Conference since 1969
• West African Economic and Monetary Union since 1994
• West African Development Bank since 1973
Economic (2008) Social (2009)
GDP (million US$) 13 288 Population (in
thousands)
12 534.2
GDP per capita (US$) 1 088 Population growth rate 2.6%
GDP real growth rate 2.5% Population density
(inhabitants per sq
km)
64.7
Major sector 1 (% GDP) Other
activities: 29%
Age structure 0-14 42.2%
Major sector 2 (% GDP) Wholesale,
retail trade,
restaurants
and hotels:
21%
15-64 54.8%
Major sector 3 (% GDP) Mining,
manufacturing,
utilities: 18%
65+ 3%
Inflation rate (GDP deflator) 7.3% Age dependency ratio 2 45.7%
Exports (US$ and % of GDP) 25.0% Gender ratio (men/100
women)
98
Imports (US$ and % GDP) 47.0% Life expectancy at
birth
63 (2007)
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Household consumption
expenditure
76.0% Under-5 mortality rate 3 114 (2007)
General government final
consumption expenditure
16.0% Languages French (official), Wolof,
Jola, Pulaar and Mandinka
Exchange rates
(IMF-based rate)
447.8 Human Development
Index rank
166th
Revenue, excluding grants
(% of GDP) 1
16.9% (2000) Poverty (% less than
US$1.25 per day) 4
33.5% (2007)
Cash surplus/deficit
(% of GDP)
-0.9% (2000) Literacy (% of people
15 or over)
42% (2007)
Merchandise trade
(% of GDP)
61.3%
Educational
attainment (primary
and secondary school
enrolment ratio, net) 5
Primary –
male
71%
(2000-2007)
External debt stocks
(million $US)
2 588 (2007) Primary –
female
70%
Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (million US$)
78 (2007) Secondary –
male
23%
Official development
assistance and official aid
(million US$)
843 (2007) Secondary –
female
18%
Labour market (2008) Migration
Labour force 5 484 000 Stock of emigrants
(% of population)
463 403 (2005)
(4.0%)
Economically active (male) 6 86.0% Top destination
countries
Gambia, France, Italy,
Mauritania, Spain, Gabon,
United States, Republic of
Congo, Guinea-Bissau and
Nigeria
Economically active (female) 61.8%
Employment rate 38.7% (2006) Emigration rate of
tertiary educated
24.1% (2000)
Informal employment rate –
Primary sector employment 55.4% Inward remittances
(million US$)
1 288 (2008)
Unemployment rate 10.0% (2006) Inward remittances
(% of GDP)
9.8% (2008)
Urban unemployment rate Dakar: 15.9%
(2006),
Other cities:
11.9% (2006)
Rural unemployment rate 6.3% (2006) Stock of immigrants
(% of population)
325 940 (2005)
(2.8%)
159
Statistics Appendix
Youth
unemployment
rate
(unemployment
less than 25
years old)
15.0% (2006)
–
–
Refugees
(% of immigrants)
6.4% (2005)
Top source countries Guinea, Mauritania,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
France, Cape Verde,
Gambia, Morocco, Syrian
Arab Republic and United
States
NOTES:
1. Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues such as fines, fees,
rent and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue, but are excluded
here.
2. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population defined as dependent (the population aged
0-14 and 65 and over) divided by the total population.
3. Under-5 mortality rate is the probability of dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed
per 1,000 live births.
4. Poverty is the percentage of the population living in households with consumption or income per
person below $1.25 per day.
5. School enrolment ratio is the number of children enrolled in primary (secondary) school who belong
to the age group that officially corresponds to primary (secondary) schooling, divided by the
total population of the same age group.
6. Economically active male and female includes the economically active males and females as a
percentage of the total men and women, respectively.
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Country profile – Tunisia
Capital Tunis
Area 163 610 sq km
Borders ALGERIA (965 km)
LIBYA (459 km)
Urbanization 66.1% (2007)
Land use 17.0 % arable land
13.1 % permanent crops
69.9 % other (2005)
Membership in ILO Since 1956
Regional organizations • Arab Bank for Economic Development Africa since 1974
• African Development Bank since 1964
• Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development since 1968
• Arab Monetary Fund since 1976
• Arab Maghreb Union since 1989
• African Union since 1963
• Islamic Development Bank since 1974
• League of Arab States since 1958
• Organization of the Islam Conference since 1969
• Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries from 1982 to
1986
Economic (2008) Social (2009)
GDP (million US$) 39 415 Population (in
thousands)
10 271.5
GDP per capita (US$) 3 846 Population growth
rate
1.0%
GDP real growth rate 6.1% Population density
(inhabitants per sq
km)
63.8
Major sector 1 (% GDP) Other activities: 28%
Age structure
0-14 22.7%
Major sector 2 (% GDP) Mining, utilities: 26% 15-64 70.1%
Major sector 3 (% GDP) Manufacturing: 18% 65+ 7.2%
Inflation rate (GDP deflator) 2.4% Age dependency
ratio 2
30.5%
Exports (US$ and % of GDP) 54.0% Gender ratio
(men/100 women)
101
Imports (US$ and % GDP) 57.0% Life expectancy at
birth
74 (2007)
Household consumption
expenditure
63.0% Under-5 mortality
rate4
21 (2007)
General government final
consumption expenditure
14.0% Languages Arabic (official),
French
Statistics Appendix
Exchange rates
(IMF-based rate)
1.2 Human Development
Index rank
98th
Revenue, excluding grants
(% of GDP) 1
28.7% Poverty (% less than
US$1.25 per day) 4
2.6% (2000)
Cash surplus/deficit
(% of GDP)
-3.2% Literacy (% of people
15 or over)
78% (2007)
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 109.3%
Educational
attainment (primary
and secondary
school enrolment
ratio) 5
Primary –
male
96%
(2000-20
07)
External debt stocks
(million US$)
20 231 (2007) Primary –
female
97%
Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (million US$)
1 620 (2007) Secondary
– male
61%
Official development
assistance and official aid
(million US$)
310 (2007) Secondary
– female
68%
Labour market (2008) Migration
Labour force 3 836 000 Stock of emigrants
(% of population)
623 221 (2005)
(6.2%)
Economically active (male) 6 71.0% Top destination
countries
France, Libya,
Germany, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Italy, United
States, Switzerland,
Canada and Belgium
Economically active (female) 26.1%
Employment rate 39.7% Emigration rate of
tertiary educated
9.6% (2000)
Informal employment rate 7 35.0% (2000s)
Primary sector employment 18.3% Inward remittances
(million US$)
1 870 (2008)
Unemployment rate 14.1% (2007) Inward remittances
(% of GDP)
4.7% (2008)
Urban unemployment rate –
Rural unemployment rate – Stock of immigrants
(% of population)
37 858 (2005)
(0.4%)
Youth unemployment rate
(unemployment less than 25
years old)
Total 15-19 age: 34.1%
(2007),
20–24 age: 30.2%
(2007)
Refugees
(% of
immigrants)
0.2%
(2005)
Male – Top source
countries
Algeria,
Morocco,
France,
Italy and
Libya
Female –
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NOTES:
1. Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions and other revenues such as fines, fees,
rent and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue, but are excluded
here.
2. Age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population defined as dependent (the population aged
0-14 and 65 and over) divided by the total population.
3. Under-5 mortality rate is the probability of dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed
per 1,000 live births.
4. Poverty is the percentage of the population living in households with consumption or income
per person below US$1.25 per day.
5. School enrolment ratio is the number of children enrolled in primary (secondary) school who belong
to the age group that officially corresponds to primary (secondary) schooling, divided by the total
population of the same age group.
6. Economically active male and female includes the economically active males and females as a
percentage of the total men and women, respectively.
7. Definition of informal employment here is slightly different than ILO Convention defined.
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Selected statistical databases
General
Capital, area, land use and borders: The World Factbook, Central
Intelligence Agency (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook) [19 Jan. 2010].
Urbanization: United Nations Population Division
(http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2007/2007_ur-
ban_rural_chart.xls) [8 Jan. 2010].
Membership in ILO: International Labour Organization
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/spanish/mstatess.htm) [19 Jan. 2010].
Regional organizations: Présidence de la République Algérienne
Démocratique et Populaire (http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/algerie/
algeriefr.htm); Arab Bank for Economic Development Africa (http://
www.badea.org); African Development Bank (http://www.afdb.org), Arab
Found for Economic and Social Development (http://www.arabfund.org),
Arab Monetary Fund (http://www.amf.org.ae), Arab Maghreb Union
(http://www. maghrebarabe.org/en), African Union (http://www.africa-
union.org), Islamic Development Bank (http://www.isdb.org), League of
Arab States (http://www.arableagueonline.org), Organization of the Islam
Conference (http://www.oic-oci.org) and Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (http://www.oapecorg.org) [19 Jan. 2010].
Economic
GDP, sector, imports, exports, exchange rates, consumption and gross capi-
tal formation: United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Section
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/SelectionCountry.asp) [19 Jan. 2010].
Inflation rate: World Bank – Key Development Data and Statistics
(http://go.worldbank.org/4C55Z0H7Z0) [19 Jan. 2010].
Revenue, excluding grants, cash surplus/deficit, merchandise trade, exter-
nal debt stocks, foreign direct investment, net inflows and official develop-
ment assistance and official aid: World Bank – Key Development Data and
Statistics (http://go.worldbank.org/4C55Z0H7Z0) [19 Jan. 2010].
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Social
Population and related: Nations Statistics Division, Social Indicators Section
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/popula-
tion.htm) [19 Jan. 2010].
Age structure and dependency ratio: Laborstat, Economically Active Popu-
lation Estimates and Projections (http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8
/data/EAPEP/eapep_E.html) [19 Jan. 2010].
Gender ratio: Nations Statistics Division, Social Indicators Section
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/popula-
tion.htm) [19 Jan. 2010].
Life expectancy at birth: UNICEF, Statistics and Monitoring
(http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry) [19 Jan. 2010].
Under-5 mortality rate: UNICEF, Statistics and Monitoring
(http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry) [19 Jan. 2010].
Religions: The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/
2147rank.html) [19 Jan. 2010].
Human Development Index rank: PNUD – Human Development Reports
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics) [19 Jan. 2010].
Poverty: World Bank – Povcalnet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/povcalnet)
year 2005 [19 Jan. 2010].
Literacy: Human Development Report 2009 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/me-
dia/HDR_2009_EN_complete.pdf), year 1999-2007 [19 Jan. 2010]
Educational attainment: UNICEF, Statistics and Monitoring
(http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry), year 2000-2007 [19 Jan. 2010].
Migration
Stock of emigrants, top destination countries, emigration rate of tertiary ed-
ucated, stock of immigrants, refugees as % of immigrants, and Top source
countries: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008
(www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances) [05 Feb. 2010].
Inward remittances: World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 11,
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-111
0315015165/ MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf), 3 November 2009
[5 Feb. 2010].
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markets, can better support development prospects. It is based 
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? To what extent has the global crisis which started in 2008 
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emigration of skilled migrants with little benefits for developing 
countries?  
? By putting decent work at the core of the development aid 
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